Assessment of the MKUKUTA and MKUZA Monitoring and Evaluation Systems

Final Draft Report

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**Abbreviations**

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANGOZA</td>
<td>Association of NGOs of Zanzibar</td>
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<td>LGA</td>
<td>Local Government Authorities</td>
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<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>MAIR</td>
<td>MKUKUTA Annual Implementation Report</td>
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<td>M-AIR</td>
<td>MKUZA Annual Implementation Report</td>
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<td>MDA</td>
<td>Ministries, Departments and Agencies</td>
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<td>MKUKUTA</td>
<td>Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini Tanzania (Tanzania Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction)</td>
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<td>MKUZA</td>
<td>Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini Zanzibar (Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction)</td>
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<td>MOFEA</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs</td>
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<td>MTEF</td>
<td>Medium Term Expenditure Framework</td>
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<td>NBS</td>
<td>National Bureau of Statistics</td>
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<td>OCGS</td>
<td>Office of the Chief Government Statistician (Zanzibar)</td>
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<td>PED</td>
<td>Poverty Eradication Division</td>
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<td>PEED</td>
<td>Poverty Eradication and Empowerment Division (in MOFEA)</td>
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<td>PER</td>
<td>Public Expenditure Review</td>
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<td>PHDR</td>
<td>Poverty and Human Development Report</td>
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<td>PIP</td>
<td>Public Investment Programme</td>
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<td>PMMP</td>
<td>Poverty Monitoring Master Plan</td>
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<td>PMS</td>
<td>Poverty Monitoring System</td>
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<td>PRS</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>PSDA</td>
<td>Participatory Service Delivery Assessment</td>
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<td>REPOA</td>
<td>Research on Poverty Alleviation</td>
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<td>TANGO</td>
<td>Tanzanian Association of NGOs</td>
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<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<td>TSED</td>
<td>Tanzania Socio-Economic Database</td>
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<td>TSMP</td>
<td>Tanzania Statistical Master Plan</td>
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<td>TWG</td>
<td>Technical Working Group</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>ZAC</td>
<td>Zanzibar AIDS Commission</td>
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<td>ZIFA</td>
<td>Zanzibar Institute of Finance and Administration</td>
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<td>ZPRP</td>
<td>Zanzibar Poverty Reduction Plan</td>
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Acknowledgment and disclaimer

The assessment team is grateful for the guidance and support received from the Director and all staff of the Poverty Eradication and Empowerment Division (PEED) in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (MOFEA). We also owe our gratitude to the many people who readily gave their time to be interviewed for this assessment – we include a list of their names in annex B.

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors, in their individual capacity. These views do not necessarily coincide with Government of Tanzania’s views, or indeed with the organisations with which the assessment team members are associated.
Executive summary

In 2010, the policy documents setting out the approach of the Government of Tanzania Mainland and Zanzibar towards poverty reduction and economic growth – MKUKUTA and MKUZA – will come to the end of their implementation period. To assess progress to date and to inform successor strategies, Government commissioned a series of reviews, including one on the MKUKUTA and MKUZA monitoring and evaluation arrangements. The purpose of this assessment was to review the effectiveness and efficiency of the MKUKUTA and MKUZA M&E systems, highlighting achievements, outstanding challenges, and lessons learned.

By way of overview, we present the key achievements, challenges, opportunities and threats faced by MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E as we observe them. They are summarised in the table below.

Table I: Achievements, challenges, opportunities and threats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Achievements</th>
<th>Challenges</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Tanzania no longer a ‘data poor’ country</td>
<td>• Incentives for production, analysis, interpretation and use of data remain weak</td>
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<td>• A long-term survey plan that is adhered to in broad terms, producing important and robust data sets</td>
<td>• The evidence-based decision making ‘mindset’ has not yet taken root firmly</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Series of high quality Poverty and Human Development Reports that shed new light on economic growth and poverty reduction and inform policy dialogue (and possibly some policy decisions)</td>
<td>• There is still a ‘missing middle’ in the MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&amp;E</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Series of MKUKUTA/MKUZA Annual Implementation Reports of increasing quality</td>
<td>• The ‘E’ in MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&amp;E is underdeveloped</td>
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<td>• Poverty Policy Weeks established as an important opportunity for stakeholder engagement</td>
<td>• Access to data and information is seen as problematic – the communication function needs strengthening</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunities</th>
<th>Threats</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Integration of MKUKUTA/MKUZA into one joint strategy</td>
<td>• MKUKUTA II could fail to gain acceptance as the single overarching policy framework for economic growth and poverty reduction</td>
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<td>• The Government approach to Planning, Budgeting and Reporting provides a unified approach to M&amp;E across Government and can facilitate monitoring of cross-sectoral strategies such as MKUKUTA, the CCM Manifesto, the MDGs, Kilimo Kwanza etc</td>
<td>• TSMP could starve the non-S&amp;C aspects of the MMS of finances</td>
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<td>• TSMP will further strengthen statistical production, building on MMS achievements</td>
<td>• Antagonistic approach by civil society might weaken appetite for evidence-based decision making in Government</td>
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<td>• More recognised M&amp;E posts and units in Government</td>
<td>• Planning, Budgeting and Reporting manual might fail to find an incentive framework to aid implementation</td>
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<td>• Growing number of CSO initiatives to analyse and disseminate evidence and facilitate citizen’s feedback</td>
<td>• Integration of MKUKUTA and MKUZA might fail</td>
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<td>• New institutional home for the MKUKUTA II Secretariat</td>
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Achievements

The first point to make is that there is a lot to celebrate and be genuinely proud of in the MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E arrangements. In the years since 2001, with the PMS was first put in place, major gains have been made in data production, analysis and utilisation. These gains have not been limited to the immediate context of the PRSP/ZPRP, MKUKUTA/MKUZA. There have been wider gains in terms of statistical production and the establishment of an evidence-based decision making culture in Tanzania.

The first observation that is apparent when comparing the late 1990s to the present situation is that Tanzania is no longer a country poor in data and information related to economic growth and poverty reduction. The efforts under the PMS and MMS have contributed in great measure to this change. The establishment of a multi-year survey plan has rationalised the work of the National Bureau of Statistics and the Office of the Chief Government Statistician and made survey activity much more strategic and responsive to national information needs and priorities. In the 1990s, in the absence of a deliberate, strategic approach to survey planning, survey implementation was ad hoc. Which survey was conducted when was largely determined by the availability of development partner funding. As a result, there were very long intervals between surveys that had limited donor interest (labour force surveys, for example) and for those topics that had ample development partner interest, such as health, overlapping or duplicating surveys were sometimes organised. An associated problem linked to this strong reliance on external funding for surveys, in the absence of a longer-term plan reflecting national needs and priorities, was that development partners exerted too much influence over the design and implementation of the surveys, sometimes making choices that were wasteful of resources. Finally, a reliance on development partner funds meant that exorbitant amounts of time were spent on mobilising funds and reporting back to development partners. The multi-year survey plan went a long way in addressing these concerns. In some ways the multi-year survey plan under the PMS/MMS was a stepping stone towards the Tanzania Statistical Master Plan, which is now under preparation. It will follow the logic that first led to the multi-year survey plan, but will extend it further to come up with a plan that extends beyond the information needs of MKUKUTA/MKUZA.

The multi-year survey plan has broadly been implemented as planned and as a result there is now a series of robust data sets on key indicators related to economic growth and poverty reduction, providing time series on many of these indicators. The analysis and reporting on these data sets has also been strengthened. Under the leadership of the Research and Analysis TWG, four Poverty and Human Development Reports have now been published. These reports are of good and improving quality and have made a real contribution to the public policy debate on economic growth and poverty reduction. For example, thinking first put forward on geographical disparities in Tanzania is now part of mainstream thinking and has informed the geographical focus of investment decisions, including those by development partners. The thinking on drivers of economic growth in the PHDR has been influential in Government thinking on how best to promote growth. Apart from the PHDRs, the improved availability of data and analysis has fed into the MKUKUTA /MKUZA Annual Implementation Reports, which have become increasingly more timely, analytical and informative since the first PRSP progress reports were published.

Another major innovation brought about by the PMS/MMS is the establishment of an annual event at which Government interacts with Development Partners, CSOs and others to take stock of the implementation of MKUKUTA/MKUZA. The Poverty Policy Weeks provide an opportunity for a frank exchange of views on the key findings of the MMS and have deepened the involvement of stakeholders in policy making on economic growth and poverty reduction.

The MKUKUTA/MKUZA Secretariats report to the Parliament/House of Representatives annually on what has been accomplished in the previous year and what is to be done next year. The involvement of Law Makers in MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E is an important innovation which strengthens domestic accountability around these strategies considerably.

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Challenges

Despite the considerable achievements, many challenges remain for evidence-based public policy making. The most critical challenge facing MKUKUTA and MKUZA M&E is that the incentives for the production of robust data, its analysis, interpretation and use remain relatively weak in Tanzanian Government. This is especially the case for data generated by routine data systems in MDAs and LGAs. The evidence-based decision-making mindset has not really taken hold yet. This is hardly surprising given the relatively short period of time the PMS/MMS have been operational and the fact that the entrenched way of doing business in Government will take a long time to change. There is still a lot of data collection and reporting as a mere formality, with those who could put the evidence to the best possible use often not empowered to actually utilise it. There are also still strong incentives to downplay, hide or question unpalatable information. The disappointing results on income poverty from the 2007 Household Budget Survey are a case in point. Wide dissemination to a variety of stakeholders, easy access to data sets and published documents, capacity building can all help to further strengthen the culture of evidence-based decision-making. Strengthened demand for accountability by Parliament and from civil society will also help. And within Government, linking evidence on performance to budget allocations and other aspects of performance management will make a difference. But nobody will deny that this will require long-term efforts and that there will be many set-backs along the way. The challenge of transforming the Government decision making culture and basing it more firmly on evidence goes well beyond MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E. This is why those with an interest in MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E would be wise to support Government efforts at rationalising planning, budgeting and reporting in Government more broadly. If these efforts succeed, MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E will become straightforward.

Many PRS monitoring systems around the world have been criticised for having a ‘missing middle’ – and the Tanzanian PMS/MMS is no exception (Booth and Lucas, 2002). The criticism implies that PRS monitoring systems have over-emphasised both the outcome indicators that track various aspects of poverty – as this is what PRSs generally aim to change – and a number of input or activity-related indicators – as this is what can be monitored without much effort on an annual basis. But there is little effort to track how inputs are transformed into outcomes, while this is the information that would be most relevant to policy makers. It is good to know what happens to the poverty headcount ratio and mortality rates, but often trend data for these high level indicators is not ‘actionable’. What has led to the minor reduction in mortality rates in one part of the country, while they are stagnant in other parts? Why has MKUKUTA implementation not led to more rapid reductions in the poverty headcount ratio? With the ‘middle’ missing, it is impossible to answer these questions. The MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E arrangements still suffer from this problem, and it needs to be addressed in the next iteration of the strategies and the associated M&E arrangements.

A related challenge is that, although we speak of MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E arrangements, the evaluation function is rather underdeveloped. The work of the Research and Analysis Working Group addresses evaluation questions to some extent, but in a fairly ad hoc manner. Evaluation questions that might usefully be asked regarding MKUKUTA/MKUZA include:

- Has the implementation of MKUKUTA/MKUZA led to noticeable changes in outcome/impact indicators?
- Has MKUKUTA/MKUZA led to significant reallocations in Government budgets and boosted pro-poor expenditure?
- Do the assumptions behind MKUKUTA/MKUZA and its implicit theory of change hold in the light of evidence over nearly a decade of implementation?
- Has MKUKUTA/MKUZA enhanced the efficiency of Government spending?

The next iteration of the strategies and their M&E arrangements would benefit from boosting the evaluation function. Scientific policy evaluations using control group design are particularly powerful to inform policy choices and should be considered. Ex ante poverty and social impact assessments could also play an important role before major policy changes are introduced. For the next phase of MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E, an evaluation strategy could be developed, perhaps led by the Research and Analysis Working Group. Training on evaluation might be provided and a fund established to finance evaluations. The Tanzania Evaluation Association is a resource that can be
used to strengthen the evaluation function of the MMS.

Several stakeholders interviewed for this assessment, particularly those from civil society and academia, complained about poor accessibility of data and published documents. This undermines the MMS, as it limits stakeholder involvement, second-level analysis, public debate and challenge, and also faith and confidence in how trustworthy the MMS evidence is. Part of this criticism is aimed at the availability of raw data sets from the National Bureau of Statistics and the Office of the Chief Government Statistician. Stakeholders complain of a lack of clarity on data access and difficulties in getting approval for the use of data sets in a timely manner. As part of the implementation of the Tanzania Statistical Master Plan, development of a transparent and liberal data access policy would be beneficial. There is also a genuine concern that the outputs of the MMS and documents related to the monitoring process (such as meeting minutes) are not easily accessible. The Poverty Monitoring Website, which used to serve as portal for these documents, has not been updated for about a year. Some civil society stakeholders pointed out it is easier to find relevant documents on development partner websites than on Government websites. This situation should be relatively straightforward to fix and should take high priority as difficulty in accessing the outputs of the MMS undermines its very purpose.

Another challenge we observed is in the funding arrangements for MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E. On the mainland, funding for the MMS is provided from Government’s own resources, by development partners through a pooled fund administered by Government, and by development partners contributing directly to TWGs. The pooled fund was supposed to simplify the administration of development partner contributions for the MMS, but it has not achieved this. Its hybrid nature — using Government systems but with earmarking of funds and significant involvement in development partners in the governance of the funds — has resulted in adding rather than reducing complexity in the funding arrangements. Government contributions for the MMS have been below expectations. The Tanzania Statistical Master Plan is expected to lead to the establishment of a new pooled fund. If this goes ahead, a very large proportion of the funds currently channelled through the MMS pooled fund will be redirected to the TSMP pooled fund. Some of our interlocutors expressed fear that this would lead to the MMS being starved of resources. We will revisit this point in some detail below.

The final challenge we have identified is that the capacity in both the MKUKUTA and MKUZA Secretariats is severely constrained. The staff complement of the Secretariats is insufficient, working conditions and incentives are poor, and there is limited capacity building support on offer. This is a curious situation given the weight of the work load falling to the Secretariats and the stated centrality of MKUKUTA/MKUZA and the associated M&E arrangements. Capacity constraints in the Secretariats have a noticeable impact on the effectiveness of the MMS and shoring up the capacity of these Secretariats should be a priority for Government in the next phase of MKUKUTA/MKUZA.

Opportunities

Fortunately there are also a number of newly emerging opportunities to deal with the challenges and threats faced by the MMS. The first is the opportunity to integrate MKUKUTA and MKUZA, for which on the basis of our interviews many stakeholders seem to have an appetite. The time frame for MKUZA was deliberately set for four instead of five years to synchronise the end dates of MKUKUTA and MKUZA. It is well beyond the remit of this assessment to take a view on the constitutional issues that might complicate such an integration. Suffice it to say that currently, poverty reduction is not a Union matter. But there is little if any difference between the broad approach taken by Tanzania Mainland and Zanzibar to economic growth and poverty reduction, so integration would seem feasible, and definitely sensible from a purely practical point of view. If a fully integrated poverty reduction and growth strategy is not feasible, at the very least a ‘two in one’ document should be attempted. For MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E, an integration would be very welcome. The replication of the complete institutional architecture for MMS on Zanzibar is too heavy for the reality in Zanzibar. The various TWGs on Zanzibar have found it difficult to maintain their membership, meet regularly and deliver core outputs. Separate institutional arrangements for MKUKUTA and MKUZA M&E also inhibit mutual learning and can complicate planning for
Tanzanian national data production. From an M&E point of view, integration of MKUKUTA and MKUZA would therefore be a welcome development. If the Constitution and political realities allow, it would be worthwhile to explore the possibility to establish a joint MKUKUTA/MKUZA Secretariat, perhaps located in a part of Government with a mandate over Union matters.

The Government approach to Planning, Budgeting and Reporting is another major opportunity for MKUKUTA/MKUZA and their M&E. The new Planning, Budgeting and Reporting manual provides a unified approach to M&E across Government and can facilitate monitoring of cross-sectoral strategies such as MKUKUTA, the CCM Manifesto, the MDGs etc. The roll-out of this new approach is not without its challenges, yet it presents the single most important opportunity to strengthen M&E and evidence-based decision-making across Government, thus directly addressing the major constraint we have identified for MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E – that of limited incentives for the production, analysis and use of robust evidence. Therefore, a close association between MMS and this new approach is critical and the MKUKUTA/MKUZA Secretariats should prioritise facilitating the roll-out of the new approach in any way they can.

We have already referred to the Tanzania Statistical Master Plan as major new development since the MKUKUTA/MKUZA Master Plans were written. In our view, the TSMP will further strengthen statistical production, building very clearly on MMS achievements. This should be seen as an opportunity rather than a threat. MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E can only benefit from better statistical production and a stronger NBS and OCGS, as long as statistical production is made relevant to the data and information needs of MKUKUTA/MKUZA. The interface between MMS and TSMP will need considerable thought in the design of the M&E system for the follow-up strategy to MKUKUTA and MKUZA. There is a need to look in particular at the institutional framework and at the funding arrangements.

Another welcome development is that a growing number of M&E posts is being established by Government, including at senior level, with the appointment of M&E specialists at Assistant Director level in various Ministries. But while M&E is clearly gaining ground, there is no Government ‘cadre’ of M&E staff yet, nor is there clarity on entry level requirements. There are also few opportunities in Tanzania to study M&E at University, resulting in a situation where virtually anyone can call themselves an M&E officer or adviser. We would recommend the establishment of a Government cadre of M&E professionals, which would automatically lead to the formulation and enforcement of standards. A formal training path for M&E professionals needs to be developed.

Another opportunity is the growing interest in civil society to analyse and disseminate evidence and facilitate citizen’s feedback. The Policy Forum and Twaweza are but two examples of this growing interest. This should be welcomed as it will deepen public debate on policy choices and will provide opportunities to strengthen the use of evidence in decision making. But the challenge of data accessibility needs to be overcome to make it possible for CSOs to analyse and disseminate evidence and facilitate citizen’s feedback.

The final opportunity we want to mention is that the MKUKUTA Secretariat now has its home in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs. The PMS Secretariat was first established in the Vice President’s Office, where the Poverty Eradication Division was located at the time. When the Ministry of Planning and Economic Empowerment was created, this Division moved there, and the MKUKUTA Secretariat moved with it. In the most recent Government restructuring, PED became the Poverty Eradication and Empowerment Division (PEED) and was placed in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs. The opportunity this offers is to integrate MKUKUTA M&E much more closely into the budgeting, MTEF and PER processes. MOFEA also plays a critical role in rolling out and managing the new approach to Government Planning, Budgeting and Reporting, which again provides opportunities for close integration with MKUKUTA M&E. To exploit this opportunity, some policy entrepreneurship is required to ensure that PEED and the MKUKUTA Secretariat are sufficiently central to MOFEA business. This might require lifting PEED up the hierarchy in MOFEA and moving it physically to be housed in the main MOFEA building. This would enable PEED and the MKUKUTA Secretariat to play a critical role in strengthening results-based management and evidence-based decision-making throughout Government, which would
address the key challenge to MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E – the weak incentive framework for the production, analysis and use of robust evidence.

**Threats**

Finally there are a number of threats that could undermine the achievements of the MMS to date and hamper its further development. There are doubts amongst stakeholders if MKUKUTA/MKUZA truly are the central, overarching policy documents that they claim to be. Some see political party manifestos and the Kilimo Kwanza initiative as competitors for MKUKUTA/MKUZA II. If MKUKUTA/MKUZA II fail to gain acceptance as the single overarching policy frameworks for economic growth and poverty reduction, this will clearly impact severely on the MMS as well. It is therefore critical for Government to communicate swiftly and clearly to all stakeholders how new initiatives interrelate with MKUKUTA/MKUZA and what level of centrality MKUKUTA/MKUZA II may expect in the policy making process.

Another threat is that TSMP could starve the non-Surveys and Census aspects of the MMS of finances. Currently, the lion’s share of the MMS Pooled Fund is allocated to the Surveys and Census TWG. If development partners fund surveys and the census through the TSMP pooled fund, this would leave the MMS pooled fund rather depleted. There is a risk that contributions from development partners for the other aspects of the MMS might not be forthcoming. As we have seen, there are quite a few misgivings about the MMS pooled fund, so Government might consider abolishing it, but not before the TSMP pooled fund is up and running and a guaranteed source of funds has been found for the other parts of the MMS. One option would be to mobilise resources for the MMS under the TSMP pooled fund. Another option would be for Government to make a more significant contribution to the MMS budget, perhaps backed up by a commitment in the GBS performance assessment framework.

We highlighted the growing interest of civil society in data analysis and feedback mechanisms as an opportunity. But there is an associated risk with this growing civil society interest. If civil society engagement is too antagonistic, it may well weaken the appetite for evidence-based decision making in Government. The last Household Budget Survey is an example: it drew an overly critical engagement from non-Governmental stakeholders and caused Government to react defensively. This kind of aggressive engagement may lead to current opportunities for policy dialogue closing, for Government to be less forthcoming with evidence, and for unpalatable information to be suppressed. None of this helps to further the underlying principles of the MMS.

The Planning, Budgeting and Reporting manual was also highlighted as opportunity, but it is facing some implementation challenges. It might fail to find an incentive framework to aid implementation. The MKUKUTA/MKUZA process can play a critical role in preventing this, by integrating MMS and the Planning, Budgeting and Reporting process closely and supporting the role out of the latter.

Finally, integration of MKUKUTA and MKUZA is also an opportunity, but if it fails it will become a threat.
Recommendations

The assessment has resulted in a large number of recommendations, which are presented here in summary under the headings of the main report. Each recommendation is explained in more detail in the main text. Not all of these recommendations are of equal importance and the ones that are most critical for the next phase of MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E are highlighted in bold. In summary, the most important recommendations focus on:

- the continued centrality of MKUKUTA/MKUZA to Government’s efforts to promote economic growth and poverty reduction
- strengthening the incentive framework for the production, interpretation and utilisation of robust evidence in Government decision making, using the Government guidelines on planning, budgeting and reporting as entry point
- boosting the capacity of the MKUKUTA/MKUZA Secretariats in line with the importance of their function
- Re-invigorate the Technical Committee, supported by a stronger Secretariat, to start considering the evidence emerging from the MMS, to interpret policy relevance and communicate policy messages to the rest of Government through the IMTC.

General

1 - Government, at senior level, to set out clearly the position on MKUKUTA II and how it relates to other initiatives such as PIP, Kilimo Kwanza, etc – taking away doubts that MKUKUTA II may not be the central guiding policy framework for economic growth and poverty reduction

Institutional arrangements – MKUKUTA/MKUZA Secretariats

2 - MKUKUTA/MKUZA Secretariats to revisit their vision and mission and to carry out an assessment of internal capacity to enable it to play the proactive, strategic, guiding and coordinating role stakeholders expect it to play

3 - Government to invest in the capacity of the Secretariats commensurately with the importance of they attach to the importance of these Secretariats.

4 - If the integration of MKUKUTA/MKUZA goes ahead, a joint Secretariat should be considered.

Institutional arrangements – Monitoring Advisory Committee/Technical Committee

5 - The Technical Committee should meet more frequently. It should focus less on the routine task of reviewing and approving work plans and budgets and more on the substance of the MMS findings – distilling and interpreting them and communicating them to the IMTC

Institutional arrangements – Surveys and Census TWG

6 - The Tanzania Statistical Master Plan is a welcome development which follows logically from the achievements made under the MMS. It will undoubtedly further strengthen the evidence base for policy making on economic growth and poverty reduction. Given the importance of statistical production and the new opportunities with the TSMP going live, Government might consider including a chapter on statistics in MKUKUTA/MKUZA II.

7 - The need for the existence of a separate Surveys and Census TWG needs to be re-assessed once the institutional set up for TSMP is clear. We should avoid a situation where the same stakeholders discuss similar issues in different fora. We should rationalise where possible, but if there is a clear need for a separate Surveys and Census TWG, it should continue to exist.

8 - TSMP should not over-emphasise economic statistics over social statistics.

9 - The pooled fund for TSMP should learn the lessons from the MMS pooled fund, and avoid committing the same mistakes.
10 - Routine Data Systems remain a concern and NBS has a role as guardian of official statistics. TSMP should help NBS address RDS issues. PMO-RALG needs to be involved centrally in these efforts, given the importance of routine data collection in local governments.

11 - NBS to build its capacity to communicate findings – repackaging findings and reports for various audiences

12 - RAWG to find ways to strengthen membership and attendance, promoting in particular participation of Government – perhaps by moving to named representatives rather than institutional representation

13 - RAWG to build on existing initiatives to promote further debate and discussion on its outputs and findings, pulling some of the ‘communication’ function under its own control

14 - Domestic analytical capacity is an issue that needs attention, but is beyond the remit of the MMS

15 – The evaluation function of MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E is underdeveloped. The RAWG can play a role in strengthening this. RAWG could work towards an evaluation strategy for MKUKUTA/MKUZA II, setting priorities for ex ante and ex post policy evaluations; championing good examples of scientific policy evaluation; boosting capacity by organising training on evaluation; and possibly establishing a fund to finance specific evaluations. The Tanzania Evaluation Association can be used as a resource in this.

16 - Consider following Zanzibar’s example of taking Poverty Policy Week closer to the people, by organising it away from the capital. Also consider a more extensive supporting media campaign for Poverty Policy Week, to maximise dissemination of MMS Findings and PPW deliberations.

17 - Move the communications function away from the Communications Working Group to the producers of data and analysis (NBS, RAWG), civil society groups (e.g. Policy Forum), with communication for MKUKUTA awareness only remaining with the Secretariat. Alternatively, retain the group but move it to a host organisations with strong expertise and a mandate on communication

18 - Revisit the indicator list when there is an advanced draft of MKUKUTA II.

19 - Focus particularly on the ‘missing middle’, by building in more public expenditure-related indicators, as well as service delivery indicators (including client satisfaction indicators).

20 - Governance indicators need strengthening, looking at international best practice in this field

21 – The revision of the indicator framework should consider inclusion of indicators that monitor the quality of the aid relationship. It should also systematically compare the indicators in the Budget Support Performance Assessment Framework and the MMS, with a view to greater synchronisation.

22 - Avoid an over-emphasis on indicators. Instead, educate stakeholders to ask relevant policy questions that can be answered with the use of indicators

23 - TSMP needs to address the well known issues in RDS and LG data production. NBS needs to work with MDAs and PMO-RALG in particular to address these issues.

24 - Exploiting the opportunity offered by the Planning, Budgeting and Reporting Manual by
a) facilitating its implementation, b) contributing to the work of the taskforce and c) engaging with the Budget Directorate to build feedback loops to MDAs and LGAs to strengthen operationalisation and monitoring of MKUKUTA

Stakeholder participation

25 – The Secretariat should use the leverage of its parent Ministry to ensure involvement of other Government stakeholders in the MMS. In particular, links need to be strengthened with the rest of MoFEA beyond PEED, the NAO, PMO and PMO-RALG, PO-PSM and the key line ministries.

Outputs of the MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E systems

26 - Revisit the function of the MAIR and bring its preparation process in line with this, either making it lighter or dropping it altogether.

Access to data and information

27 - Work towards a data access policy for NBS and OCGS under TSMP

28 - Consider accelerating preparation of Right to Information legislation

Capacity for M&E

29 - Government to recognise an M&E cadre and work towards its professionalisation

Linkages between MMS and other M&E systems at various levels

30 - MKUKUTA Secretariat to focus on building stronger linkages with the rest of MoFEA, PMO-RALG, PMO, PO-PSM, line ministries, NAO, etc

Funding arrangements

31 - Dismantle the pooled funding arrangement, but not before the TSMP pool is operational and a satisfactory arrangement has been found to fund the remaining aspects of the MMS. Consider moving to full Government funding of the MMS, especially the work of RAWG, the Communications TWG and the Secretariat. Consider a GBS condition to facilitate this.
Introduction

Background
In 2010, the overarching policy documents setting out the approach of the Government of Tanzania Mainland and Zanzibar towards poverty reduction and economic growth – MKUKUTA and MKUZA – will come to the end of their implementation period. To assess progress made to date with the implementation of MKUKUTA and MKUZA and to inform the successors to these strategies, Government has commissioned a series of reviews. One of these reviews is an assessment of the MKUKUTA and MKUZA monitoring and evaluation (M&E) arrangements. The Terms of Reference for this assessment are attached as Annex A. The purpose of the assessment was to review the effectiveness and efficiency of the MKUKUTA and MKUZA M&E systems, highlighting achievements as well as outstanding challenges, and identifying lessons learned. The broader objective of the assessment was to inform the design of the M&E system for the follow-up strategy to MKUKUTA and MKUZA.

Approach
The assessment was carried out by a team of one international and two national consultants, working closely with staff of the Poverty Eradication and Empowerment Division (PEED) of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (MOFEA). During two weeks in October 2009, the team conducted a series of individual and group meetings to gather views from the full range of stakeholders on the effectiveness and efficiency of the MKUKUTA and MKUZA M&E arrangements. Over one hundred stakeholders were consulted on the mainland and on Zanzibar. Meetings were held with:
- The Technical Working Groups for MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E
- The Chairpersons of the Technical Working Groups
- The MKUKUTA and MKUZA Secretariats
- Data producers: the National Bureau of Statistics, Office of the Chief Government Statistician (Zanzibar), selected MDAs, LGAs, civil society groups
- Consumers of data and reports produced through the MKUKUTA and MKUZA M&E systems: MDAs, LGAs, civil society groups, research and academic institutions, development partners

The full list of people consulted is attached as Annex B.

The assessment team also conducted an extensive review of existing documentation. A full list of documents consulted can be found in Annex C. Critical documents included:
- MKUKUTA, MKUZA
- The MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E Master Plans
- Medium Term Strategic Planning and Budgeting Manual
- Study on Mapping the Transition of Funding Modalities for the MM from Pooled Funds to GBS
- Tanzania Statistical Master Plan
- MKUKUTA/MKUZA Annual Implementation Reports
- The Poverty and Human Development Reports
- MDG Reports
- Survey Reports
- ‘Views of the People’ reports
- Poverty Policy Week Reports
- Thomas Cook report on Local Government M&E
- Previous studies on the PMS, MMS – e.g. Evans & van Diesen 2002, Booth 2005
- Relevant policy briefs, working papers, articles

Interpretation of the terms of reference
The TOR for the assessment specified that the team was to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of MKUKUTA and MKUZA M&E. For the purpose of this assignment, the team interpreted effectiveness as the extent to which the MKUKUTA and MKUZA M&E systems have been able to achieve the objectives, deliver the outputs and implement the activities they were
expected to. The team looked at the objectives, outputs and activities as stipulated in the M&E Master Plans, but also assessed effectiveness against expectations by the full range of stakeholders: Government, Parliament, Civil Society, Academia, Development Partners. The team interpreted efficiency as the extent to which the best possible use was made of the resources available to implement the MKUKUTA and MKUZA M&E plans. The team looked at financial as well as human resources and time. The team also considered the pooled funding arrangements for MKUKUTA M&E, an issue that was not highlighted specifically in the TOR.

Within the time allocated to this assessment, it was not possible to address all tasks spelled out in the TOR fully. In the inception phase, the assessment team agreed with PEED that two elements of the TOR (see Annex A) would be lifted out for future work. The first is the revision of the indicator framework. The team reviewed the current indicator framework and commented on its strengths and weaknesses. This report points to international best practice where areas for improvement are identified. But the actual revision of the indicator set can only be carried out when the successor strategies for MKUKUTA and MKUZA are in place and this task requires extensive consultation. In this report the team limits itself to suggesting terms of reference for a future consultancy to consider the new indicator framework in detail (see Annex D).

The team gave a similar treatment to the issue of a capacity needs assessment and staffing advice. The team assessed current capacity in relation to the current MKUKUTA and MKUZA M&E systems and made recommendations on how identified shortfalls in capacity might be addressed, but an in-depth assessment of capacity needs and specific recommendations on capacity building and staffing can only be made once the design of the new M&E System is nearing completion. Again, the proposal is that a separate consultancy is required for this and draft Terms of Reference for this task are attached as Annex E.

Under the list of specific tasks for phase II in the TOR (section 5), there is mention of the need for proposals on developing legal instruments for M&E. The team has clarified that the broader point of interest is how to strengthen the incentives for the collection, compilation, analysis and use of evidence. Legal instruments are one way of strengthening incentives, but the team looked at a broader range of ways to strengthen incentives.

Finally, one omission in the assessment team’s view is that the TOR do not specify the need for the consultants' team to look at the evaluation function in relation to MKUKUTA and MKUZA. The team thinks that the evaluation function has not received sufficient attention so far in MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E and explored why this is the case, making specific suggestions on how the evaluation function may be strengthened.
Context

Ever since independence in 1961, the eradication of poverty has been a central policy objective for the Government of Tanzania. In the late 1990s a new momentum was given to the drive to reduce poverty and promote economic growth when Government first developed the National Poverty Eradication Strategy (NPES) and later a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) for the mainland and a Zanzibar Poverty Reduction Plan (ZPRP). These plans were succeeded by Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategies - MKUKUTA for the mainland in 2005 and MKUZA for Zanzibar in 2006. Planning and budgeting were greatly facilitated by the emergence of a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and a Public Expenditure Review (PER) process in the 1990s. The introduction of a Medium-Term Strategic Planning and Budgeting Manual has further strengthened the planning and budgeting process.

The emergence of a national overarching strategy for economic growth and poverty reduction in the form of the PRSP/ZPRP also provided both a demand and an opportunity for a more systematic approach to monitoring and evaluation. In 2001, Government developed a comprehensive Poverty Monitoring System to accompany the PRSP. Consensus was built on a core list of indicators; agreement was reached on the surveys and routine data sources required to produce estimates against these indicators; an institutional framework was established which brought together producers and users of data on poverty and economic growth; and key products and a dissemination process were defined. These arrangements were set out in the Poverty Monitoring Master Plan (PMMP).

When the PRSP and ZPRP were succeeded by the MKUKUTA and MKUZA, there was a need to revisit the Poverty Monitoring System (PMS) to reflect the change of emphasis in the strategy and to adjust shortcomings of the PMS. MKUKUTA and MKUZA both put a stronger emphasis on economic growth and the importance of cross-sectoral collaboration and linkages to achieve the desired results in economic growth and poverty reduction. The indicator list was adjusted and expanded to ensure the full spectrum of economic growth, social well being and governance objectives could be tracked by the monitoring system. The new system also tried more explicitly to rationalise and strengthen linkages between the monitoring efforts of Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDA), Local Government Authorities (LGA) and national M&E efforts. In addition, the institutional framework was rationalised. There are MKUKUTA and MKUZA monitoring master plans that explain the new arrangements in detail.

MKUKUTA and MKUZA are nearing the end of their implementation period and Government has started the process of designing a follow-up strategy. A comprehensive review of MKUKUTA/MKUZA is ongoing to inform the new strategy. The assessment described in this report looks at lessons learned from the MKUKUTA and MKUZA monitoring and evaluation systems and provides specific recommendations to be taken into account in the design of the M&E plan for the follow-up strategy to MKUKUTA and MKUZA.

Over the past decade, several important broad contextual changes have occurred that are strictly speaking outside the remit of the assessment of MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E arrangements, but that have an important bearing on these arrangements in future. The most important issue is that of the centrality of MKUKUTA/MKUZA as overarching policy document guiding Government’s approach to economic growth and poverty reduction. Many of our interlocutors raised questions on this issue, expressing concerns, for example, that it is not clear to them how new initiatives such as Kilimo Kwanza relate to MKUKUTA. Others said that they worry that politicians do not necessarily feel strong ownership of MKUKUTA/MKUZA and raised questions on how MKUKUTA/MKUZA relate to political party manifestos and electoral timetables. Others again raised questions about the recent efforts to develop a Public Investment Programme (PIP) on the Mainland, saying it is not sufficiently integrated with MKUKUTA, whereas a PIP would be an important implementation tool for MKUKUTA. While all these questions are well beyond the remit of this assessment, they are important as an M&E system can only be as strong as the strategy it is attached to. Therefore, if the centrality of MKUKUTA/MKUZA is lost, the importance of their M&E arrangements will be much reduced too. If Government believes that MKUKUTA/MKUZA will remain the overarching policy
framework for economic growth and poverty reduction, an urgent requirement is to communicate clearly and swiftly to all stakeholders how new initiatives and political agendas that are perceived to run parallel to MKUKUTA/MKUZA are in fact related and integrated.
Description

A Poverty Monitoring System (PMS) was first developed for the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in 2001. The current M&E arrangements for MKUKUTA and MKUZA are still largely based on that initial approach, with some modifications. The arrangements for MKUKUTA and MKUZA M&E are set out in Monitoring Master Plans for both strategies. In broad terms, there is a lot of similarity between the arrangements on the Mainland and on Zanzibar, so we will give one description, noting any variations for Zanzibar as required. The key features of MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E arrangements are:

- An institutional framework that is inclusive and brings together all relevant stakeholders in working groups and links them to relevant Government policy and decision making bodies
- An indicator framework to track MKUKUTA/MKUZA implementation and results, specifying data sources, frequency of reporting, institutional responsibility among other things
- A survey calendar to be implemented by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and Office of the Chief Government Statistician (OCGS) to provide estimates for key MKUKUTA/MKUZA indicators
- A calendar of planning, budgeting and reporting
- Defined outputs of MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E, including survey reports, analytical reports
- A funding mechanism and a budget for the implementation of MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E

Institutional framework

The backbone of the MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E arrangements is formed by the Technical Working Groups (TWG). Under the initial PMS, there were four of these groups: the Census and Surveys TWG was responsible for the implementation of a multi-year survey plan that would produce estimates on key PMS indicators. The Routine Data Sources TWG was meant to ensure that those indicators drawing from administrative data sources would be populated in a timely manner with new estimates and was meant to serve as forum for the coordination and quality improvement of routine data sources. The Research and Analysis TWG was formed to coordinate a programme of analytical work around the PRSP and to produce the Poverty and Human Development Reports and Poverty Status Reports as main outputs of the PMS. The role of the Dissemination, Sensitisation and Advocacy TWG was to communicate the main findings of the PMS to all relevant audiences, with communication products tailored to each audience.

Some changes were made to the structure of the working groups when the MKUKUTA/MKUZA were put in place. Given the problematic performance of the Routine Data Systems TWG, it was agreed that the functions of this group should be incorporated in the work of the Surveys and Census TWG, which therefore is called the Surveys and Routine Data TWG in the MKUKUTA Monitoring Master Plan. The Research and Analysis TWG remained unchanged. The Dissemination, Sensitisation and Advocacy TWG was renamed a Communications TWG, which more accurately describes its core function.

The three TWGs report to the MKUKUTA/MKUZA Secretariat, housed in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs. The Secretariat ensures the smooth running of the monitoring system and supports the work of the TWGs as well as the Monitoring Advisory Committee and the Technical Committee. The Monitoring Advisory Committee brings together representatives of the TWGs and the Secretariat with external stakeholders from Development Partners, civil society, academic institutions and the private sector. It reviews the work plans, budgets and progress reports before they are formally submitted to the Technical Committee and also acts as line of communication to their respective constituencies. The Technical Committee is the main Government committee responsible for MKUKUTA/MKUZA implementation and monitoring. It draws its membership from all relevant Ministries, Departments and Agencies. It oversees the functioning of the MMS, ensures timely production of key outputs from the MMS, and serves as conduit for information from the MMS to the Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee.

The institutional framework for the MMS has been the topic of some controversy, with some external observers commenting that it was overly complicated and too cumbersome. But the defence of local stakeholders has been that an inclusive approach was critical to ensure a smooth
coordination of data production, dissemination and use.

**Indicator framework**
The MKUKUTA Monitoring Master Plan includes a list of about 80 indicators that the monitoring system is meant to track periodically. The indicators are roughly evenly spread across the MKUKUTA/MKUZA clusters and include a mix of process, outcome and impact indicators. For all indicators, a detailed description is provided, giving the definition of the indicator, the rationale for its inclusion, the sources of information, institutional responsibility, frequency of measurement, etcetera. Where relevant, methodological comments are also provided, as well as suggestion on how data sources might be improved.

**Survey calendar**
A multi-year survey plan was first introduced in the PMS and was a major improvement, as it enabled a move away from ad hoc survey implementation which was largely dependent on the availability of donor funding, towards a strategic survey plan that was in line with national information needs and priorities, and against which Government could more strategically mobilise resources. The MKUKUTA Monitoring Master Plan contains a calendar for surveys and census from 2005 up until 2012, with the main periodic surveys being the Integrated Labour Force Survey (every 5 years), the Household Budget Survey (every 5 years), the HIV/AIDS Indicator Survey (every 3 years), the Agricultural Survey (every 4 years) and the Demographic and Health Survey (every 4 years). The Population and Housing Census is carried out every 10 years. Zanzibar follows a roughly similar survey plan, with minor variations. In future, when the Tanzania Statistical Master Plan will be in place, the OCGS and the NBS will be collaborating even more closely than they are now.

**Calendar of planning, budgeting and reporting**
The MKUKUTA Monitoring Master Plan also contains an annual calendar of planning, budgeting and reporting, which shows how these processes interact with each other and with the MKUKUTA M&E efforts. This calendar helps to ensure that MKUKUTA M&E outputs are delivered in a timely manner, so that they can be fed in smoothly to Government's planning and budgeting processes.

**Outputs**
The main products of the MKUKUTA M&E arrangements as foreseen in the Master Plan include:
- The MKUKUTA Annual Implementation Report (MAIR - annual)
- The Strategic Policy Brief to Parliament (annual)
- National Survey Reports (annual)
- The Poverty and Human Development Report (every second year)
- Status Reports on Growth, Social Well-being and Governance (every second year alternating with the Poverty and Human Development Report)
- Views of the People Report on MKUKUTA Implementation (foreseen in 2007 and 2010)
- Various briefs (intermittent)

In Zanzibar the main products of the MKUZA M&E arrangements as foreseen in the Master Plan include:
- The MKUZA Annual Implementation Report (M-AIR - annual)
- The Strategic Policy Brief to Parliament (annual)
- National Survey Reports from the OCGS (annual)
- The Poverty and Human Development Report (every second year)
- Status Reports on Growth, Social Well-being and Governance (every second year alternating with the Poverty and Human Development Report)
- Views of the People Report on MKUZA Implementation (PSDA – Participatory Service Delivery Assessment)
- Various briefs (intermittent)

**Funding mechanism and budget**
On the mainland as well as on Zanzibar, the M&E arrangements include a pooled funding mechanism, through which Development Partners support implementation of MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E. Budgets are also included in the Master Plans.
Main findings of the assessment

Institutional arrangements for MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E

Secretariat
The Secretariats for MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E are critical in ensuring the smooth operation of monitoring and evaluation for the country’s economic growth and poverty reduction strategies. Their role is to support the work of the Technical Working Groups; to facilitate and quality assure the planning of these groups; to ensure adequate funding is available in a timely manner; to hold the TWGs to account for the delivery of their agreed outputs; to ensure information flows between the TWGs and up to the Monitoring Advisory Committee and the Technical Committee. The Secretariat also plays a key role in the production of the MKUKUTA/MKUZA Annual Implementation Reports.

On both the Mainland and on Zanzibar, the Secretariat is currently located in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs. For Zanzibar, this has always been the case, but the Secretariat on the Mainland has seen two significant institutional shifts. When the Poverty Monitoring System for the PRSP was established in 2001, the Secretariat was placed in the Vice-President’s Office. It later shifted to the Ministry of Planning and Economic Empowerment and only recently to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs. There were advantages and disadvantages in all these institutional homes for the Secretariat, but in principle the current location in MoFEA is ideal to pursue linkages between MKUKUTA M&E and the planning, budgeting and reporting process. For that to happen, PEED, the immediate home of the Secretariat, needs to be central to MoFEA business and proactively link to the Budget Directorate.

But the Secretariats are considered by many stakeholders to be weak. Stakeholders would like to see a stronger strategic direction and a more proactive approach from the Secretariats. In light of these views, it would be useful for the Secretariats and their institutional hosts both on the Mainland and on Zanzibar to analyse their capacity. Things to consider are:

- Clarity of vision and mission
- Work load and prioritisation
- Internal division of labour
- Staff capacity (numbers, skills, competencies)
- Other elements of internal capacity
- Linkages to other parts of MoFEA, wider Government and non-Governmental stakeholders

The capacity of the MKUKUTA/MKUZA Secretariat has been an issue since the early days of the PRSP/ZPRP. For many years, development partners have supported the Secretariats – with technical assistance as well as financial support. This support has reduced over time, but the capacity constraints remain. Reasons for the persistence of the capacity constraints include:

- turnover of staff
- positions not being filled
- shifts in the institutional home
- poor remuneration and incentive packages
- a poor working environment
- limited training or capacity enhancement opportunities
- technical assistance that is focused on ‘getting the job done’ rather than building sustainable capacity
- limited ‘empowerment’ of the Secretariat by senior Government officials

As part of the formulation of the successor arrangement for MKUKUTA/MKUZA, Government should take a critical view of capacity and capacity needs in the Secretariats, and make an investment in Secretariat capacity that is commensurate with the importance it attaches to the role of the Secretariats.

If MKUKUTA and MKUZA are integrated in the next phase, one option that should be given thought is the option of establishing a joint secretariat for MKUKUTA/MKUZA II.
Some stakeholders express the view that the Technical Committee and Monitoring Advisory Committee meet too infrequently. The Monitoring Advisory Committee never actually became operational. Some claim that the Technical Committee only meets at the repeated insistence of some of its members (often Development Partners). As these Committees are supposed to take a view on the work plans and budgets of the Technical Working Groups, the infrequency of meetings can lead to delays in funding flows. This has happened for example in relation to some of the household surveys conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics. A poor review of work plans and progress reports in the TWGs also causes additional work for the Technical Committee.

The fact that the Technical Committee meets only infrequently and then mainly to discuss work plans and budgets is worrying, because it is the conduit for the flow of information from the MMS to the Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee. Therefore, an important focus of its work should be to digest and interpret the information emerging from the MMS and to distil the most important messages that need to feed into critical decision making processes across Government. If the Technical Committee doesn’t fulfil this function, it leaves a gap in the flow of evidence which needs to be plugged in the next iteration of MKUKUTA/MKUZA.

Surveys and Census
The Surveys and Census TWG on the Mainland has broadly worked successfully. Meetings have been regular and well attended. The outputs of the Surveys & Census TWG – the survey reports – are of good quality.

While OCGS in Zanzibar have also managed to implement the survey schedule as planned and have produced reports of sound quality, the Surveys and Census TWG on Zanzibar has been less successful in meeting. It meets very infrequently indeed.

The multi-year survey plan agreed in the MKUKUTA Master Plan was largely implemented as planned, but with delays for some of the surveys. One reason for these delays were the extensive stakeholder consultations required ahead of surveys. Another reason is to be found in the still very cumbersome funding arrangements for household surveys. The MKUKUTA M&E pooled funding arrangement has not helped NBS greatly in rationalising the funding for household surveys. NBS relies on a combination of Government contributions, contributions from individual Development Partners who disburse directly to NBS, and contributions through the Pooled Fund. In a way, the pooled fund has simply added a layer of complications to the funding arrangements for household surveys. It hasn’t helped NBS move away from the need to engage with a multitude of funding partners, all with different needs and priorities and different accountability requirements. In addition, the way the Pooled Fund operates has caused significant delays.

Over the past few years, work has been ongoing to develop a Tanzania Statistical Master Plan (TSMP), which will cover both Tanzania Mainland and Zanzibar. This Plan builds on the achievements of the Multi-Year Survey Plan and the work of the Surveys and Census TWG to take the logical next step, which is to develop a comprehensive plan to strengthen and rationalise data production processes and to produce data that Government and key users need. TSMP will be a comprehensive document that identifies and prioritises the country’s data requirements covering the entire span of economic, environmental and social dimensions. TSMP will undoubtedly contribute to a stronger, more robust evidence base for policy making on economic growth and poverty reduction. As such, TSMP should be welcomed. Given the importance of statistical evidence for sound policy making, Government might consider to include a chapter on statistics in MKUKUTA/MKUZA II.

One of the criticisms of many PRSPs and their associated M&E systems around the world has been that they overemphasised the social sectors, and therefore social statistics. It is a welcome development, therefore, that TSMP will take a comprehensive view and look at economic, social and environmental statistics. It is true that economic statistics in particular have long been an area of underinvestment in NBS/OCGS. It is welcome that this will now be balanced out, although we would urge that the pendulum should not swing too far in favour of economic statistics and that the
production of social statistics continues to receive strong emphasis.

A pooled funding arrangement is being developed for TSMP, which should hopefully take away some of the current difficulties in resource mobilisation for survey implementation. It is important that NBS/OCGS and Government draw lessons from the MMS Pooled Fund, to ensure that mistakes made under that arrangement are avoided. The biggest lesson is that pooled funds are more effective if more development partners subscribe to them and if they result in a significant reduction of direct bilateral funding. If this isn’t the case, a pooled fund simply adds layers of complexity.

One question we considered was whether the institutional structure for the TSMP will do away with the need for a separate Surveys and Census group for MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E. After all there will be an extensive consultation and coordination framework under the TSMP and as the TSMP is geared towards servicing the information needs of MKUKUTA/MKUZA, there might be a possibility to rationalise the institutional arrangements. It is too early to take a firm view on this, but we would recommend that the future of the Surveys and Census TWG is reassessed when the institutional arrangements for TSMP are clearer. A situation where the same stakeholders meet in different fora to discuss the same issues should be avoided.

In the days of the Poverty Monitoring System for the PRSP, there was a Routine Data Systems TWG. It never took off and was abolished in the MKUKUTA M&E System. The function of coordinating administrative data systems and enhancing the quality of the data they produce was allocated to the Surveys and Census TWG. The rationale for this was that NBS is the guardian of all official statistics in Tanzania, and therefore has a role to play regarding statistical production in MDAs and LGAs. While it is hard to argue with this at a theoretical level, in practice, the Surveys and Census TWG has paid very little attention to routine data systems. This is problematic for a number of reasons. First of all, routine data systems potentially can produce statistics on key indicators with much greater frequency than surveys can. Secondly, they do so at a level of disaggregation well beyond what any survey could achieve. Thirdly, routine data production takes place very close to decentralised decision making in LGAs and therefore has great potential to promote an evidence-based decision-making culture at that level. And finally, routine data systems are generally more cost effective than surveys. The quality of evidence produced by routine data systems remains problematic and deserves attention. Routine data sources that produce robust data in a timely manner are essential to a well functioning M&E system for MKUKUTA/MKUZA. Therefore, addressing the issues in administrative data collection needs to be a priority under the follow-up arrangements for MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E. The TSMP should also offer opportunities to enhance the quality of administrative data production. But the key to strengthening routine data systems is to set the incentive framework right for the production and use of data in MDAs and LGAs. Government’s wider efforts to strengthen planning, budgeting and reporting hold the promise of a solution.

While NBS and OCGS produce survey reports of good quality, the reports are rather traditional in style and are still mainly limited to a tabular presentation of findings of questionnaire administration. NBS and OCGS could usefully build their capacity to present the findings of household surveys in a more imaginative way, packaging information in formats that are accessible and appeal to a variety of audiences.

Research and Analysis
The Research and Analysis TWG is another very successful working group. It has highly committed members and produces high quality outputs. It has the remarkable record of an almost uninterrupted series of weekly meetings since 2001. One of the ingredients of the success of the Research and Analysis Technical Working Group is the useful partnership between the Planning Commission as chair of the group and Research on Poverty Aleviation (REPOA) as secretariat. While the chair provides the group with a strong mandate for its work, guidance on Government needs and priorities, and a link into important decision making circles, the secretariat provides the technical expertise and convening power for the top analytical capacity in the country.
While attendance of the Research and Analysis TWG is generally good, attendance from the Government representatives has been less than ideal over the years. While general members are appointed in their personal capacity, on the basis of their knowledge and insights and potential contributions to the group’s work, the Government representatives attend on the basis of their institutional affiliation. As a result, there is often little consistency in attendance from Government and sometimes participation is not from the people in Government who could make the most useful contribution to the group’s work. Therefore, the group proposes to move to appointing Government representatives by name rather than by institution. This is a proposal we would endorse.

Another key to the success of the Research and Analysis TWG has been the quality of the substance of the meetings. When the meetings are focused on substantive analytical or policy issues, attendance is good. When the meetings focus on the minutiae of commissioning particular analytical pieces or producing work plans and budgets, attendance drops off. So the group needs to continue to focus on the substance rather than the process.

The Poverty and Human Development Reports, which are published every second year, are the main output of this group. We will discuss them in more detail under the outputs of the MMS, but suffice to say that they are of very high quality and have become quite influential. Three Poverty and Human Development Reports are now published, with the fourth available in draft form.

In recent years, the Research and Analysis TWG has become more proactive in promoting debate about the findings of its analytical work. This is a welcome development. Two initiatives in particular are worth mentioning – the ‘open sessions’ and the presentations of the PHDR to Parliament. The open sessions have been very popular, but have not always attracted the audience that the TWG had hoped for, with an over-representation of students. While still useful, efforts need to be made to bring in specific people who would contribute to the topic in question. A more proactive outreach ahead of each open session should be able to achieve this. In addition to the open sessions and presentations to Parliament, the TWG could do even more to promote discussion and debate on its findings. This calls for a more proactive outreach function by the Secretariat, which is well placed to play this role. In a way, this means that the Research and Analysis Working Group would take on part of the communications function currently allocated to the Communications TWG, which, as we will see below, is not functioning very effectively.

One issue raised by members of the Research and Analysis TWG is that they find their work is constrained by limited domestic capacity for analytical work. The group finds that it relies on a relatively small pool of experts, with limited opportunities for young researchers to hone their talents and enhance their capacity and experience. The issue of limited analytical capacity is beyond the scope of the MMS, but it is an issue worth flagging. If Government is serious about instilling an evidence-based decision-making culture and wants a strong results orientation, boosting domestic analytical capacity is important.

The Research and Analysis TWG in Zanzibar is weaker than the one on the Mainland. The TWG lacks a Secretariat of similar capacity and expertise to REPOA, although efforts have been directed towards developing the research and analytical capacity of the Zanzibar Institute of Financial Administration (ZIFA) and the State University of Zanzibar. The lack of an Economics Department at the nascent University is also a constraint, because it limits opportunities to build a critical mass of researchers to undertake analytical work in Zanzibar. Other issues apply to the Zanzibar RAWG as they do to the one on the Mainland: poor attendance of Government representatives; the need to focus on substance rather than process during meetings; as well as the recommendation that members should be appointed in their personal capacity, on the basis of their knowledge and insights and potential contributions to the group’s work. This should also apply to Government representatives.

Communications
The main achievement of the Communications TWG is the organisation of annual Poverty Policy Weeks, which provide an opportunity for a wide range of stakeholders to discuss implementation of MKUKUTA/MKUZA and the findings of the MMS. While some critics say that Poverty Policy Week...
is little more than a talk shop for a limited urban elite, we should not underestimate the achievement. Poverty Policy Week has definitely contributed to transparency and accountability around MKUKUTA/MKUZA, has enhanced stakeholder involvement, and has facilitated dialogue on economic growth and poverty reduction between Government, Development Partners and Civil Society. But more can be done. Zanzibar has set an interesting model by taking Poverty Policy Week closer to the people and organising this year’s week on the island of Pemba. The mainland should also look at this as an option. It would make direct involvement of stakeholders at district level of a possibility and would also expose Dar es Salaam-based stakeholders to the reality of poverty. A more extensive supporting programme of media communication around Poverty Policy Week could also be considered.

Another achievement of the Communications TWG is the Voice of the People report (2007), which provides a useful overview of people’s opinions regarding MKUKUTA implementation. It stresses the function of the Communications TWG as two-way: from Government to stakeholders and vice-versa.

But in spite of these important achievements, it is clear that the Communications TWG is the weakest of the three TWGs in the MMS institutional framework. It meets very irregularly. It has struggled right from its inception as Dissemination, Sensitisation and Advocacy TWG in 2001 to find the right membership. It really ought to bring together communications experts from across Government, media representatives and civil society representatives with a strong background in communications. But its current membership does not reflect this ideal composition. The Communications TWG is also struggling to deliver its work plan and the MKUKUTA Communication Strategy. While we made no detailed analysis of the implementation of the MKUKUTA Communication Strategy, it is clear that implementation is only very partial.

Another problem that plagues this TWG is that it is insufficiently clear on what to communicate to whom and for what purpose. It tries to seek a balance between raising awareness in general about MKUKUTA and disseminating the findings of the MMS. Its preferred model is to produce simplified versions of survey reports and policy papers. While this is undoubtedly a useful thing to do, there is a wider variety of communication products that should be produced to suit the needs of a variety of audiences. Too little has been done to map these various audiences and tailor outputs to suit their needs.

While the Research and Analysis TWG and the Surveys and Census TWG are housed in institutions with both a clear mandate and strong expertise related to the core function of these TWGs, the same cannot be said for the Communications TWG. PEED does have a mandate to communicate poverty-related information, but has no in-house communications expertise. As we observed, the Communications TWG does not bring in this expertise either.

In the assessment team’s view, the problems plaguing the work of the Communications TWG boil down to:

- a lack of expertise on communications in the host institution (PEED) and therefore an inability to provide strategic leadership to the work of the group
- a poorly constituted membership
- a lack of clarity on the function and core roles and responsibilities of the group

This leaves us with the question of what the future of the Communications TWG should be under MKUKUTA/MKUZA II. In our view, there are two options. One is to dismantle the Communications TWG and to leave the function of communication to the producers of data and evidence. The National Bureau of Statistics needs to boost its own dissemination and communication capacity and if it succeeds in doing this, the communications tasks of the Surveys and Census TWG can easily be carried out by NBS. REPOA as Secretariat to the Research and Analysis TWG already has a strong communication capacity, which can be enhanced further. If this happens, the communications tasks of the Research and Analysis TWG can be carried out by REPOA. The other main task of the Communications TWG is to organise the Poverty Policy Weeks, but this is not a task that necessarily requires a working group. It could be carried out by the Secretariat
directly, perhaps calling on an ad hoc task force as required. In addition, Civil Society already plays an active role in disseminating information on MKUKUTA/MKUZA and the findings of the MMS. The Policy Form, for example, is particularly enterprising in this respect. Again, this role could be boosted further.

The other option is to move the function of the Communications TWG to a host organisation with strong expertise and a mandate in the area of communications.

**Indicator framework**

The indicator framework for MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E can only be revised when there is sufficient clarity about the new strategy and how it differs from the current one. The assessment team therefore agreed with PEED that working on the indicator framework is premature as part of this phase of the assessment. We have however proposed Terms of Reference for a comprehensive review of the indicator framework, which are attached as Annex D. We make some general remarks based on discussions with stakeholders here.

Many indicator frameworks established to track progress with the implementation of Poverty Reduction Strategies around the world have been criticised for having a ‘missing middle’. The indicator framework for the PMS and now the MMS suffer from the same shortcoming. The indicator frameworks over-emphasise the input and activity-related indicators that can be tracked easily, as well as the high-level poverty-related outcome indicators, which the strategies ultimately want to influence. While it is understandable how this focus has emerged, it results in findings that are not immediately ‘actionable’ by key decision makers. What is missing in many PRS indicator frameworks are indicators that explain how inputs and activities are transformed into the ultimate outcomes that the strategies aim to bring about. To give an example of how this plays out, we can refer to the difficulties of interpreting the disappointing poverty headcount figures in the 2007 Household Budget Survey. Why did the headcount ratio not decline more rapidly, despite implementation of the PRSP and MKUKUTA for half a decade? Is it a failing of the MKUKUTA Strategy? Is it due to exogenous factors outwith the control of PRSP and MKUKUTA? With little more than input and outcome indicators, it is impossible to provide answers to these questions.

To plug the missing middle in the MMS indicator framework, it would be useful to have better data on public expenditure – looking at allocation, execution and value for money measures. There could also be better use of service delivery indicators. Client satisfaction levels about Government services can be particularly informative to guide policy decisions. It is a form of citizens’ feedback that it largely absent from the MMS on the Mainland at the moment. On Zanzibar, an innovative Participatory Service Delivery Assessment (PSDA) was implemented, which was highly influential on the MKUZA policy process. This assessment addressed exactly the ‘missing middle’ of the quality of services and client satisfaction with service delivery. A consortium was formed of MDAs, civil society organisations and the private sector. This consortium collaborated throughout the assessment, from defining the methodology to the interpretation of findings, which considerably strengthened ownership of the assessment. The PSDA on Zanzibar covered the Water and the Education Sectors and had an important impact on policies in these sectors. The mainland should think of incorporating these types of assessments as routine part of the MMS.

The area that is weakest in the MKUKUTA/MKUZA indicator framework is that of governance. The mantra that good governance is too difficult to measure does not hold any more, given a lot of groundbreaking work on governance indicators over the past decade. The work by Dan Kaufmann and others in the context of the World Bank’s ‘Governance Matters’ has set new standards and developed new models of tracking governance. The Millennium Challenge Corporation also has developed new thinking on measuring governance. Recent work by Jeremy Holland has looked at best practice in voice and accountability indicators. All this global expertise should be drawn on when revisiting the indicator framework. Some stakeholders also expressed a wish to see more crime and personal safety indicators included in the governance cluster.

Stakeholders also raised the question whether the MKUKUTA/MKUZA indicator framework
shouldn’t look at the quality of the aid relationship as well. This would go a long way towards strengthening mutual accountability between Government and Development Partners. The revision of the indicator framework should consider including indicators drawn from the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action, as well as the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania.

The revision of the indicator framework should make a systematic comparison of the Budget Support Performance Assessment Framework and the MKUKUTA/MKUZA indicator list. If the aid harmonisation and alignment principles are followed to their logical conclusion, Budget Support donors should simply tap into national reporting on MKUKUTA/MKUZA to inform their assessment of budget support operations. One step towards that is to ensure that the indicators in the Performance Assessment Framework and in the MKUKUTA/MKUZA framework are the same, or at least very similar. If the two are too different, the budget support operation undermines domestic accountability processes. If they are synchronised, the budget support operation strengthens domestic accountability.

As the MMS matures, the time is ripe to move beyond a rigid indicator system and towards a system in which stakeholders are empowered to ask informed policy questions, which the MMS answers by referring to a variety of indicators. The MMS is perhaps too focused on producing data for indicators, and insufficiently focused on eliciting and posing the right questions, and subsequently finding evidence to answer these questions. The TWGs, the Secretariat, the Monitoring Advisory Committee and the Technical Committee all have a role to play in bringing this shift in the MMS about – from a data production machine for an agreed set of indicators to a space for dialogue and policy thinking on economic growth and poverty reduction, strongly based on robust evidence.

**Coordination of data production**

The coordination of data production has seen a major boost over the past decade. This was at least partly a result of the PMS and MMS, and particularly through the Surveys and Census Working Group. The PMS and MMS have brought about a much clearer and much better articulated demand for robust, timely data on key indicators. Its institutional framework has brought together data producers and data users. This has enabled a much greater degree of coordination at two different levels. Coordination between data users and producers has ensured that data collected are more relevant to the needs of data users and take better account of timeliness and specific requirements of these data users. Coordination between data producers has reduced the degree of overlap and duplication in data production systems. It has also initiated work on standards and norms. The detailed indicator description in the MKUKUTA Monitoring Master Plan, with its definitions and methodological comments are making a contribution in this respect. The Tanzania Socio-Economic Database (TSED) with its metadata also made a contribution.

Coordination of Routine Data Systems and data production by LGAs has been less successful than the coordination of Survey data and as we have commented above, this now needs urgent attention. NBS and the Office of the Chief Government Statistician need to collaborate with MDAs, and LGAs to make this happen. PMO-RLAG should play an important role on the Mainland. TSMP and the Planning, Budgeting and Reporting Guidelines both provide an opportunity in this respect.

The next logical step in the coordination of statistical production is the Tanzania Statistical Master Plan, which will need to address both statistical production in routine data systems as well as through surveys and the census.

The Planning, Budgeting and Reporting Manual provides a real opportunity for MKUKUTA indicator reporting as well as strengthening evidence-based decision making in MDAs and LGAs. Supporting and facilitating it should be seen as core function for the MKUKUTA Secretariat.

Stakeholders feel that in line with Government’s decentralisation approach, statistical production at LGA level should be encouraged (including the use of village registers). Local Government statistical production should feed into the MMS and be an integral part of it. Stakeholders also
suggested that MKUKUTA/MKUZA II should include a chapter on statistical production, which caters to both Tanzania Mainland and Zanzibar.

**Participation of stakeholders**

The MMS has been heralded and criticised by many for its inclusive, multi-stakeholder approach. The elaborate institutional framework was designed to ensure that all stakeholders were represented and no institution with a relevant mandate or relevant expertise was alienated. Proponents of this approach see this as a key strength of the institutional set-up. Critics see it as an unnecessarily cumbersome and inefficient way of doing business. The Poverty Policy Weeks were also a deliberate attempt to involve a wide range of stakeholders in the review of progress with implementation of MKUKUTA/MKUZA and the discussion of findings emerging from the MMS.

But even though the design of the institutional framework for MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E emphasises inclusion, a number of civil society and private sector stakeholders we spoke to complained about limited scope for participation. On balance, the assessment team feels that the level of stakeholder involvement is just about right.

However, we are somewhat concerned about limited participation from some Government stakeholders in the MMS. Parts of Government that need to engage more proactively in the MMS include the rest of MoFEA beyond PEED, the NAO, PMO and PMO-RALG, PO-PSM and the key line ministries. The Secretariat needs to work to bring these stakeholders on board, and use its leverage with its parent Ministry to that effect.

**Outputs of the MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E Systems**

The assessment team reviewed a sample of the outputs of the MMS, looking in some detail at survey reports, MAIRs and PHDRs. On the whole, the quality of outputs is high and there is a consistent positive trend in the quality of the reports. The general point to make is that while the quality is improving consistently, further improvements can be made in terms of the timeliness of the reports and the communication of their main findings. There is often a long time lag between surveys or pieces of analysis being carried out and the report being publicly available. When a report is formally published, it is often not immediately available online and hard copies can be difficult to obtain for stakeholders not intimately involved in the MKUKUTA/MKUZA process (see next section). For some reports, a ‘simplified version’ accompanies the main report, but on the whole the MMS is not very imaginative in repackaging the findings of key outputs for various audiences and using a range of communication tools to disseminate the main messages.

The MAIR is perhaps the MMS output that has shown the most significant improvement in both quality and timeliness. Early PRS Progress Reports were chronically late and often little more that an enumeration of all the activities that were carried out in the broad context of the PRS. Now, the MAIRs are generally produced on time and the document has become more analytical and informative in its nature. Having said that, there is little clarity on who uses the MAIR and for what purpose. When we asked stakeholders about the MAIR, few said they relied on it heavily in their business. This was true for Government, Development Partners and non-Governmental stakeholders. For Government, it is clear that the MAIR facilitates the writing of the Economic Survey and the drafting of the Budget Guidelines and the Strategic Policy Brief delivered to Parliament. But without the MAIR, these key Government documents would still be produced. For Development Partners, the MAIR is an important input to the annual performance assessment of Budget Support. But a performance assessment matrix exists and a good part of the discussions between Government and Development Partners regarding the performance assessment matrix takes place without direct reference to the MAIR. Given the amount of time and effort invested in preparing the MAIR every year, it would be worthwhile for Government to reconsider the purpose of the MAIR. Its content and the amount of time and energy invested in it should be brought in line with the importance various stakeholders attach to this document. Government could either drop the MAIR altogether, or at least make it a ‘lighter touch’ document. If the Government Guidelines for Planning, Budgeting and Reporting are properly implemented by all MDAs and LGAs, the
preparation of the MAIR would become very straightforward. In this scenario, the MAIR could simply synthesise the MDA and LGA reports and draw out key messages of relevance to MKUKUTA/MKUZA.

We have already mentioned the Poverty and Human Development Reports, which are of consistent high quality and leave little scope for improvement. The series of PHDRs is now widely recognised as important analytical overviews on economic growth and poverty reduction in Tanzania. Individual PHDRs are influential in informing the national policy debate. Two examples of this are the analysis the PHDR presented on the geographic diversity of poverty and the analysis on the drivers of economic growth. Both these analyses were taken on by Government and Development Partners alike to inform their strategic decisions. The only improvement we would recommend is for the Research and Analysis Working Group to disseminate the findings of their analytical work more proactively, with a wider variety of communications products and a more active outreach programme, to proactively offer emerging findings to a wide variety of stakeholders.

Access to data and information/ Dissemination of the outputs of the M&E Systems

While stakeholders are generally appreciative of the outputs of the MMS, there is some degree of concern about the accessibility of both data sets and finished products. When it comes to data sets, some stakeholders expressed concerns about the data access policy of NBS/OCGS being less than transparent. If often takes a very long time for data sets to become available after surveys are conducted. Once a data set is final, requests for the use of the data set take a long time to get approved. Several stakeholders stressed that they would like to see TSMP result in a new, progressive data access policy for NBS and OCGS. This data access policy should actively encourage third party analysis of official data sets, without of course compromising on data protection. A pricing policy for the use of NBS/OCGS data sets should be part of this data access policy, but pricing should not make it prohibitive for students, Tanzanian analysts and civil society groups to make use of the data sets.

Many stakeholders not directly involved in the MKUKUTA/MKUZA process complain that the outputs of the MMS are hard to access. Hard copies are difficult to obtain and it often takes a long time for the reports to appear online, if at all. The Poverty Monitoring Website was useful to facilitate access to key products emerging from the PMS and general information on the MKUKUTA process, but it stopped being updated in 2007. Some commented that it is now easier to access some of the MMS products on development partner websites than on Government websites. This situation can very easily be rectified and it shouldn’t be costly to do so, and therefore we recommend that it should take high priority. Utilisation of MMS products and findings is as important as their production.

As we have pointed out already, dissemination of MMS outputs is taking place, but re-packaging of information for various audiences and promotion of analysis, interpretation and use is limited. The Communications TWG has played this role insufficiently. In the next stage of MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E, actively promoting the utilisation of evidence emerging from the MMS should take a much higher priority.

There are some interesting CSO initiatives, independent of the MMS, which are promoting access to data and evidence, including the evidence emerging from the MMS. The NGO Policy Forum is an example, as well as Twaweeza and the Infoshop initiative. Civil society involvement should be welcomed and actively encouraged. It is entirely in the spirit of the principles of evidence-based decision-making and transparent, accountable governance that underpin MKUKUTA/MKUZA.

Several of the Non-Governmental stakeholders we spoke to raised the importance of right to information legislation, which has been under preparation in Tanzania for years. Right to information could play an important role in strengthening MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E and might strengthen stakeholder participation in MKUKUTA/MKUZA implementation. Government might consider accelerating the finalisation of this legislation and make specific mention of this in the
relevant chapters of MKUKUTA/MKUZA II. The progressive Right to Information legislation in India offers an interesting model that might be considered in this context.

**Utilisation of evidence generated by the MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E Systems**

While it is easy to get completely absorbed in the definition of indicators and the mechanics of data collection when involved in M&E systems, the ultimate purpose of an M&E system is to make information available that can be used to improve implementation and to account for resources used. So the ultimate test for the effectiveness of an M&E system is to see if there are specific examples of the evidence it produces being used to inform decision making, at any level.

When we reviewed M&E practices in MDAs and LGAs, we still observed a considerable amount of data collection for its own sake, to fill forms, reports and databases without a focus on actual utilisation. This was true particularly at LGA level. But to an extent this is hardly surprising, as an evidence-based decision making culture doesn't set in overnight and in practice many incentives within Government still counter this very mindset. What is encouraging though is that examples are beginning to emerge of evidence produced by the MMS informing policy dialogue, if not policy decisions. The two examples already quoted are the spatial analysis of poverty and the drivers of growth analysis. It would be useful for the Secretariat to capture and champion good examples of the use of evidence in decision making, to build on the few good examples that are emerging.

The Secretariat should also become more proactive to encourage the use of evidence by MDAs, LGAs. This can be done by strengthening the planning, budgeting and reporting work – PEED can work with Budget Directorate on this. The Secretariat’s location in MOFEA gives it an ideal opportunity to work very closely with the planning, budgeting and reporting work and to ensure that it feeds in well to MKUKUTA/MKUZA monitoring and that it strengthens evidence-based decision making in the MDAs and LGAs.

The underlying reason for poor utilisation of the evidence generated by MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E Systems is that the incentives for evidence-based decision-making remain weak. There several possible routes to strengthening these incentives:

- accountability demanded by elected representatives in Parliament and local assemblies
- accountability demanded by citizens or citizens’ groups, directly from service providers, local authorities or central Government
- accountability demanded by Government’s own oversight bodies, such as the National Audit Office, particularly if its function extends beyond a more narrow interpretation of audit to include accountability for programme decisions and value for money
- internal Government incentives for a results orientation, for example by moving towards performance-based budget allocations

The issue as well as the solutions are well beyond the scope of MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E. The wider efforts to strengthen results-based management under the Harmonisation Taskforce offer important entry points and the stakeholders in the MMS need to align themselves closely with these efforts.

**Capacity for implementation of the MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E Systems**

A detailed capacity needs assessment for MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E can be carried out once the structure of the new strategy and the M&E requirements are clear. We have suggested Terms of Reference for a capacity needs assessment in Annex E and limit ourselves here to some general remarks.

One positive development we noted was the emergence of a growing number of M&E posts throughout Government. These posts are established at senior level (several Assistant Director posts) and at junior level. This is a welcome development and a sign that the concept of M&E is gradually taking hold in the Government of Tanzania. However, there is, to date, no recognised M&E cadre in Government. Therefore, there are no agreed entry criteria and competency standards for M&E staff. As a result, people with a variety of academic backgrounds and different
job profiles claim the title of M&E officer. There is also no recognised training programme at undergraduate or graduate level to prepare people for a career in M&E. The training on offer on M&E is ad hoc and short term. Recognition and professionalisation of the M&E cadre in Government would be a major step forward towards stronger evidence-based decision making.

**Linkages between MMS and other M&E systems at national, MDA and LGA levels**

Since 2005, Tanzania has reformed planning, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation including reporting processes that determine the direction Government will take in order to meet its development objectives. Literature review and stakeholders opinion acknowledge the government initiative to put in place a harmonized planning and budgeting framework. Concerns however recorded during this assessment are the need to continue to adopt the planning cycle current prevailed by the government as majority of MDAs, RS and LGA have acquainted and are now in favour of the model. This assessment further suggests that in MKUKUTA/MKUZA II there should be a harmonised approach that affirms a common planning and reporting language strictly, as documented in Medium Term Strategic Planning and Budgeting Manual, and in all cases the MKUKUTA/MKUZA monitoring arrangement should follow government planning model as indicated below.

The recently introduced Planning, Budgeting and Reporting Manual presents a major opportunity for the MMS. It introduces a common approach to reporting that can serve the needs of MKUKUTA/MKUZA and any other cross-sectoral initiative very well. Form 12b in the Manual in particular is an important step forward. The reporting under the Manual is already making the production of the MAIR a lot more smooth. At the moment, the potential offered by this new approach is not yet fully exploited. More could be done to analyse the Forms 12b from MDAs and LGAs systematically.

A core function of the Secretariat should become to facilitate MKUKUTA integration into MDA and LGA plans, budgets and reports and to facilitate a two-way interaction between MDAs, LGAs and MoFEA in this respect.

**Funding arrangements**

The cost of implementing the MMS is considerable. The total planned annual budget for MMS on the Mainland stood at 2.3 billion TShs in 2001/02 and increased to 6.3 billion TShs in 2007/08, with a peak of 9.9 billion TShs in 2005/06. However, actual expenditure was well below the planned expenditure in each year. In 2007/08, for example, expenditure was only 4.4 billion TShs.

There are three main sources of funding for the MMS:
- Government contributions
- Development partner contributions directly to the TWGs (or more precisely, their secretariats)
- Development partner contributions to a especially established pooled fund

Government contributions to the MMS are relatively small and have not been increasing over time, as was the original intention. Government is expected to contribute at least TShs 1 billion per annum towards MKUKUTA M&E, but in reality only a fraction of this has been forthcoming. In 2009/10, for example, Government has only catered for 290 million TShs. Whether Government is willing to invest its own resources into the M&E arrangements for MKUKUTA is the ultimate test of how serious that Government is about the growth and poverty reduction strategy and the monitoring effort associated with it. A 2006 study by Daima Associates argued that Government should take full responsibility for funding the MMS through the Budget by 2012. But progress towards this aim has been slow. A question that needs serious thought is whether the willingness of Development Partners to invest in M&E for MKUKUTA is not in itself a reason for low Government contributions?

The intentions behind the pooled fund for the MMS were laudable, but its implementation has meant that it has simply created an additional layer of complexity and higher transaction costs. The fund was initially meant to simplify and rationalise funding for MKUKUTA M&E by mobilising Development Partner funds against the overall MKUKUTA Master Plan, hoping this would discourage direct funding to individual TWGs by ‘cherry picking’ Development Partners, making it easier for the MKUKUTA Secretariat to steer the MMS in the meantime. But not all donors bought into the pooled funding arrangements and several continued to provide direct funding to the TWGs. Therefore, the pooled fund was an additional funding mechanism and didn’t replace anything. Another challenge with the pooled fund is that it sits in between Government and Development Partner rules and regulations, therefore not following either set of rules and regulations properly. The bureaucracy involved in administering the pooled fund, particularly the need to review and approve work plans and budgets, has created a lot of work and has led to significant delays in funding being released due to the cumbersome nature of the scrutiny and approval process.

We propose discontinuing the pooled fund for MKUKUTA M&E as soon as the TSMP pooled fund is operational and provided that a satisfactory way is found to fund the RAWG, the Communications TWG and the remaining core functions of the MKUKUTA Secretariat. Government’s own contribution to MKUKUTA M&E should be guaranteed. A GBS condition in the PAF should be considered to ensure a smooth transition towards Government funding for the MMS.

Value for Money

Is it impossible to make a sound value for money judgement on the MMS at this moment in time, because of two reasons:

1 – the evidence generated by the MMS is of relevance to a much wider audience than the MMS stakeholders. Without mapping out who uses this evidence and for what purpose it is impossible to judge how the cost of the MMS compares to the benefits derived from it.

2 – we are insufficiently clear on what the evidence generated by the MMS is used for even by MMS stakeholders. We therefore cannot easily measure policy gains brought about by the MMS.
Annex A – Terms of Reference for the Assignment

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE STUDY ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MKUKUTA MONITORING AND EVALUATION FRAMEWORKS AND IMPLEMENTATION

1.0. Background

Soon after independence in 1961, Tanzania declared war against three enemies – poverty, disease and ignorance. This nature of policy direction determined the nature of interventions and their monitoring mechanisms. During that period, monitoring activities were carried out basing on sectors, programmes and projects until mid-1990s. Towards the end of 1990s a number of initiatives or establishing an integrated poverty monitoring system emerged. The ascendancy of the Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS), the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and Public Expenditure Review (PER), the National Strategy for Poverty Eradication (NPES) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) increased the demand for a systematic and integrated poverty monitoring system. The Government developed a list of Poverty and Welfare Monitoring Indicators in 1999 and the Tanzania Socio-Economic Database with specific module on poverty.

In 2001, the Government developed a comprehensive Poverty Monitoring System (PMS). The PMS, for the first time, provided guidance for a more systematic data and information collection, research and analysis. Surveys, census and researches were basically guided by one poverty reduction agenda through a set of indicators developed in a consultative manner. Research and academic institutions and Community Based Organizations were all coordinated under the Poverty Monitoring System. To exploit synergies and integration of monitoring, the PMS adopted a partnerships institutional set up, based on Technical Working Groups and the Steering Committee as a decision making body.

The adoption of MKUKUTA in 2005 created new challenges in terms of planning, budgeting and reporting. The need for cross sector collaboration and linkages increased the demand for coherent and coordinated national level approach to data and information collection, analysis and dissemination. Based on this new demand, the Government adopted the MKUKUTA Monitoring System after a broader consultative review with stakeholder including CSOs, MDAs and DPs.

The MKUKUTA Monitoring System (MMS) is also structured around Technical Working Groups of Data, Research and Analysis and Communication with the view to bringing into interface data
users and producers. MMS champions a national integrated approach to results monitoring, using MKUKUTA as the guiding medium-term framework. It aggregates performance reporting from Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) and Local Government Authority (LGAs) based on the Strategic Plans (SPs). MMS is broader and more comprehensive in its formation gathering and analysis; adopting a holistic view of monitoring encompassing growth, social wellbeing and governance. Thus MMS is key process towards an integrated Government monitoring and reporting mechanism over all national development underpinned by the National Developing Vision 2025.

In 2005 the Government through the harmonization task force developed the Medium Term Strategic Planning, Budgeting and Reporting Manual to provide the structure for MDA and LGA monitoring, evaluation and reporting. The manual in the process to strengthen the link between sector and national M&E systems it introduced structured reporting requirements of three types: quarterly, annual three years reporting. Processes are underway to institutionalize M&E activities into the Government machinery.

There is much to learn from the performance records including the improved availability of data and information, improved transparency and accountability; better articulation of indicators and agenda; and enhanced RBM Concept.

There are challenges, however, on managing results based monitoring system. There is more pressure from broad agenda underpinned by the MKUKUTA framework. The MKUKUTA Framework has broadened and deepened the monitoring agenda in terms of data collection, analysis and dissemination, and resources and management of the system. The expansion of indicators to more than 80 exerts even more pressure and hence more works on data collection (both routine and surveys), research analysis than during the PRS. The outcome framework is also calling for participation of more institutions and players than before.

Review of the indicators is also needed to avoid ambiguity. In their current version, some indicators cannot associate or link performance with the interventions. For example, indicators on corruption: one cannot clearly apprehend whether the increase in the number of corruption cases reported is a result of strengthened oversight institutions, increased media reporting or investigative journalism or increase in crime.

Emerging from this account is the need for a stronger national monitoring and reporting systems
with a clear links within and across Government and with other key players and strong and elaborate institutional set up. Thus, it is important that any credible monitoring systems is designed with the view to strengthen links between the MMS and the MDAs and LGAs monitoring systems, improve data quality, accessibility in the M&E system, improve expenditure reporting hence facilitate efficient resources allocation, improve M&E coordination arrangements, and strengthen results-based management, and strengthen capacity at all levels.

However, there are several other issues around M&E that need to be addressed during the review for further improvement. Among these is the capacity to undertake the necessary M&E analysis. This issue is particularly critical as more emphasis in the successor strategy is placed on deeper analysis and reporting on value for money. Critical review of these issues is needed to strengthen key processes of regular reviews and analysis (for example, monitoring systems and PER process at national, sectoral and local levels) and building capacity to manage them. Review of the indicators is also needed to avoid ambiguity. In their current version, some indicators cannot associate or link performance with the interventions. For example, indicators on corruption, one cannot clearly apprehend whether the increase in the number of corruption cases reported is a result of strengthened oversight institutions, increased media reporting or investigative journalism or increased in crime. There is therefore a need to re-examine such indicators during the process of reviewing MKUKUTA and their monitoring systems.

2. **Purpose**

The main purpose of this exercise is to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the monitoring system in terms of design, composition, implementation, incentive for reporting, and use of data by decision makers, and thereby informing the design of the next monitoring and evaluation.

3. **Objective**

The main objective is to review the design and functioning of the current MKUKUTA M&E framework and to identify the main factors that facilitate or act as obstacles to the monitoring of the progress towards goals and targets, and evaluation of impact of MKUKUTA policies.

4. **Specific Tasks for phase I**

This exercise is expected to cover the following main areas:
i) Assessment of the effectiveness of the monitoring system in terms of institutional design, implementation and reports and other M&E outputs, incentive for reporting, and use of data by decision makers.

ii) Assessment of the gaps in the data systems (to be addressed by TSMP) and realistic baseline and targets;

iii) Assessment of effectiveness of current indicators especially in the areas of good governance and accountability;

iv) Assessment of progress on capacity development of M&E systems to undertake RBM analysis at national, sectoral and district/council levels;

v) Assessment of the progress made towards broad based participation of local stakeholders in the implementation of monitoring of MKUKUTA.

vi) Assessment of quality of outputs of the systems in feeding into policing making processes.

vii) Assessment of linkages between national and sectoral M&E systems and units.

viii) To assess the linkage of PLANREP and LGMD in the achievement to MMS objectives/or assess the extent to which the PLANREP and LGMD have contributed/complimented to the effectiveness of MKUKUTA M&E.

ix) To provide a set of recommendations and proposed way forward.

5. Specific Tasks for phase II

i) Assessment of achievement and obstacles to deepen institutionalization of monitoring and evaluation systems in government (see chapter 7 of the manual).

ii) Undertake capacity needs assessment on the monitoring activities across government including assessment of M&E systems to undertake RBM analysis at national, sectoral and district/council levels for MKUKUTA II,

iii) Provide advice on staffing across government and implementation of MMS II,

iv) Provide strategic advice on strengthening the links and harmonization between MMS II and PER process;

v) Review the link between the LGAs M&E system and MMS;

vi) Provide advice on harmonization of MKUKUTA II M&E and MKUZA M&E.

vii) Develop modalities (practices) for how performance information should be provided to the public, Parliament and others;
viii) Develop proposals on developing legal instruments, which might include performance reporting acts, regulations or circulars and M&E policies.

6.0. Methodology

This assignment will require combination of independent assessment desk review and consultation. It may also require tapping on international best cases and experience. The consultations have to review the following documents, among others, Chapter 7 of the Medium Term Strategic Planning and Budgeting Manual, a study on Mapping the Transition of Funding Modalities for the MM from Pooled Funds to GBS, TSMP, MAIRs, MDGRs, Monitoring Master Plans, Survey reports, articles, working papers, briefs by Government, researchers, civil society etc.

7.0. Expected Outcomes

Leadership: Leadership of M&E coordination improved at both national and LGA levels.

Delivery: The deliverables of the MKUKUTA and MKUZA Monitoring Systems improved.

Capacity: National capacity to manage and use M&E improved.

8.0. Expected Output

The expected output is a report that informs on how best to improve the effectiveness of M&E framework to monitor and reporting on the implementation of the new strategy at all levels.

9.0. Process and timeframe:

For phase I: First, the consultant will submit a brief inception note describing his reflections on the study topic and ToRs and how best will be the approach to achieve the set outputs to the Lead Actor (PEED). The Lead Actor through CWG III will discuss the inception note and agree with the consultant on the aspects of the MKUKUTA monitoring system that would be the focus of the main report. Deadline: two weeks after signing the contract.

Second, the consultant will submit a draft report and all the relevant background information. Deadline: one month after signing the contract. Finally, the consultant will submit the final report, after revisions on the basis of the comments from consultations. Deadline: three weeks after
This assignment is supervised by PEED as Lead Actor. Technical Discussions on the inception note, draft and final reports will be within the dialogue structure mechanism under CWG III and the current MKUKUTA Monitoring System. These activities should take approximately 25-30 workdays. Payments will be made as follows: 20% upon submission of the inception note, 50% upon submission of draft report, and 30% upon submission of final report satisfactory to the Lead Actor.

10. **Budget for phase I**

International consultant  
- Air ticket (return) $981X25 = TZS 2,648,700  
- DFID standard Hotel $161X25 = TZS 5,433,750  
- DSA 79,780X 25 = TZS 1,994,500

National consultant  
- 331,279X25 = TZS 8,281,975

National consultant  
- 398,853X25 = TZS 9,971,325

**Total Cost**  
TZS **28,330,250**

Exchange rate 1$=TZS 1350

11. **Budget for phase II**

International consultant  
- Air ticket (return) $981X2 = TZS 2,648,700  
- DFID standard Hotel $161X30 = TZS 6,520,500  
- DSA 79,780X 30 = TZS 2,393,400

National consultant  
- 331,279X30 = TZS 9,938,370

National consultant  
- 398,853X30 = TZS 11,965,590

**Total cost**  
TZS **33,466,560**

12. **Profile of the consultants**

The international consultant should have a minimum of the Master Degree, with more than 10 years of experience in National Level Monitoring and Evaluation systems particularly in African
and Asian countries. The national consultants should have at least a postgraduate qualification with not less than 5 years of experience in M&E. Experience in MKUKUTA/MKUZA monitoring systems and LGA M&E will be an additional advantage.
Annex B – List of people met

1 - M. Abassy, National Bureau of Statistics
2 - Said Aboud, National Bureau of Statistics
3 - Rose Aiko, Adviser, Swiss Development Agency
4 - Kyoko Akasaka, JICA-RASDAG
5 - Alana Albee, previously Poverty Monitoring Adviser to the Government of Tanzania
6 - Christopher Awinia, Executive Director, Praxis Limited
7 - Henry Banwebaga, Poverty Eradication and Empowerment Division, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs and Secretary to the Communications Working Group
8 - Amarakoon Bandara, UNDP
9 - Monique Bergeron, Senior Programme Analyst, CIDA
10 - Djax Biria, Executive Director TRACE and President, Tanzania Evaluation Association
11 - Jackson Biswaro, JICA
12 - Beverly Brar, Institutional Development Adviser, UNAIDS
13 - Robert Chacha, Senior Economist, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives
14 - Albina Chuwa, Director General, National Bureau of Statistics and Chair of the Surveys and Census Working Group
15 - Julian K. Crutta, Ministry of Industry, Trade and Marketing
16 - Thomas Danielewitz, JPO, World Bank
17 - Mary Faini, Planning Commission and Chair of the Research and Analysis Working Group
18 - Kabuje Furdha, Ministry of Livestock Development and Fisheries
19 - Genya C. Genya, Ministry of Industry, Trade and Marketing
20 - Ebenezer Godfrey, Poverty Eradication and Empowerment Division, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
21 - Tim Harris, Statistician, UK Department for International Development
22 - Hendrik van der Heijden, Senior Consultant to the Development Partners Group, MKUKUTA Review
23 - Omar Jecha, Foundation for Civil Society
24 - Albert Jimwaga, ActionAid
25 - Joseph Kaiza, Programme Analyst, UNDP
26 - Happiness Katuma, Statistician, Ministry of Health
27 - Hadija Kigoto, Ministry of Health
28 - Semkae Kilonzo, Coordinator, Policy Forum
29 - Riika Karkkainen, Programme Officer, Finnish Embassy
30 - Hassan Kitenge, Assistant Director, President's Office, Public Service Management
31 - Dan Kobb, M&E Adviser, President's Office, Public Service Management
32 - Aldegunda Komba, National Bureau of Statistics
33 - N. B. Kombo, MAHRO, Temeke Municipal Council
34 - Ulrika Lang, Swedish Embassy
35 - Emmanuel Kwiligwa, OD Practitioner, TRACE and Tanzania Evaluation Association
36 - Stevan Lee, Senior Economist, UK Department for International Development
37 - J.D.M. Lema, Poverty Eradication and Empowerment Division, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
38 - Stephen Nelson Maganda, National Bureau of Statistics
39 - J.D. Maige, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives
40 - Ahmed Makbel, National Bureau of Statistics
41 - Pheonas Makoba, Ministry of Health
42 - Dr Sylvia Mamkwe, MMOH, Temeke Municipal Council
43 - Amon Manyama, UNDP
44 - Albanie M Marcossy, Manager, Accountability Monitoring, Policy Forum
45 - Radegunda H. Maro, National Bureau of Statistics
46 - M.M. Masogo, Statistician, Temeke Municipal Council
47 - Elias M. Masunga, Principal Economist, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives
48 - Grace Matiko, Poverty Eradication and Empowerment Division, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
49. Joan Mboya, Principal Economist, Government Budget Division, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
51. Da Silva D. Mlay, Ministry of Livestock Development and Fisheries
52. Deogratius Mlay, Orgut Consulting and member of the Communications Technical Working Group
53. Sophia Mlote, Head of M&E Section, Ministry of Livestock Development and Fisheries
54. Donald Mmari, REPOA
55. Grace Mosha, Planning Commission
56. Pius M. Mponzi, Assistant Commissioner, Government Budget Division, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
57. Dr. Zakayo E. Msokwa, East African Statistical Training Centre
58. J.K. Msuya, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives
59. Victor P. Mwainyekeule, Assistant Director, Poverty Eradication and Empowerment Division, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
60. Hamisi Mwango, Deputy Director, TRACE and Tanzania Evaluation Association
61. Isaac E. Mwangonoo, MIA, Tembe Municipal Council
62. Enoch Muhehe, M&E Officer, DPP, Ministry of Health
63. Laurian J. Munna, Economist, Tembe Municipal Council
64. Selestine P. Mushi, Poverty Eradication and Empowerment Division, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
65. Lelansi Mwakibibi, Poverty Eradication and Empowerment Division, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
66. Anna Mwasha, Director Poverty Eradication and Empowerment Division, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
67. Mary Mwingira, Executive Director, TANGO (Tanzanian Association of NGOs)
68. W. Mwingira, National Bureau of Statistics
69. Yasunuri Nakamura, Economic Cooperation Adviser, Embassy of Japan
70. Bunyazu Ntambi, Ministry of Education and member of the Communications Technical Working Group
71. Gerald Nzalalila, Statistician, Ministry of Health
73. Emily Poskett, Statistician, UK Department for International Development in Tanzania
74. Nsiande Raymond, Economist, Ministry of Livestock Development and Fisheries
75. Oswald Rubohe, Principal Economist, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives
76. Alex Ruchyahinduru, Manager, Media, Communication and Advocacy, Policy Forum
77. Servus Sagday, Assistant Director, Poverty Eradication and Empowerment Division, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
78. Danford Sango, REPOA
80. Prof. Joseph Semboja, Executive Secretary, Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA)
81. Ian Shapiro, previously Governance Adviser and Team Leader, UK Department for International Development in Tanzania
82. Edward Simon, Economist, Tembe Municipal Council
83. Geir Sundet, Programme Director, Accountability in Tanzania, KPMG
84. Emmanuel Tutuba, Principal Economist, Government Budget Division, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
85. Joyce Urassa, National Bureau of Statistics
86. C.W.M Wambura, Head of M&E Section, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives
87. Waly Ware, Senior Economist, World Bank
88. Michio Watanabe, Team Leader, JICA-RASDAG
89. Wilfred Yohana, Ministry of Health
Zanzibar

90 - Jamila Abbas, MKUZA Secretariat
91 - Karim S. Ahmada, MKUZA Secretariat
92 - Fatma Bilal, UNFPA
93 - Maryam Dhahir, MKUZA Secretariat
94 - Ahmed M Haji, MKUZA Secretariat
95 - Hasan Khamis Juma, Secretary General of ANGOZA (Association of NGOs, Zanzibar)
96 - Mwanaishi Ali Khamis, OCGS and Secretary of the Surveys and Census Working Group
97 - Crispin Kapinga, Programme Analyst, UNDP
98 - Amina Makame, M&E Officer, ZAC
99 - Abdul Rahman Mnoga, Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government
100 - Mayasa M Mwinyi, Head of Social Statistics, OCGS
101 - Saeed Seif, Lecturer, ZIFA
102 - Ameir Sheha, Commissioner External Finance, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
103 - Dr Zakia, Lecturer, State University of Zanzibar and Research and Analysis Working Group chair
Annex C – List of documents consulted


Bitz, Michael; *Tanzania LGA M&E Systems Assessment. Assessment of Options for Integration and Streamlining of the Multiple LGA Information Systems in Tanzania.* June 2009.


Cook, Thomas; *Consultancy Services to Refine the Monitoring and Evaluation of the LGRP II (D by D) Reform Process in the United Republic of Tanzania (Mainland).* May 2009.


Policy Forum; *Kaya za Tanzania Bara: Umaskini Umepunguza? Tafsiri Rahisi ya Ripoti ya Utafiti wa Bajeti ya Kaya Tanzania Bara.* Dar es Salaam, s.d.


United Republic of Tanzania; *Communication Strategy for the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty.* Vice-President’s Office, July 2005.

United Republic of Tanzania; *MKUKUTA Monitoring Master Plan and Indicator Information.* Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowerment, December 2006.

United Republic of Tanzania; *Medium-Term Strategic Planning and Budgeting Manual.* October 2007.


Annex D - Draft TOR for the revision of the indicator framework

Background

Ever since independence in 1961, the eradication of poverty has been a central policy objective for the Government of Tanzania. In the late 1990s a new momentum was given to the drive to reduce poverty and promote economic growth when Government first developed the National Poverty Eradication Strategy (NPES) and later a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) for the mainland and a Zanzibar Poverty Reduction Plan (ZPRP). These plans were succeeded by Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategies - MKUKUTA for the mainland in 2005 and MKUZA for Zanzibar in 2006. Planning and budgeting were greatly facilitated by the emergence of a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and a Public Expenditure Review (PER) process in the 1990s. The introduction of a Medium-Term Strategic Planning and Budgeting Manual has further strengthened the planning and budgeting process.

The emergence of a national overarching strategy for economic growth and poverty reduction in the form of the PRSP/ZPRP also provided both a demand and an opportunity for a more systematic approach to monitoring and evaluation. In 2001, Government developed a comprehensive Poverty Monitoring System to accompany the PRSP. Consensus was built on a core list of indicators; agreement was reached on the surveys and routine data sources required to produce estimates against these indicators; an institutional framework was established which brought together producers and users of data on poverty and economic growth; and key products and a dissemination process were defined. These arrangements were set out in the Poverty Monitoring Master Plan (PMMP).

When the PRSP and ZPRP were succeeded by the MKUKUTA and MKUZA, there was a need to revisit the Poverty Monitoring System (PMS) to reflect the change of emphasis in the strategy and to adjust shortcomings of the PMS. MKUKUTA and MKUZA both put a stronger emphasis on economic growth and the importance of cross-sectoral collaboration and linkages to achieve the desired results in economic growth and poverty reduction. The indicator list was adjusted and expanded to ensure the full spectrum of economic growth, social well being and governance objectives could be tracked by the monitoring system. The new system also tried more explicitly to rationalise and strengthen linkages between the monitoring efforts of Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDA), Local Government Authorities (LGA) and national M&E efforts. In addition, the institutional framework was rationalised. There are MKUKUTA and MKUZA monitoring master plans that set out the new arrangements in detail.

MKUKUTA and MKUZA are nearing the end of their implementation period and Government has started the process of designing a follow-up strategy. A comprehensive review of MKUKUTA/MKUZA is ongoing to inform the new strategy. Once the follow-up strategy for MKUKUTA/MKUZA is in place, the M&E arrangements for the strategy will also need to be revisited, with a view to strengthening the evidence-based culture and practice in the promotion of economic growth and poverty reduction and building on lessons learnt with the Poverty Monitoring System and the MKUKUTA/MKUZA monitoring system over the past decade.

At the core of the MKUKUTA/MKUZA monitoring system is a list of indicators, that together are aimed at making it possible to track progress with the implementation of the strategy, as well as the outputs and outcomes of this process. Under the earlier Poverty Monitoring System, 60 indicators were systematically tracked. Under MKUKUTA/MKUZA, this list was expanded to 84, to take account of the shifting focus of the strategy and accommodate the information needs of stakeholders. Of these 84 indicators, 50 are tracked on an annual basis and the remaining 34 are tracked less frequently.

The MKUKUTA Monitoring Master Plan provides detailed metadata for each indicator, including:
- definition
- rationale for inclusion
- relevant MKUKUTA section
- source(s) of data
- responsible institution(s)
- frequency of measurement
- time lag in reporting
- levels of aggregation
- baseline year and value
- MKUKUTA target
- comments on data quality
- methodological comments
- action required
- relevant policies and strategies in place

The detailed, systematic presentation of meta-data in the MKUKUTA Monitoring Master Plan sets best practice when it comes to PRSP monitoring systems.

Van Diesen, Mpemba and Mwisomba, in their 2009 review of MKUKUTA and MKUZA M&E arrangements, make the following remarks about the indicator systems for MKUKUTA and MKUZA:

- Like many other indicator frameworks established to track progress with the implementation of Poverty Reduction Strategies around the world, the MKUKUTA and MKUZA indicator frameworks also struggle with a ‘missing middle’. They over-emphasise the input and activity-related indicators that can be tracked easily, as well as the high-level poverty-related outcome indicators, which the strategies ultimately want to influence. While it is understandable how this focus has emerged, it results in findings that are not immediately ‘actionable’ by key decision makers. What is missing in many PRS indicator frameworks are indicators that explain how inputs and activities are transformed into the ultimate outcomes that the strategies aim to bring about. To plug the missing middle in the MMS indicator framework, it would be useful to have better data on public expenditure – looking at allocation, execution and value for money measures. There could also be better use of service delivery indicators. Client satisfaction levels about Government services can be particularly informative to guide policy decisions.

- The area that is weakest in the MKUKUTA/MKUZA indicator framework is that of governance. The mantra that good governance is too difficult to measure does not hold any more, given a lot of groundbreaking work on governance indicators over the past decade. The work by Dan Kaufmann and others in the context of the World Bank’s ‘Governance Matters’ has set new standards and developed new models of tracking governance. The Millennium Challenge Corporation also has developed new thinking on measuring governance. Recent work by Jeremy Holland has looked at best practice in voice and accountability indicators. All this global expertise should be drawn on when revisiting the indicator framework. Some stakeholders also expressed a wish to see more crime and personal safety indicators included in the governance cluster.

- Stakeholders also raised the question whether the MKUKUTA/MKUZA indicator framework shouldn’t look at the quality of the aid relationship as well. This would go a long way towards strengthening mutual accountability between Government and Development Partners. The revision of the indicator framework should consider including indicators drawn from the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action, as well as the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania.

- The revision of the indicator framework should make a systematic comparison of the Budget Support Performance Assessment Framework and the MKUKUTA/MKUZA indicator list. If the aid harmonisation and alignment principles are followed to their logical conclusion, Budget Support donors should simply tap into national reporting on MKUKUTA/MKUZA to inform their assessment of budget support operations. One step towards that is to ensure that the indicators in the Performance Assessment Framework and in the MKUKUTA/MKUZA framework are the same, or at least very similar. If the two
are too different, the budget support operation undermines domestic accountability processes. If they are synchronised, the budget support operation strengthens domestic accountability.

- As the MMS matures, the time is ripe to move beyond a rigid indicator system and towards a system in which stakeholders are empowered to ask informed policy questions, which the MMS answers by referring to a variety of indicators. The MMS is perhaps too focused on producing data for indicators, and insufficiently focused on eliciting and posing the right questions, and subsequently finding evidence to answer these questions. The TWGs, the Secretariat, the Monitoring Advisory Committee and the Technical Committee all have a role to play in bringing this shift in the MMS about – from a data production machine for an agreed set of indicators to a space for dialogue and policy thinking on economic growth and poverty reduction, strongly based on robust evidence.

But while MKUKUTA/MKUZA II should not be too narrowly focused on data production for a rigid indicator list, the M&E arrangements still need a core list of indicators to track progress and hold the wide variety of stakeholders involved in implementing MKUKUTA/MKUZA to account. When a draft MKUKUTA/MKUZA II is available, the indicator list needs revisiting and revising. The following general principles should be borne in mind in this exercise:

- Continuity: to allow tracking of indicators over time, since the inception of the first PRSP and ZPRP, it is important that where indicators are still relevant and there are no significant measurement problems, they remain in the indicator framework unchanged.
- Affordability/feasibility: the cost of adding indicators should be considered carefully before expansions of the indicator list are considered. Not only the cost of data collection for the indicators needs consideration, but also the cost of collating, analysing and interpreting the data, as well as reporting against each indicator. With over 80 indicators already included in the MKUKUTA Monitoring Master Plan, the upper limit of what is a manageable list of indicators has probably already been reached.
- Plugging the ‘missing middle’: make better use of public expenditure data; include indicators that explain how inputs and activities are translated into outcomes; use service delivery and client satisfaction indicators.
- A spread of indicators across MKUKUTA/MKUZA: ensure areas that are weak in the indicator framework, governance in particular, are covered more adequately. Consider the inclusion of crime and personal safety indicators. Also consider indicators that describe the quality of the aid relationship.
- A judicious mix of frequencies of reporting: not all indicators will be estimated every year. Ensure there is a good mix of indicators that can be reported against annually and those that are estimated less frequently.
- Consistency with other M&E efforts: consider indicators used in other M&E efforts, in particular LGA and MDA strategic plan reporting, sector review processes, performance assessment for budget support. As far as possible, ensure the same indicators are used.
- Build consensus: if the tracking of indicators is to be meaningful, those whose performance is being tracked need to have ownership of these indicators. Therefore, the revision of the indicator list needs to be carried out in close consultation with the relevant MDAs, LGAs and non-governmental stakeholders.

Purpose

To produce an updated and improved indicator list for MKUKUTA/MKUZA II.

Objective

To revisit and revise the MKUKUTA/MKUZA indicator lists in order to produce an improved indicator framework which:
- reflects changes in emphasis in MKUKUTA/MKUZA II
- has been discussed and is agreeable to all relevant stakeholders
- covers all aspects of MKUKUTA/MKUZA II
- allows tracking of implementation of the strategy, as well as progress towards outputs and outcomes
- will result in timely evidence for decision makers
- is based on international best practice
- is affordable and realistic
- prioritises continuity where possible, to allow long-term tracking
- matches well with other M&E and reporting efforts (MDA and LGA strategic plan reporting, sector reviews, Budget Support performance monitoring)

Specific Tasks

- Analyse the draft MKUKUTA/MKUZA II and compare it against the existing indicator list, highlighting aspects that are not covered as well as those indicators that are no longer relevant. Propose new indicators for those aspects of the strategy not sufficiently covered.
- Review the track record of each existing indicator, highlighting any difficulties with data availability, measurement problems, interpretation of data. Propose changes to the indicator framework accordingly.
- Consider other M&E processes, in particular MDA/LGA Strategic Plan reporting, sector reviews and budget support performance assessment. Determine to what extent the indicator lists are consistent and propose changes to enhance consistency.
- Reflect international best practice on governance indicators to stakeholders and propose how governance might be covered better in the indicator framework.
- Consider the spread of indicators and the problem of the ‘missing middle’. Present proposals on how the ‘missing middle’ may be plugged, looking in particular at public expenditure, service delivery and client satisfaction indicators.
- Develop ideas on how summary reporting against the MKUKUTA/MKUZA indicators might be strengthened, proposing a ‘dashboard’ approach for use in the MAIR and PHDR.
- Hold interviews with key stakeholders, including both data producers and data users, to collect views on the choice of indicators and indicator reporting and make proposals for changes accordingly.
- Hold clinics with small groups of stakeholders to discuss individual indicators and how they might be strengthened, aiming for consensus with relevant MDAs, LGAs and non-governmental stakeholders.

Methodology

The team will use a mix of:
- desk review
- interviews with key stakeholders
- clinics to discuss individual indicators

Expected Outcomes

The expected outcome of this exercise is a revised indicator framework that allows timely tracking of progress with MKUKUTA/MKUZA II implementation as well as progress towards outputs and outcomes.

Expected Output

- An inception report one week after the start of the assignment
- A draft report within six weeks of the start of the assignment
- A final report within two weeks of the submission of comments by Government of Tanzania

Process and time frame

The assignment will be carried out by a team of one international and two local consultants. It shall
commence as soon as a final draft report of MKUKUTA/MKUZA II is available. Over a period of two months, the person days required are estimated at 15 days for the international consultant and 30 days for each national consultant. The international consultant will provide international expertise and best practice examples, and will quality assure the work of the local consultants. The local consultants will conduct the interviews and clinics and detailed desk review.

**Budget**

Government of Tanzania to suggest.

**Profile of the Consultants**

The international consultant should have at least a Master’s Degree in statistics or in another relevant field with a strong quantitative focus, with more than 10 years of experience in national level Monitoring and Evaluation systems particularly in African and Asian countries. Previous experience with PRSP M&E systems is desired. The national consultants should have at least a postgraduate qualification with not less than 5 years of experience in M&E. Experience in MKUKUTA/MKUZA monitoring systems and LGA M&E will be an additional advantage. All consultants should share a sound understanding of the role of evidence in policy making and how it may be enhanced.
Annex E - Draft TOR for a capacity needs assessment

Background

Ever since independence in 1961, the eradication of poverty has been a central policy objective for the Government of Tanzania. In the late 1990s a new momentum was given to the drive to reduce poverty and promote economic growth when Government first developed the National Poverty Eradication Strategy (NPES) and later a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) for the mainland and a Zanzibar Poverty Reduction Plan (ZPRP). These plans were succeeded by Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategies - MKUKUTA for the mainland in 2005 and MKUZA for Zanzibar in 2006. Planning and budgeting were greatly facilitated by the emergence of a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and a Public Expenditure Review (PER) process in the 1990s. The introduction of a Medium-Term Strategic Planning and Budgeting Manual has further strengthened the planning and budgeting process.

The emergence of a national overarching strategy for economic growth and poverty reduction in the form of the PRSP/ZPRP also provided both a demand and an opportunity for a more systematic approach to monitoring and evaluation. In 2001, Government developed a comprehensive Poverty Monitoring System to accompany the PRSP. Consensus was built on a core list of indicators; agreement was reached on the surveys and routine data sources required to produce estimates against these indicators; an institutional framework was established which brought together producers and users of data on poverty and economic growth; and key products and a dissemination process were defined. These arrangements were set out in the Poverty Monitoring Master Plan (PMMP).

When the PRSP and ZPRP were succeeded by the MKUKUTA and MKUZA, there was a need to revisit the Poverty Monitoring System (PMS) to reflect the change of emphasis in the strategy and to adjust shortcomings of the PMS. MKUKUTA and MKUZA both put a stronger emphasis on economic growth and the importance of cross-sectoral collaboration and linkages to achieve the desired results in economic growth and poverty reduction. The indicator list was adjusted and expanded to ensure the full spectrum of economic growth, social well being and governance objectives could be tracked by the monitoring system. The new system also tried more explicitly to rationalise and strengthen linkages between the monitoring efforts of Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDA), Local Government Authorities (LGA) and national M&E efforts. In addition, the institutional framework was rationalised. There are MKUKUTA and MKUZA monitoring master plans that set out the new arrangements in detail.

MKUKUTA and MKUZA are nearing the end of their implementation period and Government has started the process of designing a follow-up strategy. A comprehensive review of MKUKUTA/MKUZA is ongoing to inform the new strategy. Once the follow-up strategy for MKUKUTA/MKUZA is in place, the M&E arrangements for the strategy will also need to be revisited, with a view to strengthening the evidence-based culture and practice in the promotion of economic growth and poverty reduction and building on lessons learnt with the Poverty Monitoring System and the MKUKUTA/MKUZA monitoring system over the past decade.

One broad issue that needs attention if the evidence-based decision-making culture is to truly take hold across the Government of Tanzania is the issue of capacity – the capacity to:

- define and communicate information needs emerging from policy formulation or policy implementation
- design and implement M&E systems that will meet identified information needs
- design robust data collections systems, covering surveys as well as routine data systems
- analyse data sets
- disseminate evidence in an appropriate manner to a wide variety of audiences
- interpret data and apply evidence to the policy making process
- design and deliver robust, scientific policy evaluations
- identify research and evaluation questions
Van Diesen, Mpemba and Mwisomba, in their assessment of MKUKUTA/MKUZA M&E arrangements, make the following remarks about capacity issues:

- The MKUKUTA/MKUZA Secretariats are considered by many stakeholders to be weak. Stakeholders would like to see a stronger strategic direction and a more proactive approach from the Secretariats. In the light of these views, it would be useful for the Secretariats and their institutional hosts both on the Mainland and on Zanzibar to analyse their capacity. Things to consider are:
  - Clarity of vision and mission
  - Work load and prioritisation
  - Internal division of labour
  - Staff capacity (numbers, skills, competencies)
  - Other elements of internal capacity
  - Linkages to other parts of MoFEA, wider Government and non-Governmental stakeholders

- The capacity of the MKUKUTA/MKUZA Secretariat has been an issue since the early days of the PRSP/ZPRP. For many years, development partners have supported the Secretariats – with technical assistance as well as financial support. This support has reduced over time, but the capacity constraints remain. As part of the formulation of the successor arrangement for MKUKUTA/MKUZA, Government should take a critical view of capacity and capacity needs in the Secretariats, and make an investment in Secretariat capacity that is commensurate with the importance it attaches to the role of the Secretariats. If MKUKUTA and MKUZA are integrated in the next phase, one option that should be given thought is the option of establishing a joint secretariat for MKUKUTA/MKUZA II.

- A positive development in recent years is the emergence of a growing number of M&E posts throughout the Government of Tanzania. These posts are established at senior level (several Assistant Director posts) and at junior level. This is a sign that the concept of M&E is gradually taking hold in the Government of Tanzania. However, there is, to date, no recognised M&E cadre in Government. Therefore, there are no agreed entry criteria and competency standards for M&E staff. As a result, people with a variety of academic backgrounds and different job profiles claim the title of M&E officer. There is also no recognised training programme at undergraduate or graduate level to prepare people for a career in M&E. The training on offer on M&E is ad hoc and short term. Recognition and professionalisation of the M&E cadre in Government would be a major step forward towards stronger evidence-based decision making.

- The Research and Analysis TWG members feel that their work is constrained by limited domestic capacity for analytical work. The group finds that it relies on a relatively small pool of experts, with limited opportunities for young researchers to hone their talents and enhance their capacity and experience. If Government is serious about instilling an evidence-based decision-making culture and wants a strong results orientation, boosting domestic analytical capacity is important.

**Purpose**

To make a detailed assessment of existing capacity across the Government of Tanzania, at all levels, for monitoring and evaluation and evidence-based decision making, resulting in a set of recommendations on how this capacity may be boosted during MKUKUTA/MKUZA II.

**Objective**

To provide clarity on capacity constraints for M&E and evidence-based decision-making across the Government of Tanzania and to make realistic proposals on what Government might do to alleviate these capacity constraints.
Specific Tasks

- To assess the extent to which capacity for M&E and evidence-based decision-making has been enhanced over the past decade, and to determine the extent to which this change can be attributed to the PRSP/ZPRP/MKUKUTA/MKUZA implementation process. This task should consider progress at national, sectoral and district levels.

- To carry out a capacity needs assessment in the light of the newly emerging M&E arrangements of MKUKUTA/MKUZA II and the Government’s wider drive to strengthen results-based management. This should look at all stages of evidence-based decision-making (from design of M&E systems and data collection tools to the application of findings to the policy process) and look at national, sectoral and district levels. Specific attention should be paid to the capacity needs of the MKUKUTA/MKUZA secretariats.

- To gather and present international evidence on how other Governments in Africa and further afield have gone about building capacity for M&E and results-based management. This would include examples of Governments that have proactively built an M&E cadre in the civil service.

- To provide an inventory of service providers in Tanzania and in the region who could be used to strengthen capacity for M&E and results-based management. To identify institutions that offer distance-based capacity strengthening on these topics.

- To suggest minimum standards and a competency framework for M&E personnel at different levels. To suggest a draft job description for M&E staff at different levels.

- To produce a detailed, costed and sequenced proposal on how capacity for M&E and results-based management may be enhanced during MKUKUTA/MKUZA II.

Methodology

The consultants will use a combination of:
- Desk review
- Interviews
- Online research

Expected Outcomes

A concerted effort by Government of Tanzania to address capacity constraints that hold back progress towards the establishment of a results-oriented decision-making culture firmly based on robust evidence.

Expected Output

- Inception report setting out the approach
- Report setting out capacity constraints and a costed, sequenced, realistic plan for capacity enhancement
- Draft competency framework and minimum standards for M&E staff
- Model job description
- Inventory of service providers

Process and time frame

The assignment will be carried out by a team of one international and two local consultants. It shall commence as soon as a final draft report of MKUKUTA/MKUZA II is available. Over a period of two months, the person days required are estimated at 20 days for the international consultant and 30 days for each national consultant. The international consultant will provide international expertise.
and best practice examples, and will quality assure the work of the local consultants. The local consultants will conduct the interviews and detailed desk review.

**Budget**

Government of Tanzania to suggest.

**Profile of the Consultants**

The international consultant should have at least a Master's Degree in statistics or in another relevant field with a strong quantitative focus, with more than 10 years of experience in national level Monitoring and Evaluation systems particularly in African and Asian countries. Previous experience with PRSP M&E systems is desired. The national consultants should have at least a postgraduate qualification with not less than 5 years of experience in M&E. Experience in MKUKUTA/MKUZA monitoring systems and LGA M&E will be an additional advantage. All consultants should share a sound understanding of the role of evidence in policy making and how it may be enhanced.