Politics, Patronage and Projects: The Political Economy of Agricultural Policy in Tanzania

Brian Cooksey
March 2012

This paper was produced as part of the FAC Political Economy of Agricultural Policy in Africa (PEAPA) work stream.
‘Cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shall thou eat of it all the days of thy life; … and thou shalt eat the herb of the field. In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground;’

Book of Genesis, Chapter 3, verses 17-19
**ACRONYMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGRA</td>
<td>Alliance for the Green Revolution in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFSP</td>
<td>Accelerated Food Security Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMSDP</td>
<td>Agricultural Marketing Systems Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDP</td>
<td>Agriculture Sector Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDPr</td>
<td>Agriculture Sector Development Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDS</td>
<td>Agriculture Sector Development Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASLM</td>
<td>Agriculture Sector Lead Ministries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAADP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAG</td>
<td>Controller and Auditor General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Chama cha Mapinduzi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DADP</td>
<td>District Agricultural Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBS</td>
<td>General Budget Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIDF</td>
<td>District Irrigation Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoT</td>
<td>Government of Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFAD</td>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAAC</td>
<td>Local Authorities Accounts Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGA</td>
<td>Local Government Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAFS</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAFC</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MITM</td>
<td>Ministry of Industry, Trade and Marketing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKUKUTA</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLDF</td>
<td>Ministry of Livestock Development and Fisheries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOWI</td>
<td>Ministry of Water and Irrigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAIVS</td>
<td>National Agricultural Inputs Voucher Scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIDF</td>
<td>National irrigation Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMB</td>
<td>National Microfinance Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>Operation and Maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMO-RALG</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s Office – Regional Administration and Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEAPAP</td>
<td>Political Economy of Agricultural Policy in Africa Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACCOS</td>
<td>Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAGCOT</td>
<td>Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAP</td>
<td>Tanzania Agricultural Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNBC</td>
<td>Tanzania National Business Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVC</td>
<td>Village Voucher Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRS</td>
<td>Warehouse Receipt System</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
0.0 Abstract

The Political Economy of Agricultural Policy in Africa (PEAPA) Programme examines the impact of political competition, patronage, and foreign aid on agricultural policy outcomes across a sample of eight African countries. This report examines the effects of these factors on agricultural policy formulation and implementation in Tanzania through the lens of two initiatives, the Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP) and the National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme (NAIVS). The report asks whether competitive politics has improved the policy regime for rural voters as political parties compete for their support and the ruling elite responds to increasing electoral pressures to deliver concrete benefits. The broad conclusion is that both vote-seeking and patronage incentivise agricultural policy but that the benefits to voters in terms of private and public goods delivered as a result are limited by the same patronage practiced from national to local levels. On balance, donor aid supports essentially statist policies which serve to marginalise the private sector as the ‘engine of growth.’

The ASDP (2006-13) is Tanzania’s main agricultural policy initiative of the new century. The Programme was slow to take off through disagreements between the Government of Tanzania and donor agencies, who partly financed it through basket funding and a World Bank soft loan. Donors perceived a heavily state-centred development strategy focusing on the provision of public goods, a consequent overconcentration of resources for central government ministries and their dependent parastatals, and a secondary role for markets and private actors.

Shortly after the 2005 elections, President Kikwete announced an ambitious target for irrigated rice production, which then became the main focus of the ASDP. A number of donors pulled out of the programme, but the WB weighed in with a large project, thus endorsing the controversial focus on small-scale irrigation schemes. Though there was a clear vote-seeking incentive to the President’s initiative, it is likely that the rents created for irrigation and other ASDP initiatives were largely appropriated by central and local-level elites and private actors, though corroborative information is lacking.

The NAIVS is a clearer example of a vote-seeking initiative by the ruling elite. Consisting of input vouchers for fertiliser and seeds for maize and rice production, NAIVS expanded rapidly in the build-up to the 2010 elections, with significant support from the WB’s Accelerated Food Security Programme (AFSP). In 2010/11, NAIVS was scaled up to 74 districts in 20 regions targeting around 2,000,000 direct beneficiaries. How many farm households actually benefited from the scheme is yet to be established, but there is substantial anecdotal evidence of patronage and rent-seeking from the centre down to the village level influencing actual distribution.

In all events, the 2010 elections attracted a very low voter turn-out, and the overall showing of the ruling party fell significantly nationwide, suggesting that voters are beginning to respond to the government’s perceived poor performance in creating public goods and services and delivering on electoral promises. The continued lack of widespread benefits to farmers increases the likelihood of deepening voter disenchantment with the current ruling elite and of growing challenges to Tanzania’s inclusive political settlement.

While stimulating some useful policy debate, the WB and other donors have been unsuccessful in addressing institutional constraints on policy implementation, while lack of coordination has contributed to systematic project failure in the agricultural sector. The two initiatives examined in this report are examples of the tendency of donors to finance policies and practices that do not meet their formal market-based principles or fail on practical grounds. We conclude that, in the final analysis, national interests trump donor attempts to exert policy leverage. Aid serves the political purposes of the ruling elite.

Local agribusiness and trade cartels have flourished since trade liberalisation, influencing trade in fertiliser, food aid, sugar and rice, tractors and power tillers, and limiting market entry for new aspirant players. The significance of these interests for agricultural policy has yet to be explored.

Possible forces for change in the existing policy regime include the gradual emergence of a class of commercial farmers, growing external strategic and commercial interests in acquiring land for biofuel and food production for export, and a plethora of initiatives by philanthro-capitalists and international agencies to deliver the green revolution, food security, and poverty reduction. It remains to be seen how these new forces will influence the existing political settlement.

The report concludes that patronage and rent-seeking undermine official policies designed to deliver public or private goods to voters, with both public and private sector interests informally capturing the lion’s share of the rents created. What proportion of these rents is invested in production rather than dissipated in consumption is not known. Key future research and data needs are flagged in the final section.

1.0 Background and rationale

The gradual insertion of Tanzanian farm households into global commodity markets that began before colonial rule was reversed after a few years of independence, when the ruling party began to implement policies that proved to be inimical to sustained export growth on capitalist lines. Declining terms of trade and depressed prices for export crops, together with inefficient state-controlled input and produce markets forced many export-crop growing households to switch
to maize and other crops for subsistence and cash. Households diversified their livelihoods by turning to non-agricultural activities, including trade, services, casual wage labour and mining. After two decades of deepening crisis, the Tanzanian economy eventually stabilised in the 1990s, but ‘traditional’ export agriculture has not prospered overall as a result of marketing reforms. Food production has more or less kept pace with population growth largely through the extension of cultivation rather than through productivity gains. In drought years, the government still imports food.

Fifty years after independence much of Tanzanian agriculture remains small-scale, labour-intensive. Population growth, declining soil fertility, and (in some places) HIV-AIDS have undermined rural living standards. The ‘green revolution’ that has been promised more than once is yet to appear. A recent review concluded that:

‘Weak incentives and low agricultural growth have left Tanzanian farmers in a severely de-capitalized state. They own very few productive assets, and are ill equipped to bring about an acceleration of agricultural growth.’

Although the main notional object of the official policy narrative on poverty reduction and food security, the millions of small-scale Tanzanian ‘farming’ households have very little direct influence on national policy making. The majority of rural households remain relatively autonomous of the state as both recipients of state-provided services (public goods) or other private benefits, or as taxpayers.

Numerous explanations for the lack of agricultural transformation have been proposed. These may be classified as structuralist, state failure, market failure and policy failure. Structuralist arguments stress declining terms of trade for primary produce reflecting falling price of food and income poverty.13 A ‘strong urge to do everything and do it at once.’ Policies became ‘frontal attacks’, ‘operations’ and ‘matters of life or death.’ Second, ‘policy makers often decided on matters without first having obtained full and detailed knowledge of the possible consequences of their decisions.’ Third, policy makers were unwilling ‘to use the past as a source of guidance for the future.’ Last, public sector officials ‘work in a context where public expectations constantly exceed what can ... be attained...’

We do not intend to undertake a detailed critique of these positions, each of which has its strengths and weaknesses, but none of which can be expected to capture the whole story. The persistence of widespread rural poverty suggests that the Government of Tanzania (GoT) has succeeded in crafting neither state- nor market-driven solutions to the problem of agricultural transformation. Since structural adjustment, the Tanzanian state has not embraced market-driven strategies to address chronic poverty and underdevelopment with any conviction or consistency. This paper focuses on policy failure by examining the dynamics of policy formulation and implementation within a state-dominated policy regime. We consider the contribution of aid to policy failure. New external influences on ‘policy’ have been largely left out of the mix, though they are dealt with briefly in section 5.2.

Low factor productivity in Tanzanian agriculture is reflected in high levels of food and income poverty. A generally depressed rural economy has driven livelihood diversification and migration. Bryceson employs the terms ‘depeasantisation’ and ‘deagrarisation’ to capture the type of agricultural change that has taken place throughout sub-Saharan Africa during the last half century. Ellis and others have shown that both ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ farm households engage in a variety of off-farm

...
The proportion of adults involved in agriculture has fallen significantly as former or would-be farmers seek or create non-agricultural, largely informal, off-farm employment opportunities. Farming and fishing accounted for 78 percent of male employment in 1991, falling to 70 percent in 2001. For females the figures were 85 and 73 percent respectively. In both years women made up 55 percent of the agricultural labour force. The proportion of adults involved in agriculture has fallen significantly as former or would-be farmers seek or create non-agricultural, largely informal, off-farm employment opportunities. Farming and fishing accounted for 78 percent of male employment in 1991, falling to 70 percent in 2001. For females the figures were 85 and 73 percent respectively. In both years women made up 55 percent of the agricultural labour force.16 Finally, whereas at independence in 1961, 95 percent of Tanzanians lived in rural areas, by 2004, well over a third of Tanzanians (37 percent) were urban.17 These figures suggest that providing the rapidly growing urban population with its basic staple (maize) and other wage goods constitutes a major success for Tanzanian agriculture over the last half century.18

Yet it would be wrong to conclude that as a result of poor policies and deagrarianisation there are no commercial farmers or (more or less) semi-subsistence smallholders who are responsive to market signals and opportunities. First, there are large farms and estates in the country, and their number is likely to increase in future. Second, though firm evidence is lacking, there are signs that a class of medium- to large-scale Tanzanian farmers is beginning to emerge, a trend already noted by Putterman in the mid-1990s.20 Third, there are also numerous examples of small-scale producers responding positively to improved market signals during the post-liberalisation period, either by expanding production of established crops or experimenting with new ones. Lastly, successful outgrower schemes (sugar, tea, horticulture) or producer-processor value chain initiatives (cashew, tobacco, coffee) have gone counter to the deagrarianisation trend.

This study examines agricultural policy making and implementation in the Agriculture Sector Development Programme (ASDP) and the National Agricultural Inputs Voucher Scheme (NAIVS) in order to better understand the dynamics of policy formulation and downstream consequences.

2.0 Methodology and research questions

The breadth and focus of agricultural policies, variety of potential beneficiaries of such policies and multiple sources of influence on policy making and implementation complicate the discussion of agricultural policy and force us to make some hard choices on research priorities. We also have to consider the possible benefits derived from policy that we might usefully study even though there is a widespread sense that policies are not implemented as planned, benefits are meagre or unevenly distributed, and often not sustained after the conclusion of the mechanism that deliver them to farmers.

The Future Agricultures Consortium’s PEAPA (Political Economy of Agricultural Policy in Africa) programme approaches agricultural policy as potentially emanating from two main sources: the formal political process and informal patronage.22 In a competitive electoral system, ruling elites may initiate policies targeting specific constituencies, including the rural population who constitute a majority of voters, and particular subgroups who may be potential swing voters or defectors.21 The extent to which ruling elites may be prepared to commit scarce resources to the provision of community and private benefits in order to retain or secure electoral support depends on a number of factors, explored further below.

We know that historically Tanzania’s rural population has been more likely to use avoidance tactics than resistance or protest (collective action) when confronted by state power.24 In the current competitive political context, has the state become more benign in its dealings with farmers than in the past? Have farmers become more organised and assertive in furthering their collective interests as a result of political competition and state policies of participation and empowerment? Do longer-term, underlying factors limit the impact of short-term changes?25

The incentives that formal competitive politics present to the ruling elite to become more farmer-friendly are mediated by the nature of the existing power structure and state-civil society-private sector relations. Traditionally, Tanzania has been characterised by a high degree of inclusion of interest groups within the ruling coalition, in which the allocation of rents or rent-making opportunities to various interests to solidify the ruling coalition has not been excessively costly. Cooksey (2011) argues that the transaction costs of maintaining political order have risen rapidly in recent years, and some see the growing likelihood that the ruling party, riddled with costly and policy-crippling factionalism, will be seriously challenged in the 2015 elections. The tenendal decline of elite solidarity creates the conditions for the deepening of a diffuse, rent-seeking elite that pays formal homage to an increasingly beleaguered presidency and ruling party in disarray. The impact of a weakening elite on agricultural policy is difficult to measure, but we speculate that ‘increasing relative autonomy’ would best describe the strategic powers and privileges of existing (sub-)state agencies, including ministry bureaucracies, regional and district commissioners, ruling party actors, and relevant parastatsals, in unmediated26 collaboration with big private interests both inside and outside the country.

It is not easy to assess the extent to which policies influence agricultural performance. There are numerous policies that impact directly and indirectly on the agricultural sector, but it is problematic to attribute causality to a single policy strand, since of course multiple factors influence short- and longer-term outcomes. Identifying definite trends in production, productivity and profitability is made more difficult by the well-known weaknesses of official statistics and inaccessibility of key data.27 The impact of certain policy interventions, for example, research and extension, training and capacity building, cannot be measured directly. In terms of policy with (potentially) measurable state/donor-financed deliverables, we would hope to be able to identify both
beneficiaries and benefits. Candidates include irrigation schemes, outgrower and contract farming, subsidised inputs, and power tillers. Benefits from these are inevitably targeted, either formally, for example, focusing fertiliser subsidies on certain areas and crops, or informally, when benefits with a large potential target group are captured by strategically placed individuals and groups. Other significant ‘policy’ benefits accrue to importers obtaining licences and tax exemptions for routine or emergency food imports, generating major rents.

Official policies target various formal objectives, including boosting exports and foreign exchange earnings (see below), enhancing national food self-sufficiency and household food security/poverty reduction. In this programme, we are concerned with the forces that drive policy towards improving the lot of smallholders through the provision of public, private and club goods, as opposed to furnishing opportunities for patronage and clientelism to sections of the ruling elite, or providing rents to commercial interests. For reasons just mentioned, imputing causality for any policy intervention is highly problematic. Both the GoT and donors are prone to claim that policies and supporting projects are more or less successful in achieving their stated objectives. Below we are at pains to assess claims of policy/project success critically, albeit very approximately. This impacts on the precision with which we address our two research questions, as explained below.

Two final prefatory remarks. First, the centrality of agriculture in the Tanzanian political economy has arguably declined significantly in the post-liberalisation period. Falling agricultural exports during the 1970s and 1980s was a major cause of the country’s growing trade deficit and ensuing financial crisis. Liberalisation did not bring about the hoped-for revival of ‘traditional’ agricultural exports, and Tanzania came to depend increasingly on aid to bridge the trade gap. During the last 15 years, minerals, tourism and manufactured goods have reduced agricultural exports to almost a residual category: by 2008, non-agricultural exports accounted for 86 percent of total exports by value. Yet agriculture still employs about three-quarters of the labour force, for 86 percent of total exports by value. Agriculture in the Tanzanian political economy has still a long way from reaching the CAADP target of 10 percent and 4.9 percent respectively. For reasons actual transfers in the last two years cited were only 2.3 percent and 6.1 percent in 2007/08 and 2009/10, but increased from 3.8 percent of the total in 2000 to 4.6 percent of public spending. The agricultural budget turn-over rate, a number of key respondents were interviewed via email.

Our two key research questions are presented below.

Research question 1: To what extent is agricultural policy driven by the ruling coalition’s concern with securing the rural vote directly through the ballot rather than indirectly through clientelism at national and lower levels?

Question 1 targets the political process as a potential driver of agricultural policy. A key issue is whether political competition, which was reintroduced in Tanzania in the early-mid 1990s, has had a beneficial impact on the rural population that still constitutes the majority of voters. Have post-1995 governments been less heavy-handed that their predecessors in dealing with the rural population and their problems? Have budgets and services increased? Are carrots replacing sticks in the policy armoury? Alternatively, has political competition heightened pressures for patronage from local political elites as a means of delivering votes?

Public spending on agriculture is one indicator of political commitment. Though spending has increased in absolute and relative terms in recent years, the GoT is still a long way from reaching the CAADP target of 10 percent of public spending. The agricultural budget increased from 3.8 percent of the total in 2000 to 4.6 percent and 6.1 percent in 2007/08 and 2009/10, but actual transfers in the last two years cited were only 2.3 percent and 4.9 percent respectively. For reasons discussed in this report, we should not assume a significant positive relationship between public spending, service and public goods delivery, and increased in agricultural production and productivity.

A number of policy decisions in recent years could be interpreted as offering benefits to rural voters as a means of gaining favour and containing the potential appeal of opposition parties, including the abolition of the development levy in 2003, reduction or abolition of taxes and levies on export crops (various years), lifting of export bans on maize and other crops (prior to the 2010
Tanzania’s relatively lack of political rivalries based on ethnic/regional divisions means that the ruling party is not under severe pressure to target policy benefits on areas where the opposition is gaining ground. But possible general defection to rival parties is likely to worry the ruling party in the absence of improved livelihoods for the poor rural majority, particularly when investment and growth are taking place in other, non-agricultural sectors. Where livelihoods are under threat, party loyalties are likely to loosen.

Delivering additional indirect benefits to rural areas and voters, through research and extension, for example, takes time and is less visible than direct transfers such as input subsidies. Though, as we will see, research and extension are earmarked for substantial additional funding, it is not self evident that more money will mean better performance. Alternatives to offering direct policy benefits to rural voters include the use of force and intimidation, bribery and vote-rigging during elections. These require the mobilisation of local political and administrative elites and are unlikely to be accompanied by significant direct benefits to the mass of rural voters beyond receipt of green and yellow (ruling party) kanga (wrappers) and kofia (caps) at election time.

Research question 2: How has aid influenced Tanzanian agricultural policy formulation and implementation?

Structural adjustment in the 1980s saw a rapid decline in donor support for agriculture, reflecting the failure of statist policies of the preceding two decades. More recently, international interest in food security and poverty reduction, global warming and biofuels has regenerated donor agency, philanthropy and private sector interest in tropical agriculture.

Aid to Tanzanian agriculture is dominated by loans from the WB, followed by IFAD and the AFDB. New initiatives, including the Alliance for the Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), bring additional private resources into the mix, supplementing loan-financed project and (still quite limited) sector support from bilateral sources. In addition, international NGOs also finance and implement projects of one kind or another in collaboration with local partner organisations. As a result, Tanzanian agriculture is the focus of multiple external initiatives with diverse rationales, objectives and implementation modalities. The literature suggests that neither the government nor the various external actors have the capacity to coordinate these different initiatives effectively.

Last, external agents push policy prescriptions as well as direct interventions. Since the mid-1980s, ‘state versus market’ discourses have been the focus of policy debate.

There is a view, expressed by both external and local critics, that donors—the WB in particular—have imposed neo-liberal policies on aid dependent recipients like the GoT. An alternative view is that, in the final analysis, local policy preferences prevail. How has foreign aid influenced policies and policy implementation? How does foreign aid influence the main players’ patronage strategies?

This report examines agricultural policy through the lens of two GoT initiatives, the Agriculture Sector Development Programme (ASDP) and the National Agricultural Inputs Voucher Scheme (NAIVS). The ASDP was chosen as it constitutes the GoT’s major agricultural policy initiative of the new century. ASDP offers an opportunity to examine ways in which agricultural policy reflects and responds to the ruling elite’s concern with maintaining electoral support during a period of rising political competition. Did the ASDP offer farming households new public goods or market opportunities that might help the ruling party retain its traditional support among the rural electorate? Alternatively, did existing informal patronage networks dominate the policy implementation process in ways that might undermine this electoral calculus? The NAIVS is a potentially politically rewarding investment in targeted input subsidies (fertiliser and improved seeds) that went to scale two years before the 2010 elections. Both ASDP and NAIVS involved policy discussions and financial commitments on the part of multilateral and bilateral donors. How did donor concerns with the GoT’s policy choices and implications for deepening agricultural markets affect the elaboration and implementation of these two initiatives?

We first turn to the ASDP.

3.0 The Agricultural Sector Development Programme

The ASDP (2006-13) was Tanzania’s main agricultural policy initiative of the new century. ASDP was billed as the ‘operationalisation’ of the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS 2000). Preparing an agricultural strategy was a condition for Tanzania to receive HIPC debt relief (late 1990s) and for the subsequent PRSP (MKUKUTA). The ASDS proposed to: (i) strengthen the institutional framework for managing agricultural development; (ii) create a favourable climate for commercial activities, including improving the marketing of inputs and outputs; and (iii) improving transport and trade. The ASDP added processes of decentralisation and participation to this list.

External support for the ASDP was to be ‘basket funded’. From the late 1990s, GoT and donors developed basket funding arrangements for health and education, subsequently reducing the number of stand-alone projects in these sectors. According to the Agricultural Reference Group (2004:1) ‘The large number of projects especially in the Agricultural Sector have distorted the
Donors viewed the initial ASDP draft as proof that the GoT still maintained an essentially statist view of the sector, with the government as the main service provider and the private sector playing a subordinate role. One donor described the programme as a ‘wish list’ based on the four Cs: Cars, Cash, Computers and Cellphones. Ministries were likened to a ‘hungry animal’. Donors were consequently reluctant to move towards basket funding the agricultural sector.43

The ASDP proposed achieving poverty alleviation through decentralisation, community participation in decision-making, and private sector leadership in production, marketing, processing and service delivery.44 All three themes reflect largely externally-derived agendas, and have proved problematic, as explained below.45

The implementation of ASDP was extremely slow and there were many problems. Greeley (2008) suggests that ‘the underlying problems with the ASDP process were ... decentralisation, irrigation and harmonisation and alignment.’ 47 In a detailed analysis, Therkildsen (2011) shows how the GoT and donor agencies struggled to find enough common ground to proceed with the ASDP.48 Despite GoT claims to privilege private sector leadership, to donors ASDP looked like a traditional government-centred, productivity-enhancing programme with the private sector playing the role of contractor.49 The central ministries resisted donor pressures to give LGAs a more independent role.50

Additional problem areas identified by donors included a growing emphasis on fertiliser subsidies; state intervention in areas best left to the private sector; ‘incremental administrative costs’ entailed in spreading public agricultural functions across five ministries; and the failure of the GoT to reflect ASDP priorities in the agricultural budget. On subsidies, donors argued that:

‘The recent increase in fertiliser subsidies creates specific distortions in the fertiliser market, and also sends a wider signal that the Government may not confine itself to provision of public goods and services, as committed under the ASDP.’ 51

We return to fertiliser subsidies in section 4.

A 2004 trouble-shooting workshop for GoT and donor representatives to review progress in preparing ASDP implementation listed 48 ‘achievements’ and 111 ‘challenges’, including lack of commitment, ownership and leadership.52 How did implementation proceed, and who benefited? We now turn to small-scale irrigation schemes, the (eventual) main component of the ASDP.53

A 1997 Agricultural Policy Paper mentioned a target of irrigating one million additional ha of land, and this figure was repeated in the 2001 ASDS and the 2005 CCM election manifesto.54 The original ASDP target for small-scale irrigation was 405,000 ha of additional irrigated land within 15 years (or 27,000 ha a year). This figure was contained in the 2002 Irrigation Master Plan prepared by Japanese consultants.54 In 2005, the GoT dramatically increased the ASDP budget target, from TShs 744 billion...
to TShs 2,943 billion, and national and local irrigation activities were separated, with TShs 1,493 billion earmarked for districts and TShs 474 billion for national schemes. According to Greeley, these figures represented ‘a major shift in agricultural policy towards a huge public investment commitment.’ What was behind such a dramatic change?

Jakaya Kikwete came to power at the end of 2005, winning an impressive 80 percent of the presidential vote. In a post-election meeting between Kikwete, Minister of Agriculture Joseph Mungai, and employees of the MAFC, Mungai proposed a total of five million ha of additional irrigation within a decade, or 500,000 ha a year, nearly twenty times the ASDP target and surreally unachievable. The President responded that a more realistic target would be a million ha over five years, still more than seven times the original ASDP target. Since (hardly surprisingly) no one challenged Kikwete’s proposal, which was contained in the 2005 manifesto, it was subsequently included in his inauguration speech, and became the main component of the programme. Yet irrigation had not been a high-profile issue in the 2005 manifesto. This story shows how easily the intensive consultation with stakeholders, including donors, farmers, and technocrats, that was said to characterise the ASDP process could be overridden by the political centre, with little room for negotiation. A CCM election commitment to one million ha of additional irrigation trumps a technocratic argument for a much less ambitious target based on practical considerations.

This story reminds us of the characteristic weaknesses of Tanzanian policy making discussed by Hyden for the early post-independence period, mentioned above, and alerts us perhaps to an important theme for a meta-analysis of the political economy of agricultural policy in Africa.

How did donors react to the new emphasis on irrigation? ASDP was initially crafted by mid-level ministerial staff and consultants during 2001-02. Thereafter (2003-06) donors of mixed experience came to dominate the process, leading to an overconcentration on procedural as opposed to substantive technical issues. Conflicts emerged between different donors and between donors and government over the respective roles of the line ministries and the ASDP secretariat, as mentioned above. The ministries did not want a strong secretariat that could interfere with their established procedures and routines. Donors were unhappy with the chosen coordinator, but failed in attempts to get him replaced by someone more influential and qualified.

Therkildsen maintains that, prior to the President’s sudden intervention, no senior politician or bureaucrat was intimately involved in or identified with the ASDP. He offers the following possible broad explanations: elites only get involved in policy in crisis situations; they are not normally expected to play an active policy making role, but only to ‘interpret’ party policies; frequent shuffling of ministries, ministerial portfolios and permanent secretaries weakens policy making capacity at the top. OPM et al (2005) found that ministers were not generally involved in bargaining over budgetary allocations: such decisions are made by a relatively small group of ruling party politicians and officials around the president. Thus it is unlikely that the Minister of Agriculture played a very central role in either raising the agricultural budget during this time or raising the profile of small-scale irrigation.

The donors doubted that the government had the required capacity to implement such an ambitious programme, and in 2006 withdrew from financing ASDP’s (core) irrigation component. One may imagine the surprise, therefore, when the WB’s USD 90 million Agriculture Sector Development Project (ASDP) was announced in 2008, making the WB the main external source of finance for both the national and the local irrigation initiatives. In addition, in 2009/10 and 2010/11 the WB added a further USD 65 million to the original 90, most of which went to finance small-scale irrigation under the DADPs. Additional finances were required as more and more proposals for new irrigation schemes were meeting DIFD funding criteria. Thus the WB bankrolled the very component of ASDP that donors had earlier refused to finance.

Was there evidence that the GoT pressured the WB to support an initiative that its own experts had been critical of theretofore? Were fertiliser lobbies involved? Was the WB happy to find a sizeable project to help meet its quite high disbursement targets? Perhaps a combination of these and other possible motives was involved.

How successful was the implementation of irrigation projects under ASDP? Schram et al. (2007) identified numerous capacity constraints among all major stakeholders. ‘...farmers do not see the importance of contributing to the water fees’ so that ‘... irrigators’ organisations often have problems with the collection of water fees.’ ‘Most WEOs ... lack adequate know-how to formulate irrigation projects.’ The irrigation technicians that are available in the districts do not have the required skills for the implementation of the irrigation component of ASDP. The Regional Agricultural Advisor is usually not an irrigation specialist...’ ‘The MAFC has not had a systematic and coordinated training programme for irrigation experts.’ ‘...there is limited knowledge of irrigation agronomy among services providers in the private sector.’ ‘Many local firms have limited experience in irrigation design and construction.’

Annual joint reviews since 2008 demonstrate that ‘age old problems of irrigation are not being addressed.’ The third joint review (2008) found that economic analysis is absent for most proposed schemes. Local authorities prefer to invest in new schemes rather than rehabilitate existing ones. ‘Many projects are started but receive insufficient funds for completion.’ Further finances cannot
be planned or guaranteed as DIDFs have no legal status.

‘This contributes to stop-go construction and the dragging out of project completion.’

The third joint review mission also noted ‘with concern that all schemes visited had unsustainable arrangements for … operation and maintenance.’ Both skills to assess O&M needs and funds to finance them were inadequate. Beneficiary contributions towards O&M were 1/10th to 1/20th of those in Asian countries or Kenya, too low ‘to prevent inefficient water use and eventual scheme collapse’. Problems exist with ensuring that water rights are respected and consistent with water availability. A number of … schemes produce only one crop per year and the land is idle for 7 months due to the unavailability of dry season water rights. Despite the grave problems noted by recent reviews, the 2009 review mission ‘established that the programme implementation is on track and overall performance rated to be satisfactory’.

There is considerable evidence of corruption in local councils, which may undermine DADP implementation. For example, summarising spot checks of local road construction and maintenance in 2009, the parliamentary Local Authorities Accounts Committee (LAAC) Chairperson Dr Wilbrod Slaa identified sub-standard (or no) construction and ‘in most cases’ procurement and tender procedures were not followed ‘raising serious doubts of corruption.’ These weaknesses include ‘gaps in the accounting system, inadequate supervision and failure to observe laws and regulations.’

The quality of project implementation is therefore a major concern, particularly in the less developed regions. For example, in 2009 a TShs 230 million irrigation scheme in Nyatwali village, Bunda District, Mara Region, failed to take off, allegedly because the pumps procured for the project were too small or ‘substandard’. The local DC twice refused to inaugurate the scheme, and ‘over 200 hectares of maize are wilting for lack of water.’ The scheme is in the constituency of Mr Stephen Wassira, the (then) Minister of Agriculture. The Minister directed his private secretary “to follow up on the engines.” More recently, the Minister of Agriculture, ‘…accused heads of agricultural departments of misusing funds. ‘For example, when the government releases funds for irrigation projects, you use it (sic) to pay allowances to officers who participate in exhibitions. When we query, you come up with lengthy explanations why you decided to misappropriate the money,” he said.

Despite the serious constraints on project performance, the WB’s additional USD 35m finance for the ASDP committed in 2010 ‘rated the risk that ‘irrigation expansion targets [are] not aligned to capacity and available financing’ as ‘modest’, as were all other risk elements.’ It is worth noting that almost as much of the additional finance was for rehabilitation (USD 15.4m) as for new projects (USD 16 million). To state the obvious: projects that have to be ‘rehabilitate’ have clearly failed the sustainability test. How many past donor-financed irrigation schemes have delivered sustainable benefits to significant numbers of farmers, cost-effectively?

The NIDF (large projects based on PPPs) has not taken off as government funds are inadequate and potential investors are not forthcoming because, it appears, of risks attached to water and land rights and failed out-grower arrangements. The problems of water rights and O&M identified at the start of ASDP had not been seriously addressed by 2010. The fifth joint review mission (September 2010) found that none of 12 schemes visited had O&M arrangements in place in line with ASDP guidelines. Ten schemes had no user organisation. No farmers paid the required five percent of crop value as recommended. Yet ‘the review makes no recommendations on how to tighten up O&M. As in previous reviews, the overall progress of implementation is rated as ‘satisfactory’. Box 2 asks why so many audits, reviews and evaluations seem to paint an overly rosy picture of the performance of donor-financed projects and programmes.

Why are there so few project successes and so little impact? Therkildsen suspects that:

‘donors and government collude in assessing the ASDP positively despite disturbing evidence from their own joint review reports to the contrary. One Tanzanian participant in the review told how the visited projects were cherry-picked by the local authorities, and how there was a clear reluctance in the team to take hard decisions.’

ASDP claims that the total area under irrigation increased from 264,000 ha in 2006 to 332,000 in 2010, or 17,000 ha of additional irrigated area a year. DADP procedures for identifying and financing irrigation projects were slow and cumbersome. The 2010 joint review claims that average paddy yields (most of the irrigation projects are for rice) increased by 600 percent as a result of irrigation. Even if this claim is an exaggeration (and we cannot know for sure) we may still assume that project participants enjoy some short-term gains, but our analysis suggests that these gains (‘club goods?’) are unlikely to be either significant or sustained.

There is no evidence to suggest that ASDP managers have addressed the fundamental issues of land and water rights, irrigation scheme O&M systems and finance that determine the sustainability of these investments. After endorsing the irrigation focus of ASDP on coming to power, the President and his new ruling coalition left the tricky legal and institutional issues to the bureaucracy to sort out—or ignore. This division of labour between the political and the bureaucratic arms of the state has been noted by Hyden (1984, 2006). Donor concerns with GoT capacity to deliver proved well founded, though they did not prevent the WB from investing a total of USD 155 m in the programme.

What were the politics behind ASDP? Theory suggests that the ruling coalition may have both clientelistic and electoral motives for spreading material benefits to rural areas. ASDP took off in a big way after the 2005 elections,
With some notable exceptions, programme/project monitoring, evaluation and audit, are heavily biased towards funders and implementers, with basic issues ignored or understated. For example, a forensic audit of a USD 50m Norwegian funded programme implemented by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRP) concluded that at least half the programme funds had been misused, despite annual audits by the Controller and Auditor General, independently reviewed by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, and regular joint missions, including project and site visits. One sub-project, previously considered a major success, turned out to be riddled with corruption and waste. Working relations built up over many years between external programme officials, researchers and consultants and their Tanzanian counterparts made it difficult to address fundamental issues about how the programme was managed, and touchy issues like possible waste and corruption at national and project level were studiously ignored. Neither side was in real terms accountable to a public watchdog or elected body. In a controversial resolution to the problem, the Tanzanian government paid back a fraction of the amount identified as misused by the forensic audit, while at the same time the Norwegian government was designing a NOK 500 million carbon credit programme (REDD Plus) with the Tanzanian government.

From 1966 to 1998, the WB financed 40 loans to Tanzanian agriculture and livestock. Of these, the WB evaluated 31 projects: 19 were rated ‘unsatisfactory’ (61 percent) and 12 ‘satisfactory’. Three agricultural adjustment credits worth USD 227 between 1990 and 1993 were deemed ‘satisfactory’. A more recent internal assessment rated all ongoing WB projects in the country as ‘satisfactory’. Putterman (1995) explained the ‘disappointing results of liberalization ... in agriculture’ (particularly in export crops) in terms of ‘deficiencies in policy and implementation.’

The Parliamentary Local Authorities’ Accounts Committee (LAAC) routinely unearths examples of financial irregularities in LGAs receiving clean bills of health from the CAG. In part, this reflects the limitations of the audit function, which does not investigate value for money, but there is a strong suspicion that irregularities are systematically glossed over. ‘External’ and ‘independent’ reviews and evaluations are also routinely biased towards the funders and implementers who hire them. It is thus possible for an underperforming programme or project to be given an undeserved stamp of approval. Value for money (efficiency) and sustainability are chronic problems, rarely admitted.

Local academics and consultants generally avoid criticising the policies and projects on which they work. Patronage in hiring consultants and commissioning studies assures the bureaucracy that ‘sensitive’ or ‘project-relevant’ irregularities in LGAs receiving clean bills of health from the CAG. In part, this reflects the limitations of the audit function, which does not investigate value for money, but there is a strong suspicion that irregularities are systematically glossed over. ‘External’ and ‘independent’ reviews and evaluations are also routinely biased towards the funders and implementers who hire them. It is thus possible for an underperforming programme or project to be given an undeserved stamp of approval. Value for money (efficiency) and sustainability are chronic problems, rarely admitted.

Sources: Jansen 2009; Erickson 2011; World Bank 1990; 1998; Putterman 1995; Slaa 2009; Booth 2011

Box 2: What do we learn from audits, reviews and evaluations?

With some notable exceptions, programme/project monitoring, evaluation and audit, are heavily biased towards funders and implementers, with basic issues ignored or understated. For example, a forensic audit of a USD 50m Norwegian funded programme implemented by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRP) concluded that at least half the programme funds had been misused, despite annual audits by the Controller and Auditor General, independently reviewed by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, and regular joint missions, including project and site visits. One sub-project, previously considered a major success, turned out to be riddled with corruption and waste. Working relations built up over many years between external programme officials, researchers and consultants and their Tanzanian counterparts made it difficult to address fundamental issues about how the programme was managed, and touchy issues like possible waste and corruption at national and project level were studiously ignored. Neither side was in real terms accountable to a public watchdog or elected body. In a controversial resolution to the problem, the Tanzanian government paid back a fraction of the amount identified as misused by the forensic audit, while at the same time the Norwegian government was designing a NOK 500 million carbon credit programme (REDD Plus) with the Tanzanian government.

From 1966 to 1998, the WB financed 40 loans to Tanzanian agriculture and livestock. Of these, the WB evaluated 31 projects: 19 were rated ‘unsatisfactory’ (61 percent) and 12 ‘satisfactory’. Three agricultural adjustment credits worth USD 227 between 1990 and 1993 were deemed ‘satisfactory’. A more recent internal assessment rated all ongoing WB projects in the country as ‘satisfactory’. Putterman (1995) explained the ‘disappointing results of liberalization ... in agriculture’ (particularly in export crops) in terms of ‘deficiencies in policy and implementation.’

The Parliamentary Local Authorities’ Accounts Committee (LAAC) routinely unearths examples of financial irregularities in LGAs receiving clean bills of health from the CAG. In part, this reflects the limitations of the audit function, which does not investigate value for money, but there is a strong suspicion that irregularities are systematically glossed over. ‘External’ and ‘independent’ reviews and evaluations are also routinely biased towards the funders and implementers who hire them. It is thus possible for an underperforming programme or project to be given an undeserved stamp of approval. Value for money (efficiency) and sustainability are chronic problems, rarely admitted.

Local academics and consultants generally avoid criticising the policies and projects on which they work. Patronage in hiring consultants and commissioning studies assures the bureaucracy that ‘sensitive’ or ‘embarrassing’ issues will be ignored or dealt with sympathetically. Though there is somewhat less patronage in hiring external reviewers and consultants, most of these also exercise varying degrees of self-censorship in their handling of the same issues. Booth (2011) argues that self-censorship is exercised in part out of simple self-interest (school fees, mortgages...). Without honest feedback on project performance it is impossible to learn from past failures, including ‘innovative’ projects trying new approaches.

Sources: Jansen 2009; Erickson 2011; World Bank 1990; 1998; Putterman 1995; Slaa 2009; Booth 2011

Continued clientelism rather than seeking direct support from the electorate, is by far the dominant elite strategy. As Poulton concludes from a sample of African countries, ‘policy is rarely the dominant approach to gathering votes.’ Patronage breeds leakages at all points in the project cycle, reducing the funds available for actual schemes. The likelihood that many proposed schemes are not financed through lack of funds or other reasons raises the risk of disappointing more voters than are brought (or kept) on side through successful projects. Figure 1 summarises key characteristics of direct vote seeking as opposed to indirect clientelist strategies for elites intent on gaining political support.

The likelihood that clientelism will absorb the major part of available resources, leaving little to trickle down to the intended beneficiaries should not be discounted lightly. Systemic clientelism with periodic efforts by local elites to bring in the vote, in the general absence of economic progress or state-derived benefits of any kind, sums up our political economy of agricultural policy at the local level. Initiatives justified in terms of poverty
Figure 1: Vote seeking and clientelistic elite strategies compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deliverables</th>
<th>Vote seeking</th>
<th>Clientelism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Broad-based benefits to selected regions, districts and localities</td>
<td>• Opportunities for local state/party officials and private sector to capture rents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefits</th>
<th>• Enhanced livelihoods</th>
<th>• Local level elites are bound to the ruling coalition and help it retain power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Greater state legitimacy</td>
<td>• Rents may lead to accumulation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Limitations</th>
<th>• Private benefits do not reach many voters and are not sustained</th>
<th>• Clientelistic rents reduce potential benefits of competitive politics to voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Non-beneficiaries disillusioned</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

reducing or livelihoods enhancing objectives serve the purposes of networks of national and local elites. Are these 'purposes' on balance economically productive or largely redistributive? Rent theory leaves open the possibility that rents or rent-creating opportunities can be put to productive use, perhaps spurring the growth of a commercial farming class. In this respect, access to cheap or free land afforded to elite members by exercising political influence constitutes a key rent. Whether these rents are or are not used productively remains to be seen.

Bourgoin and Therkildsen (2011) argue that democratisation has increased the power of local elites relative to the political centre. Indicators of this trend include local control over land allocation, selection of CCM candidates, and the effects of decentralisation. Disputes over land allocation are common and increasing in light of growing population pressure and foreign investment in estate and outgrower agriculture, empowering village leaders. CCM candidates for parliament are now selected by all local party members, not just the local party elite. With the process of decentralisation delivering ever larger transfers to local governments, the political centre is under pressure to decentralise a significant amount of patronage to lower level actors.

A further innovation that has potential to strengthen the position of incumbent parliamentarians is the Community Development Fund (CDF) that became law in August 2009. Both ruling and opposition MPs supported the bill, which was strongly opposed by CSOs. Currently, the CDF is worth TShs 10 billion (USD 6.3m) a year.

The apparent rising strategic powers of local elites vis-à-vis the centre are also a consequence of political competition: the centre now needs local elites more than it did before. Decentralisation may then be a way to compensate local elites for the extra political role that they now play as regards bringing in votes. Where opposition parties are relatively strong, there is potential for 'real politics' to develop around agricultural issues. Case studies are required to determine the circumstances in which real political competition is likely to improve rural livelihoods.

Since decentralisation policy originated with donors, one might speculate that—at least in this case—donor policies did have an impact on internal political processes.

Another key issue that data limitations prevent us from fully addressing is the extent to which specific regions/districts are favoured in the ASDP or alternatively discriminated against for being in the opposition camp, as is sometimes claimed. At the district level, what determines which of the contending projects gets financed and which don’t? Are politically marginal regions/districts likely to receive more or less schemes than the more loyal?

Appendix 1 compares the country's regional irrigation potential with transfers to regions for irrigation projects in 2007. It is clear that the transfers largely favour areas with relatively low irrigation potential: Ruvuma, Mtwara, Lindi, Tanga, and Singida; not the higher potential irrigation regions (Morogoro and Coast are the only high irrigation potential regions which also have high DADP allocations). Ruvuma is an outlier, receiving 12 percent of all funds. We lack an obvious explanation for this pattern (assuming it represents actual disbursements). It is most unlikely that it reflects variations in the quantity and quality of project proposals, which are aggregated at district level. According to Greeley (2008:21) the political centre still has the major say on the overall allocation of irrigation scheme finances. The high irrigation potential of Kilimanjaro Region (ranked 2nd in the country) is not reflected in the 2007 DADP allocations (ranked 19th). Could ‘Kilimanjaro’ be being ‘punished’ by the centre as a hotbed of the opposition rather than courted for its swing voters? Alternative explanations for the pattern of allocation include attempts to secure regional food security and/or poverty alleviation, as some of the favoured regions are relatively poor.

Much comparative research suggests that Tanzania’s regulatory and policy environment is still fundamentally inconducive to private sector development. Our review of ASDP suggests that the private sector plays a subsidiary role and that the objective of increasing private investment in the sector is not furthered by the programme’s various components.
3.1 Conclusions on ASDP

3.1.1 State engagement with stakeholders

What does the irrigation component of ASDP tell us about agricultural policy? In its formulation and implementation does it reflect a programmatic engagement of policy makers and technicians with farmers to find sustainable solutions to water management problems? Or does it reflect the interests of senior politicians and bureaucrats to advance their own interests, both formal and informal? Or a bit of both? Where does ‘the market’ fit in?

One of the ASDP’s objectives is to increase private sector investment in agriculture based on an improved regulatory and policy environment. GoT and donors have been the key actors throughout the ASDP project cycle. Commentators argue that the private sector (businesses and farmers) has not been sufficiently engaged in the programme. Did the private sector play a significant role in ASDP formulation and implementation? According to Lewis et al. (2008), ‘the private sector is not yet an active player in ASDP. On ASDP formulation and implementation, Lewis et al. relate that:

“As early as 2002 - during ASDP preparation - there was a high level meeting of private sector stakeholders jointly chaired by the then Permanent Secretaries of the Ministries of Agriculture and Food Security and Cooperatives and Marketing. This ‘brainstorming’ session produced recommendations from key private sector organisations covering aspects of investment, marketing, institutional development and land development which might be addressed through ASDP. However, substantial support for private sector development has not yet been systematically incorporated into ASDP activities."

‘Joint Implementation Reviews of ASDP indicate that... there has so far been limited involvement of farmers and other private sector actors in the process. It is generally acknowledged that “capacity building and a change of attitude in LGAs are needed to make farmer empowerment and private sector involvement a reality”

Were irrigation schemes built and rehabilitated efficiently and effectively? Programme reviews cite fundamental problems that undermine impact and sustainability. Above we quoted Hyden's critique of the post-independence policy process in Tanzania. Policy making was overly ambitious and failed to take human and material constraints into account. Does the decision to focus on irrigation conform to this image of unrealistic policy making? Arguably, the sudden presidential initiative and ASDP’s subsequent focus on small-scale irrigation provides a modern example of impromptu ‘policy-making’, largely uninformed by prior technical and risk analysis. Irrigation engineers were sceptical of the exercise, but were reluctant to say so publicly. This conclusion supports the ‘policy failure’ explanation of agricultural underdevelopment mentioned in section 1, but it does not address the issue of the interests served by irrigation schemes.

Although farmers and their representatives were involved in the formulation of irrigation projects at the local level, the ultimate choice of the ‘most viable’ projects was left to the secretariat representing the ASLMs. We have no information on the fairness or technical quality of the screening process, or the degree to which patronage is involved. Partial indirect evidence cited above suggests that the pattern of DADP financing is unrelated to irrigation potential, but more research is required.

No doubt some schemes were more viable than others, but the chances that many of them (rehabilitated and new) will prove sustainable or economically viable are not good, if past experience of routine policy implementation failure is any guide. A parallel is rural domestic water schemes, which have frequently suffered from management and governance problems that threatened their sustainability. We cannot say that the main motivation behind the irrigation schemes was to provide public goods benefiting farm households and communities; they seem rather to serve the institutional imperatives of (part of) the ruling elite and the donor community, discussed further below. We can speculate that success in providing patronage benefits to local elites may have helped motivate the latter to support the ruling elite as well as to bring out the rural vote at election time. It is also possible that some intended beneficiaries derived significant value from irrigation schemes, including higher yields and income, which might encourage them to vote for the ruling party. We lack hard evidence to test either proposition.

3.1.2 Role of donors

Donors fund the ASDP through basket funding, general budget support, and projects. From the outset, donors had difficulty coordinating their aid efforts and operationalising their formal commitment to enhancing the role of the private sector. They found it difficult to agree with the GoT on key aspects of the ASDP, but they also disagreed among themselves. According to Greeley:

‘... donor proliferation, with seven DPs helping to develop the ASDP, has been a serious obstacle to speedy ... progress. There is (sometimes) lack of internal coherence of DPs within country offices and often with their HQs.'
These problems slowed down the launch and implementation of ASDP.

The GoT’s administration of the agricultural sector—with five ‘agricultural’ ministries—makes it extremely difficult to implement sector-wide projects and programmes effectively, efficiently and on time. The practical solution adopted by the WB and other lending agencies has been to subcontract project implementation to notionally independent Project Management Units (PMUs).\textsuperscript{108} This solution offers significant opportunities for patronage in project staff recruitment, rent-seeking in tendering and contracting, and the embezzlement and waste of project funds.\textsuperscript{109}

In her discussion of aid to Tanzanian agriculture, Wolter (2008) notes that ‘the evidence so far suggests that the involvement of recipient, and especially the private sector, in the development and implementation of DADPs is limited.’ She cites evidence suggesting that ‘donors were … reluctant to share the lessons they had learnt from their projects. … As a result the chance to feed project experience into programme support was largely missed.’ Furthermore, ‘The 2007 World Bank evaluation of several of its projects in the agricultural sector points to the Bank’s limited analysis beforehand of the institutional capacity of the GoT to implement the ASDP.’\textsuperscript{110}

Analysts have long linked aid ineffectiveness to institutional weaknesses and rent-seeking. Ateba (1999) argues that failure to take these into account can explain much of the WB’s poor project performance in Africa.\textsuperscript{111} During the 2008 parliamentary budget session, the chairman of the Parliamentary Finance Committee, Dr Abdallah Kigoda, said that ‘the funds channeled to local authorities through the ASDP must be strictly monitored to curb embezzlement as the impact of the billions spent in the past was not evident.’\textsuperscript{112}

ASDP was a first attempt at an agricultural basket arrangement following the successful introduction of education and health baskets. Inadequate oversight and accountability among both donors and government allow this collaboration to continue, despite failure to deliver economically viable and sustainable outcomes to significant numbers of farm households. Therkildsen identifies a virtual conspiracy between aid agencies and the GoT that drives a common discourse of project success despite broad agreement on the low level of state capacity regarding public goods creation and service delivery.\textsuperscript{113} As long as both sides of the aid equation are largely unaccountable to local or external publics, underperformance and waste of human and material resources in aid-financed projects are likely to continue. A political economy of aid needs to address the question: why, if project loans are so conceptually and practically flawed, does the project cycle continue to survive and prosper?

As bilateral donors either pulled out or retained a modest presence in ASDP, WB funding became far more than other donor contributions combined. The WB’s decision to proceed with a large loan in support of ASDP despite serious policy and practical reservations among numerous other donors served to underwrite the vested interests of state actors in the programme, thus undermining the attempt to leverage a more market-oriented approach through basket funding and budget support. The WB’s dominant role among Tanzania’s traditional donors allowed this to happen without the obvious contradictions becoming a public embarrassment for the Bank. The virtual conspiracy between WB and GoT includes claims that the WB’s support was validated by the results, despite the major caveats mentioned above.\textsuperscript{114}

We now turn to input subsidies. Are these a more successful vote buying ploy than irrigation schemes?

### 4.0 The National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme

In his 2003 budget speech, the Minister of Agriculture and Food Security announced the reintroduction of fertiliser subsidies. Neither the subsidies nor their concentration on the Southern Highlands had been the object of prior public debate.\textsuperscript{115} Moreover, ‘subsidies went against the stated policy of all major donors.’\textsuperscript{116} Continued donor opposition to subsidies contrasted with pressures from MAFS and MPs to spread the subsidies beyond the Southern Highlands.\textsuperscript{117}

Subsidies were worth TShs 2 billion in 2003/04, increasing to TShs 32 billion in 2008/09 and, with the help of a WB loan, TShs 138 billion (USD 92 million) in 2009/10, when the system expanded to include paddy. In 2008/09 the National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme (NAIVS) targeted 700,000 farmers in ten regions to receive 155,000 metric tons of subsidised fertiliser and 65,000 tons of seeds.\textsuperscript{118} Nearly 1.5 million farmers were targeted in 2009/10. In 2010/11, an election year, NAIVS was scaled up to 74 districts in 20 regions targeting 2,000,000 direct beneficiaries.\textsuperscript{119} Therdkilden (2011) sees this escalation of subsidies as evidence of the ruling coalition’s efforts ‘to win political power.’ The decision to reintroduce and expand fertiliser subsidies was politically motivated and seen as a vote winner by the highest political leadership.\textsuperscript{120} It was also very much against the advice of the donor community at the time, as explained in table 1.

Imported fertiliser is used mainly on maize, tobacco, and coffee. Fertiliser use varies hugely between regions. The Southern Highlands ‘big four’ regions (Irvinga, Mbeya, Rukwa and Ruvuma) consumed more than half of all fertiliser in Tanzania prior to the removal of subsidies. As part of structural adjustment, the IFIs advised the GoT to remove fertiliser subsidies and abandon pan-territorial pricing of inputs and purchased crops. The demise of these policies (1991-94) made commercial maize production too expensive for many smallholders, particularly in outlying parts of the Southern Highlands.\textsuperscript{121} In 1991, over a quarter (27 percent) of agricultural holdings are said to have used fertiliser, declining to only
11 percent in 1997. However, the withdrawal of subsidies seems to have had little effect on maize production per capita, which has remained flat, while labour productivity has stagnated at a very low level. Table 1 summarises input use in ten mainland regions in a survey undertaken during March-April 2007.

The majority of Tanzanian farmers have never used chemical fertiliser, improved seeds or other chemical inputs. Few have used agro-chemical pesticides, herbicides or fungicides. Even two-thirds of the best-off farmers have never used chemical fertiliser. Disaggregating the results reveals marked regional differences, with nearly three-quarters (73 percent) of Iringa respondents having used chemical fertilisers. Not surprisingly, the least poor farmers were much more likely than the poor to use chemical fertiliser and improved seed, and to find input prices and availability more satisfactory than the poor. We suspect that a relatively small group of better-off farmers accesses the lion’s share of the fertiliser available to Tanzanian farmers, though evidence-based quantifications of this are not yet available. Below, we make a first attempt.

A review of fertiliser subsidies and use in Iringa, the country’s main maize surplus region, reveals the following. First, Iringa farmers received nearly a fifth (19.5 percent) of all subsidised fertiliser during 2009, and the four southern highlands regions nearly half (49.3 percent). Second, more Iringa farmers use chemical fertiliser than farmers in other regions. In 2007, only 37 percent of Iringa farmers had never used chemical fertiliser, compared with 86 percent of farmers nationwide (see Appendix 2). Third, there was a wider range of fertiliser use between poorer and better-off farmers in Iringa than nationally, suggesting a group of larger than average farmers in Iringa who benefit disproportionately from subsidised inputs. Four, inorganic fertiliser use varies significantly between districts. Table 2 gives 2002/03 census figures for fertiliser use in Iringa’s seven districts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Fertiliser use in Iringa Region by District, 2002-2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>No fertiliser</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Households</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iringa R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mufindi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Njombe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ludewa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iringa U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilolo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 3 suggests that Njombe received a disproportionate number of the total vouchers allocated to the region. Very provisionally, we may conclude that: the southern highlands (plus Morogoro) are the main targets for subsidies; better-off farmers benefit disproportionately from input subsidies; the better-off farmers are concentrated in certain areas, for example, Njombe; and such areas are likely to receive more vouchers per farming household.

Iringa rural constituencies are a bastion of support for the ruling party. In the 2010 elections, the Chadema candidate narrowly won the Iringa Urban constituency (50.4 of votes cast versus 44.3 for CCM), but the other nine Iringa constituencies remained firmly in CCM hands. In Njombe Urban, Ismani, Ludewa, and Mufindi (North) constituencies, CCM candidates were returned unopposed, while in the other four the CCM majority ranged from 91 percent (Kilolo) to 67 percent (Njombe West).

The above description of input subsidies is consistent with a number of interpretations of what drives Tanzanian agricultural policy. There is little doubt that the ruling elite would be interested in the formulation and implementation of the NAIVS. First, if subsidies lead to a rise in maize production this would put a downward pressure on prices in Dar es Salaam and other urban markets. Since food is the main expenditure item of the urban poor, it makes political sense to subsidise maize prices. Input subsidies are also consistent with a vote-seeking or a supporter-rewarding interpretation of policy. Alternatively, the solid support for CCM in rural areas could be seen as a response to the input subsidies, suggesting that votes can be bought by successful policies. The weakness of this argument is that many farmers probably do not receive subsidised inputs, even in Iringa. There is also a risk that the disappointed non-recipients are more likely to vote for the opposition than perhaps they would have been in the absence of subsidies. The evidence presented below concerning the implementation of the input scheme leaves little doubt that misallocations from national level down undermined the objective of targeting the subsidies on a broad group of smallholder households. But what orders of magnitude are we talking about?

Control of subsidies also means control of incentives for patronage and rent-seeking. At the national level, rents may be very substantial. Locally, we may expect subsidised inputs to provide benefits for ‘lower level factions’ within the ruling party and bureaucracy, and for big farmers. These will then be more motivated to support the centre and bring out the vote when required to do so. Clearly, the greater the benefits to lower level factions of CCM and other supporters through diversions of the subsidy, the fewer the benefits to farmers in general.

Further research is required to understand the local-national political dynamic and the role of larger commercial farmers in input policy and implementation.

How did donors react to the growing policy interest in subsidised inputs? In 2004, donors expressed their concerns in a letter to the Minister of Finance. The main issues were that the profitability of fertiliser use varies widely; subsidies are difficult to target, and benefits are modest even for the recipients; they are expensive to administer; crowd out the private sector; and displace more sustainable land use practices. As regards targeting, ‘benefits are often captured by the least needy farmers.’ Administrative costs (including rent-seeking) ‘often outweigh the benefits.’ Subsidised fertiliser often arrives too late to be effective, and has often been of the wrong type. The DPs collectively concluded ‘that money currently allocated to price and credit subsidies for fertiliser can be better spent on alternative approaches, many of which are already operative in Tanzania and can be scaled up.’

The general donor attitude to fertiliser subsidies softened in the mid-2000s, in part as a result of the perceived success of the Malawi subsidy programme. Thus it was somewhat less of a surprise than might have been the case when in 2008 the WB announced a USD 160m loan for an Accelerated Food Security Project (AFSP), in support of the input voucher scheme. Still, WB staff were warned of the likely risks involved in a large-scale project of this kind in Tanzania. They were reminded that input vouchers were ‘enormously risky’ because of the lack of critical background analysis and the inadequacy of state technical and managerial capacity at both national and local levels. The WB justified the project as an emergency response to an urgent request from the GoT to address a short-term food crisis.

A food crisis can denote localised shortages as a result of crop failure leading to hunger in rural households, or urban shortages leading to price rises for the majority poor. Both aspects were potentially important for the ruling elite in the build up to the 2010 national elections. Subsidies targeted the southern highlands, Iringa Region in particular. This strongly suggests a concern with urban food prices. In terms of farmer targeting, those with one hectare or more of maize or rice were formally identified as potential beneficiaries. Those below this threshold were excluded on the grounds that they would not be able to afford even subsidised fertiliser. A relatively small number of better-off farmers were formally excluded on the grounds that they could afford to pay the full price.

In 2008, there were said to be just over four million farming households in Tanzania, of whom ‘farming households growing more than 1 ha of maize or rice’ numbered 2.9 million (73 percent of the total). The total number of farmers (as opposed to farming households) growing more than one ha of maize or rice was put at 2.59 million. Of this number, almost all (2.55 million) were identified by Village Voucher Committees (VVC) as potential beneficiaries. MAFS distribution data indicate that 29 percent of this total received maize fertiliser subsidies in 2008/09, and 57 percent in 2009/10. Given that in 2007 86 percent of farmers had never used chemical fertilisers (Table 1 above), the input scheme aimed to reach an additional 29 percent of all farm
households nationwide (86 percent minus 57 percent), or roughly 750,000 farmers ‘growing more than 1 ha of maize or rice.’ If each household contained two voters, CCM’s target constituency to help retain electoral support could be 1.5 million voters. However, the actual distribution of vouchers is likely to have reduced this figure significantly, for reasons discussed below.

Input vouchers are distributed through a series of committees from the national to the village level. The MAFC manages and oversees the entire process, establishes the volume of vouchers to be distributed ‘in line with regional requirements; prepares guidelines for the scheme’s implementation and a directive on farmers’ eligibility. MAFC also prepares guidelines for setting up voucher supervisory committees at regional, district, ward and village levels. The Minister of Agriculture chairs the MAFC committee and the PS is the secretary. The regional committee, which is chaired by the RC, manages the scheme at the regional level and is charged to assure that areas whose irrigation infrastructure is in good condition are given priority in voucher distribution. The district committee, chaired by the DC, is responsible for identifying rice and maize farmers eligible for the scheme. Here we see the overlap between ASDP and NAIVS. The Ward committee, chaired by the WEO, is the link between the village and the district. Finally, the village committee prepares a list of farmers engaged in growing at least one hectare of maize or rice and identify those who qualify as beneficiaries for the voucher scheme. There are three vouchers, two for fertiliser and one for seeds. Agents provide inputs to farmers in exchange for vouchers and cash. The vouchers represent half the retail value of the inputs. Vouchers are checked by the DALO before the agents present them to the National Microfinance Bank (NMB) for payment.

Thus identifying beneficiaries of subsidies is micro-managed by the state’s politico-administrative system, with the private sector brought in to handle the finances and physical distribution. The latest (2010) review rated most NAIVS/AFSP performance indicators as ‘moderately satisfactory.’

‘The implementation of the voucher program shows substantial regional and local variation. Critical data to facilitate decision making on voucher allocation and program implementation for the current year still has significant gaps. The implementation of seed sector activities continues to be seriously delayed, including as a result of slow procurement...’ the mission noted poor documentation and recording of the voucher distribution at both district and village level.

In terms of financial management the review noted weak internal controls and poor record keeping, delays in voucher redemption and in the release of government counterpart funds. Consequently, the: ‘Financial Management System risk has been rated as substantial due to the complexity of the project which involves different actors with high inherent fiduciary risk taking into consideration that the vouchers are as good as cash.’

Half a dozen actions agreed to in a previous action plan to improve financial management had not been implemented by the time of the 2010 review.

Despite these weaknesses, no grand corruption or ‘elite capture’ was detected in NAIVS/AFSP. In Iringa:

‘At a meeting of District level officials of the entire Region those present were encouraged to share such instances but examples were not forthcoming. The only examples of maladministration related to capture by a particular agro dealer of all the vouchers thereby curtailing competition, attempt by an agro dealer to cheat farmers by giving less quantity of input that (sic) required, attempt by the village level officials to dominate the allocation of vouchers etc. However in all cases the maladministration was reported to have been detected in time and rectified. The mission found no reason to doubt this impression created by local authorities. It found the District Commissioner Iringa very involved in the project and taking a personal interest in its implementation by touring villages and educating farmers.’

An official audit of the AFSP for 2009-10 gave the project an ‘unqualified’ opinion, observing that: ‘... expenditure incurred was made judiciously and exclusively for the purpose of the Project with due attention to economy and efficiency.’

Independent information on the implementation and impact of the AFSP is patchy, but a picture of systematic ‘leakages’ is emerging that challenges the official view presented above. At the national level, fertiliser agents have been registered under pressure from senior officials. In August 2009, training of agents by external consultants was interrupted when the MAFC came up with a different list of agents, who were duly trained, though some lacked the basic experience for the task. ‘Fake’ agro-dealers may reallocate vouchers destined for remote areas to other beneficiaries. Asked in April 2008 whether the MOAF was ‘aware that some of the selected agents are cheating by... exporting subsidised fertiliser to neighbouring countries or even selling the same to farmers at full market prices’ the Minister of Agriculture replied that: ‘the ministry is ... investigating these allegations.’

At the local level, abuses of input distribution procedures are common. A civil society source claimed that: ‘The operation of the input subsidy ... has been
dominated by corruption.\textsuperscript{161} The CAG’s annual reports note numerous irregularities in the management of the voucher scheme.\textsuperscript{162} In January 2008, two junior officials in Mbozi District were ‘suspended … for illegally selling … tonnes of subsidised fertiliser’ to Malawi and Zambia. In June 2010, Rukwa Regional Commissioner Daniel Ole Njoolay tasked the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) and Attorney General’s office (AG) to carry out investigations into ‘massive irregularities, misappropriation of funds and theft of agriculture inputs worth over 8bn/- through the voucher system.’\textsuperscript{163} In August 2011, two voucher distribution agents in Rufiji District were arraigned for offering a TShs 10 million bribe to a PCCB officer in connection with an investigation into input voucher fraud in the district.\textsuperscript{164} At the same time, an Area Councillor in Moshi Rural District complained that she had ‘been swamped with complaints regarding the distribution of subsidised fertiliser.’\textsuperscript{165} In Chato District, Kagera Region, no less than 49 people, including three agriculture and livestock officers, 29 village executive officers and 11 village chairpersons) were charged in court for abusing the system. This source points out that ‘all the accused are respectable community leaders and government officials who … are tasked to implement and safeguard the system.’\textsuperscript{166}

Only farmers who can afford the fertiliser at the subsidised rate are supposed to be deemed eligible by the village level. ‘The segment of the voucher supply chain most vulnerable to manipulation and corruption is at the village level.’\textsuperscript{177} This suggests the limits of voter-oriented elite initiatives in a political structure characterised by the rationale of decentralised patronage and informality. The evidence cited above suggests that subsidised fertiliser is being systematically diverted from the poorer to the better off target groups. Evidence from REPOA (2007) suggests that benefits from the state accrue disproportionately to better-off farmers (Table 3).\textsuperscript{178}

The possible abuse of the input system is corroborated by oversight exercises by the Controller and Auditor General (CAG) and the Parliamentary Accounts Committee (PAC). In April 2011, PAC Chairman John Cheyo criticised the Ministry of Agriculture over the management of the inputs and the power tillers (small tractors) programmes. ‘The committee says there are all tale-tale signs of existence (sic) of massive corruption and flouting of rules and regulations governing good business practice in the ministry…’ citing the qualified reports MAFS received from the Controller and Auditor General for the last two financial years.\textsuperscript{179} One of the CAG reports referred to states that the: ‘Ministry ordered 2,687,600 farmer’s input vouchers with face value of Shs. 87,684,600,000 at a cost of Shs.646,552,040 out of which vouchers with face value Shs. 18,633,000,000 costing Shs. 135,010,669 were not distributed.’\textsuperscript{175}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{‘What does the government do to help farmers?’}\textsuperscript{179} & \textbf{Poor} & \textbf{Less-poor} & \textbf{Least-poor} & \textbf{All} \\
\hline
\textbf{Nothing} & 82 & 76 & 66 & 75 \\
\textbf{Subsidises fertiliser} & 1 & 5 & 15 & 7 \\
\textbf{Supplies improved seeds} & 4 & 6 & 6 & 5 \\
\textbf{Markets} & 2 & 4 & 3 & 3 \\
\textbf{Other} & 4 & 5 & 3 & 4 \\
\textbf{DK/No response} & 7 & 4 & 5 & 6 \\
\hline
\textbf{All} & 100 & 100 & 99 & 100 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Government help to farmers, percent 2007}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{173} Kikwete complained that some officials were ‘sabotaging the delivery and distribution of farm inputs’ while ‘others were forging farmers’ signatures to show that they have received subsidised … fertiliser…’

The evidence cited above suggests that subsidised fertiliser is being systematically diverted from the poorer to the better off target groups. Evidence from REPOA (2007) suggests that benefits from the state accrue disproportionately to better-off farmers (Table 3).\textsuperscript{178}
Although three-quarters of all farmers thought they received ‘nothing’ from the government by way of agricultural services, over a quarter of the least poor saw some benefits, subsidised fertiliser in particular. The emerging picture is of benefits formally intended for a broad swath of rural voters being systematically diverted to the better-off. If the latter were likely to vote for the ruling party anyway, there is little to be gained electorally from input subsidies. For the moment, no data are available on the actual distribution of vouchers or the extent to which the system is being manipulated. Further research is required on the distribution of subsidised inputs from the national down to the local level.

A final point: the majority view is that from the late 1970s, agricultural policy had a deleterious effect on rural livelihoods, but the party of ujamaa was not rejected en masse by rural voters as a result. It is possible that the ruling elite’s greater commitment to agriculture and the rapid expansion of subsidies in the build-up to the 2010 elections had a positive impact on rural voters, independent of any benefits derived. Again, it is difficult to test this empirically.

4.1 Conclusions on NAIVS

The immediate objective of fertiliser subsidies was to help assure food self-sufficiency during a period of rising global food and fertiliser prices. But food self-sufficiency has been an agricultural policy objective since independence, and there are other ways than state-managed projects of achieving the same objective. Below we return to our two research questions.

4.1.1 Vote-seeking versus clientelism

Our first research question asked whether the re introduction of fertiliser subsidies could be interpreted as vote- or rent-seeking, or both. Policymakers may be motivated by a mix of both vote-seeking and rent-seeking goals. Senior politicians were clear that subsidising inputs, which accounted for half the MAFC budget in 2010/11, had a vote-seeking dimension. It is clear that a much larger number of voters may benefit from relatively cheap farm inputs than from irrigation schemes. At the same time, a voucher scheme is much more vulnerable to clientelism at both national and local levels than a small-scale irrigation programme. Direct vote-seeking incentives are limited by the reach of the voucher scheme. In the 2009/10 season vouchers were said to have been distributed to 1.5 million households. Clientelism reduces the number of rural voters benefiting from input vouchers. In an election year (2010) input vouchers were a means of mobilising both local elites and voters. Allowing local agricultural elites to capture rents from subsidies serves to keep them on side, and enlists their support in bringing in the vote. Evidence cited below suggests that this strategy is remarkably successful at lower levels of the electoral system.

As in the ASDP, the local ‘private sector’ was not a prime mover in the NAIVS but was incorporated into the scheme on the GoT’s terms as contracted financial and distribution managers. The only local source of fertiliser for the voucher scheme is the Minjingu phosphates factory in Manyara Region. The quality and appropriateness of the phosphates produced have been criticised by some farmers. Despite official support, the privately owned factory was obliged to sell through the Tanzania Fertiliser Company (TFC), an arrangement that threatened to bankrupt the plant. In this case, the inefficient incorporation of the private sector into the input subsidies programme served to lessen its impact. A more strategic inputs policy would be to support the development of an efficient private inputs distribution system, but this is not an obvious short-term vote winner, and would require creating rent-making opportunities for a substantial number of small and medium-sized private companies, while removing such opportunities from existing beneficiaries/clients.

4.1.2 Role of donors

The role of the WB in supporting a policy that other concerned donors had challenged on both theoretical and practical grounds is consistent with the view that policy content matters less than the imperative to meet lending targets. For a number of years, donors criticised subsidies on economic efficiency grounds as well as on concerns with the GoT’s capacity to deliver. It appears that the WB chose to ignore these concerns, including the GoT’s delivery capacity. We argue that the WB and other lending agencies assume a certain level of capacity to manage the state apparatus efficiently at national and sub-national levels. This assumption is a prerequisite for project loans managed by government to flow, for without it, aid of this type would be very difficult to justify. The Tanzanian ruling elite actively promotes the illusion of capacity, which is useful for its own self image as well as for the smooth functioning of the aid machine.

The virtual conspiracy that we and others identify between donors and the Tanzanian state is protected by relatively low levels of accountability to respective constituencies. Though internal evaluations are often quite critical of project outcomes, the project mode itself continues unabated. Appendix 4 provides an historical background to aid to agriculture in Tanzania.

5.0 Discussion and tentative conclusions

‘What is striking about many African countries is how little trickles down to the worse off through patronage network and how much sticks to a few hands at the top.’

Poverty reduction and economic growth are the twin policy objectives of Tanzania’s ongoing MKUKUTA. For more than a decade, economic growth has been robust in sectors other than agriculture, and poverty has fallen significantly in Dar es Salaam but not in rural areas.
Apparently, neither MKUKUTA in general nor policies targeting agriculture directly have had much impact as regards reducing poverty or improving livelihoods. Targeting putative benefits on relatively poor farmers is clearly unlikely to succeed when rents can be easily appropriated by the less poor.

Below we proceed as follows. We review our two research questions in order and add a brief discussion of possible policy drivers other than the state and donor agencies. Then we ask briefly whether private sector interests are more significant than previously assumed, and how these are linked to the two main actors.

**Research question 1: To what extent is agricultural policy driven by the ruling coalition’s concern with securing the rural vote directly through the ballot rather than indirectly through clientelism at national and lower levels?**

Our review suggests that providing direct benefits to farmers in order to assure their political support is not a major motivation of the Tanzanian ruling elite, even in an increasingly competitive political system. Clientelism continues to trump the ballot box. First, though the picture is changing quite rapidly, most rural voters continue to support the ruling party despite its low capacity to deliver concrete benefits through sound programmatic policies. Possible explanations include a ‘better the devil you know...’ attitude among voters, and a fear that the ruling party’s propaganda that voting for the opposition would inevitably lead to violence and bloodshed might be true. In a discussion of livestock politics, Leonard et al (2009) maintain that the patronage linkage between voters and MPs is heavily weighted in favour of the latter. Eking out a precariously existing and largely uninformed of what policies their MPs promote at the national level, poor rural voters are perforce satisfied with occasional handouts in lieu of better policies.

The ruling elite does not yet appear to be excessively worried about the potential mass defection of rural voters to opposition parties. Second, there are multiple examples where policy-as-practice appear to have a negative effect on rural voters’ welfare, for example, when RCs ban cross-border crop sales, local officials shake down small farmers and traders at road blocks, the Warehouse Receipt System (WRS) presents opportunities for official rent-seeking, and the government makes promises (input subsidies, irrigation schemes) on which it delivers only partially and unevenly. Third, rural projects are likely to deliver few benefits (at perhaps significant cost) to target groups through inefficiencies and rent-seeking in project implementation. In addition, patronage diverts benefits away from the mass of poor households towards the better off farmers and local elites, who can usually be relied upon to bring in the vote. For these reasons we expect the rural population to continue to be short-changed by state policies and practices.

Policies that intentionally or coincidentally undermine private investment at all levels help perpetuate failed approaches to agricultural development. The dominant discourse justifying state-led agricultural policy is strongly normative and ideological. The rural population is considered backward, custom-bound and ignorant. The incumbents of state power have to protect the small farmer against the predatory (‘greedy’; ‘unscrupulous’) middleman/trader. Public investment in research and extension will increase the productivity of land. Benefits promised are collective (public goods) not opportunities for private risk-taking and accumulation. Narratives of ‘empowerment’ and ‘participation’ in local development planning are essentially donor-inspired, and do not correspond to the dominant view of the appropriate relationship between the state and the rural poor, which is paternalistic or laissez faire at best and authoritarian and coercive at worst.

Nationalist sentiments dominate the discussion of foreign investment in large-scale agriculture. Many in the elite are worried by the potential political consequences of foreign investors taking over large areas of land and turning small farmers into landless labourers. Since colonial times, foreign-owned estates and plantations in densely-populated parts of the country have been the subject of conflicts over land and water rights with local populations. Despite a quarter of a century of liberalisation, the GoT still owns hundreds of thousands of hectares of estates and ranches that it is clear unlikely to succeed when rents can be easily appropriated by the less poor.

Unstated anti-market sentiments sometimes help undermine formally pro-market projects during implementation. For example, the 5th ASDP review concluded that the Warehouse receipt system is being implemented successfully... on cashew nuts and sesame crops... in Lindi region. Yet for cashew there is no rationale for a WRS, since the crop is harvested and sold immediately, not stored post harvest to wait for prices to improve. The WRS gives cooperative societies a monopoly of cashew purchasing and the opportunity to make a sizeable rent through arbitrage between sellers and buyers. Cashew purchases are financed with loans from the National Microfinance Bank (NMB), guaranteed by the treasury. NMB actively supports the WRS: with a state guarantee it does not have to worry about the creditworthiness of his customer. Cooksey (2008) estimates the rent earned by the official middleman in the 2007/08 cashew marketing season at over twenty million USD. ‘Success’ in implementing the WRS means the effective exclusion of the private sector from buying specific crops. Box 3 gives an example.

Though justified in terms of the expected income and welfare benefits to the rural population, agricultural policy and its implementation serve primarily the interests of key members of the state apparatus, including CCM cadres at all levels, state bureaucrats in central and local government, parastatal organisations under the five ‘agricultural’ ministries, marketing boards and cooperative societies. Though data are lacking, it is likely that the additional funds that the GoT has allocated to agriculture in recent years have not been used to create value-for-money public goods, despite the enormous needs for more and better services of all kinds, but rather to service the needs of a diversity of poorly functioning,
semi-autonomous state bureaucracies. Research and consultancy interest groups help legitimate state agricultural policies and investments, while large corporations, project implementers and contractors receive a significant proportion of both external and internal development funds invested in ‘agriculture’.

Statist policies emanating from anti-private sector values among the ruling coalition serve to undermine attempts at agricultural development, which to succeed requires cooperation and synergy between public and private domains that goes beyond cronyism. While the probity and competence of private agents are frequently questioned in public discourse, these qualities are routinely taken for granted in the case of the state.

We return to private interests influencing policy below.

Research question 2: How has aid influenced Tanzanian agricultural policy formulation and implementation?

Until now, we have posed our research questions separately, but empirically the shared interests of donors and the ruling elite may be one of the main keys to the political economy of Tanzanian agricultural policy. Though both sides are formally committed to private sector driven growth, their separate and joint activities routinely serve to sideline the private sector, privileging activities designed to address state rather than market failures and to strengthen state rather than market institutions.

Aid agencies attempt to support market-led agricultural development through both money and projects. Much recent aid from the major agencies has taken the form of sector ‘baskets’ and general budget

Box 3: Green gram traders exploit farmers

The way in which the WRS has been appropriated to serve the interests of the elite demonstrates how donor-driven policies and projects may be ‘instrumentalised’ during implementation. For example, in March 2012, Nanyumbu District Commissioner Ms Fatuma Alli, ‘banned traders who have been buying green grams from farmers without using proper weighing machines.’ ‘Farmers should sell their crops to the primary cooperative societies which have been licensed to do the business,’ she said. ‘The DC noted that the government had done everything to empower cooperative unions to ensure that they buy crops from farmers at reasonable prices.’ ‘We have also introduced the warehouse receipt system to ensure that farmers are benefiting by getting maximum price for their crops,’ Ms Alli said, noting that there was no reason why farmers should sell their produce to fraudulent traders who have been exploiting them.’ ‘The DC, who is also the chairperson of the district peace and security committee, directed village and ward executives to ensure that they apprehend businessmen who would short change farmers by buying the crop at low price or using unauthorised weighing machines.’ ‘Buying crops at low prices or using weights which have not been authorised is against the law. Businessmen who do so should be arrested,’ she said:

Source: Ibadi 2012.

Box 4: How did AMSDP perform?

Financed by IFAD, the African Development Bank and Ireland Aid, this USD 43 million project to promote local-level financial and commercial markets was operating in eight regions by 2008. AMSDP introduced the Warehouse Receipt System (WRS), designed to help farmers store produce rather than sell it all at disadvantageous post-harvest prices (see text). A final internal review of AMSDP and another IFAD initiative, the Rural Financial Services Programme (RFSP), worth USD 25m, concluded that ‘there are many positive experiences’ but that ‘the programmes have had ... modest influence on the national policy and institutional frameworks for rural finance and agricultural marketing.’ ‘RFSP’s support did not result in strong apex organisations for micro and rural finance.’ ‘The design of both programmes underestimated the challenge of establishing or promoting viable private enterprises.’ ‘AMSDP was to establish/promote 1,000 viable producer/trader groups and achieved 1,202 of which only 16 per cent are self-sustainable.’ ‘A major factor [contributeing to] high costs in RFSP and AMSDP] has been the combination of operating largely in project mode and the ambitious area coverage, distributing relatively limited budgets over vast geographical areas and many districts.’ ‘There are serious challenges related to the sustainability of the supported beneficiary groups. A relatively large part of the SACCOs struggle with critically low repayment rates which threaten their long-term survival.’

Despite AMSDP’s mixed results, IFAD is financing a $90m follow-up project building on the ‘successes’ of its predecessor, which is described as a ‘pilot’ project.

Source: Final AMSDP Evaluation 2011, IFAD website accessed 01/01/12
support. Both have helped boost the total agriculture budget and allowed the GoT to put substantial amounts of money into irrigation and input subsidies, with the results described above. Despite donor support, Tanzania has not met its CAADP target of allocating 10 percent of its budget to agriculture, though the trend has been generally upwards.

Second, aid agencies have taken the lead in promoting the private sector in agriculture through a large number of mostly uncoordinated projects. For example, in FY 2006/07, there were at least 140 donor-funded activities promoting the private sector in agriculture, with total commitments of USD 445 million. According to Wolter (2008), the Agricultural Marketing Systems Development Programme (AMSDP) was ‘one of the few projects addressing … agricultural marketing.’ Box 4 examines its performance.

Area projects like AMSDP have negligible leverage on central government on agricultural marketing and regulation policy. The plethora of large and small market-related projects scattered all over the country enjoy no overall coordination, synergy or mutual learning. Rarely do they admit or react energetically to failure, and are lacking in public oversight and popular accountability. One experienced observer claimed never to have seen a successful WB agriculture project since independence 50 years ago. Globally, success in agriculture does not figure in the WB’s five claims for developmental impact during the last decade.

Virtual collusion between the GoT and donors allows both sides to describe projects as ‘satisfactory’ that by commercial standards would be described as failures. The absence of effective public oversight of donor-financed/GoT implemented projects allows both sides to repeat the underperforming project cycle unchallenged, incurring extremely high (but rarely mentioned) overhead/transaction costs in the process.

Agricultural projects—both those implemented by donors and the GoT—have a miserable track-record regarding impact and sustainability. Yet projects continue to feature in the armoury of agricultural policy implementation, particularly those financed by the WB and other lending agencies. These projects supplement GoT budgets for the agricultural ministries. One respondent was highly critical of donor projects for:

‘enabling the agricultural sector lead ministries to continue on their selfish, inefficient and ineffective paths of seminars, training, 4x4s and meetings. This masks the need to respond to real-life requirements and pressures. They are cushioned from these pressures by the donor funding...’

We need to explain how repeated failure to achieve stated objectives can continue unchallenged for extended periods. An independent assessment would start from the premise that clientelism is a major driver of agricultural policy in Tanzania, and that this helps explain why central and local government are so inefficient in the provision of public goods.

At the same time, central and local level regulatory practices undermine the confidence of the private sector, whose investments impact on agricultural policy. In the WB’s 2010 Ease of Doing Business survey, Tanzania ranked 131st out of 183 countries surveyed (72nd percentile). According to the 2009 survey, Tanzanian taxes are so numerous and so complex that most businesses ‘must cheat to survive.’ Ambiguity (‘virtually everything appears to be negotiable’) and high taxes create a ‘hothouse for corruption.’ According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Tanzania scored between 2.2 and 3.2/10 between 1999 and 2011, which is in the bottom quartile and slightly below the African average. Yet, neither of the interventions discussed in this paper placed any priority on ‘private sector development.’

The private sector needs to be actively encouraged by competitive taxation policies, effective regulation and predictable corruption. Failing a dramatic turn-around, the highly flawed but well-entrenched state-donor nexus will be in charge of agricultural policy for the foreseeable future. The following sections examine possible emerging political and private sector challenges to this gloomy conclusion.

5.1 The political settlement and Tanzanian agricultural policy

Tanzania’s ‘political settlement’, defines the broad ‘rules of the game’ adhered to by the component parts of Tanzania’s ruling elite. Tanzania’s political settlement has moved from centralised hegemony (single party, strong president, moral as much as material incentives, tolerable corruption control, little regionalism) based on a heavily rural support-base to a looser alliance around the ruling party’s Central Committee, senior bureaucrats, and the army where competitive rent-seeking ratchets up the cost of the settlement without assuring stability over the longer term.

By African standards, Tanzania is still a relatively well-integrated polity, reflecting low levels of historically-derived conflicts based on race, religion, geography, ethnicity, or class, and the successful statecraft of the country’s first president, which established an institutionalised ruling party. During the 1960s and
1970s capitalist tendencies in cooperatives and among ‘rich’ African farmers and traders were suppressed, while European and Asian businesses and rental property were nationalised. Until the 1990s, politicians, bureaucrats and parastatal employees could not own shares, rental property or private companies. The resultant elite settlement incorporated all national and regional elites under a strong executive that largely managed to control opportunistic rent-seeking tendencies. 216

Tanzania’s political settlement is currently in transition from a centralised and inclusive single party to a looser and more competitive model. Competitive politics in the 1990s saw the rise of new political parties to challenge the hegemony of CCM, while economic liberalisation removed the constraint on public servants engaging in private business, opening the door to ‘money politics’. In the first multiparty elections in 1995 opposition parties obtained nearly two firths of the popular vote, but CCM strengthened its position in 2000, with significant increases in both presidential and parliamentary majorities (Table 4). In 2005, President Kikwete trumped his predecessor’s performance and opposition presidential candidates performed poorly, though there was little change in CCM’s (huge) parliamentary majority.

But in the most recent elections (November 2010) the opposition made significant inroads into both presidential and parliamentary majorities, reflecting a substantial rise in the opposition vote and a very low voter turn-out. 217 Nationally, only 8.4 million voters out of 20.1 million registered (43 percent) actually voted in the 2010 elections. 218 Though most of the seats won by the opposition parties were in urban constituencies, the rural voter seems to have voted with his/her feet, abstaining in large numbers. These results suggest that the ruling party is under increasing pressure to deliver tangible benefits to rural voters if it is to retain its dominance of Tanzanian politics. We would thus expect to see more programmatic policy initiatives aimed at the rural vote. Yet, with the arrival of Kilimo Kwanza and related initiatives discussed further below, official ‘policy’ is veering away from exclusive concerns with smallholder productivity and poverty reduction and towards encouraging large-scale commercial agriculture based on substantial foreign investments and land acquisitions.

The party bosses’ attempts to retain pan-elite unity under the ruling party is threatened by the emergence of rival internal clientelist networks of senior politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen. The currently dominant faction that orchestrated President Kikwete’s 2005 and 2010 election strategy is challenged internally by a minority faction concerned that growing political corruption will weaken the economy and strengthen the hand of opposition parties. Since the reintroduction of political competition, aspirants to political office have increasingly vied for political support with war chests financed directly through looting state coffers and/or indirectly through deals with foreign and local businessmen. 219 There is a view that looting, rent-seeking, land grabbing and natural resource plunder are increasingly costly consequences of heightened political competition within the ruling party.

Signs of a loosening of the centralised hegemony of the ruling party’s settlement since liberalisation are said to be the increasing influence of lower-level elites through decentralisation, control of land allocation, and the selection of parliamentary candidates. 220 The security of tenure of CCM incumbent MPs has fallen as a result, raising the possibility of defections to opposition parties when incumbents are not reselected. The weakening of central control of the political selection process allows for local state-private-civil society relationships to come more into play.

The settlement is also under threat from urbanisation, which reduces the importance of the rural vote, traditionally the core support of the ruling party and from the decline of ujamaa as an ideological force. The press has revealed excesses at the top, but accountability still remains inadequate. For the moment, the majority of senior CCM officials, bureaucrats and the military are in the President’s camp, but this could change, depending on conjunctural politicking and the opposition’s unity and popularity in the build-up to the next elections.

Finally, the role of aid has to be factored into the political settlement. Di John and Putzel (2009:18) see a possible two-way relationship:

Not only does the political settlement set the constraints for what can and cannot be accomplished with foreign assistance, but foreign assistance itself can have an impact on the political settlement. This analytical framework provides a window for donors to grasp the politics of a place in order to design more effective interventions.

The manner in which this interaction between aid and the political settlement works over time is a story yet to

Table 4: Electoral results during the multiparty era, 1995 to date

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presidential (% votes)</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament (% seats)</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Councils (% seats)</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>91.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village/Hamlet (% seats)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: USAID 2010; National Electoral Commission (www.nec.go.tz); Chaligha 2008; Wikipedia 24/11/11

Working Paper 040
be told. Our working hypothesis is that the aggregate impact of aid is massively supportive of Tanzania’s state-led agricultural policy, providing additional recurrent and development funds that fuel the clientelistic practices of the state bureaucracy at all levels. Far from stimulating policy reflection and debate, on balance, aid reinforces the anti-market approach to agricultural policy.

We conclude with some observations on the role of local and external business interests on the political settlement and agricultural policy during a period of trade and investment liberalisation.

5.2 Business and agricultural policy

How do private interests influence the political settlement and agricultural policy? With the arrival of Kilimo Kwanza in 2008, official agricultural policy took a sharp turn towards large-scale investment in agriculture. In support of this policy, discussed further below, the Tanzanian Investment Centre set up a ‘land bank’ and some large foreign investments are underway, usually brokered by senior members of the ‘system.’

Since liberalisation, local private interests (largely Asian and Arab) have begun to penetrate the political centre. According to Hoeffler:

‘Within agricultural sub-sectors, the continuous existence of quasi-monopolies in commodity marketing, trade or processing demonstrates that the struggle against patronage and corruption is far from over.’

Regional and global grain markets are key components of the agricultural policy story. It has been common for the GoT to ban cereal exports to neighbouring countries in the name of food security. For example, in May 2008, the Minister of Agriculture banned exports of all food crops pending the results of an ongoing food assessment’ by his ministry and the PMO. Global food shortages and price increases had discouraged ‘some local traders’ from importing maize. In January of the same year, the Minister had suspended maize exports after establishing apparent cereal shortages, leading the GoT to ‘waive tax on imported maize ... in order to enable local traders to import 300,000 tonnes of maize.’

‘Claim that an oligopoly of importers actively seek to influence the perceptions of food crises by influencing the media to write about impending food shortages. The aim is to influence politicians to allow food imports at lower duty rates. When ministry of finance recently tried to question the validity of a food security assessment, it eventually had to back down.’

If there is collusion between ‘a powerful lobby of grain importers’ and the GoT which allows the former to ignore the East African Community’s (EAC) Common External Tariff (CET), then it must be incorporated as an important piece of our understanding of agricultural ‘policy.’

Politically well-connected companies obtain access to major rent-making opportunities, while politically un-connected companies get little or no official support and are vulnerable to the extortive behaviour of the TRA and officialdom in general. As in other sectors, there is a ‘missing middle’ of commercial farmers and farm service providers, reflecting the difficulties and costs of doing business in a hostile legal and regulatory environment.

In 2008, the anti-private sector bias of official policy often complained about by donor agencies was challenged by the arrival of Kilimo Kwanza (KK), the latest framework for agriculture sector development, superseding the ASDS/ASDP. KK was formulated by the Tanzania National Business Council (TNBC). Although it is said to be ‘private-sector driven’, Kilimo Kwanza is structured in a surprisingly similar way to the ASDP, with a heavy GoT presence in the majority of components and dozens of activities supposedly involving multiple coordinated actors. Tanzania’s horticulture strategy has the same claim to be private-sector driven, and the same complex blueprint for implementation, with a major role for the state.

The potential for rent-seeking within KK has been highlighted with the involvement of Indian-made tractors and power tillers in a deal involving SUMA JKT, the army’s commercial wing, and a local trading company that was involved in the External Payments Account scam in the Bank of Tanzania. Funded with a USD 40m soft loan from the Indian government, 1,860 tractors, 400 power tillers and other farming implements were to be imported. By early 2011, most of these remained unsold, and were said to be gathering dust in Lugalo Barracks, outside Dar es Salaam.

Other potentially important external influences on agricultural policy come from the private corporate sector, the international community, and private philanthropies. The driving forces for these increasing external interests are the threat of global food shortages, rising energy costs and efforts to reduce carbon emissions. The UN promotes the Alliance for the Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), which receives massive funding inter alia from the Gates Foundation. The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) under the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) is another major initiative to increase farm productivity. CAADP aims at attaining a budget commitment of 10 percent of total spending and 6 percent annual growth for agriculture to help achieve Millennium Development Goal 1 (cutting hunger by half by 2015). Major agribusiness corporations put together public-private investment consortia, with mandates to increase food security and generate exports. DFID has created a ‘challenge fund’ for investment in African agribusiness. And so on.

By invitation from President Kikwete, the Norwegian fertiliser giant YARA recently entered the Tanzanian...
market and is already supplying 40 percent of the fertiliser consumed in the country. YARA says it has invested USD 20 million in bulk storage capacity at Dar es Salaam harbour in anticipation of growing commercial fertiliser imports. YARA supplies unsubsidised fertiliser for the tobacco industry on the basis of an annual competitive tender. YARA is a member of SAGCOT (the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania), a public-private consortium of 23 official and large international commercial interests, farmers’ groups and the GoT, with ambitious plans to develop market chains for smallholders and large-scale farms.

YARA has been actively lobbying major donor agencies to get them to share the risk of major private investments in relatively insecure African markets. It claims success in ‘rolling out’ its multi-sector value chain approach in a number of Tanzanian districts.

The growing global interest in biofuels has led to the rapid acquisition of large areas of land in numerous African countries, including Tanzania, by a range of external players of all sizes and degrees of integrity. External and local opposition to the new ‘land grab’ suggests that foreign investors may find it difficult to enforce their land and water rights. Early investments have not been particularly successful, with at least one European investor pulling out prematurely.

What is the potential impact of these new external actors and initiatives on national agricultural policy and practice? On the one hand, the involvement of the international community in promoting the green revolution could be seen as unlikely to influence Tanzanian policy, based as it is on traditional technical approaches to increasing land productivity. This plays into the hands of the GoT by endorsing statist solutions to the chronic problem of agricultural underdevelopment.

On the other hand, agribusiness interests in commercial farming, backed with market influence and donor support, might stand a better chance of influencing Tanzanian policy. Whether or not this would be a good thing remains to be seen.

Key issues for policy are the relations between local and external ‘private’ interests. Local interests could be expected to lobby to limit foreign investments in land-intensive projects, ban certain imports, or reserve certain sectors for local businesses. Joint ventures are a possible solution to the external-internal problem. It is only natural for existing patronage networks controlling key imports to protect their monopolies against external attempts to dismantle them. It would be hard to identify a local pro-market agricultural lobby favouring a radical opening of agricultural investment and trade, including agribusiness multinationals.

If the experience of the mining sector is any guide, state support for agribusiness could wane quite rapidly. Land and human rights groups and adverse media coverage and commentary might provide the stimulus for such a change in policy. The ruling elite would not want to be associated with policies that appeared to take land away from semi-subsistence farmers to produce bio-fuels.

6.0 Research

The political economy of Tanzanian agricultural policy is not widely researched, and consequently this has been a partial and largely exploratory study. Lack of research and data on critical issues have thwarted the analysis at critical junctures. We know little of the manner in which various interest groups—endogenous and exogenous, public and private— influence policy making and implementation through formal and informal means.

Past research has focused almost exclusively on the state and donor agencies as drivers of agricultural policy. Economic analysis of agriculture has more or less ignored underlying political factors influencing policy formulation and implementation. In recent years, the forces of globalisation and philanthro-capitalism have brought new actors onto the scene, making ‘policy’ an increasingly difficult concept to operationalise.

A comprehensive scoping exercise is required to map the main players and their interactions. Rent theory provides a promising analytical framework to structure these interactions, and to link them to larger questions of economic transformation and poverty reduction. If, as recent research suggests, the strategic political role of local elites is increasing, what are the means by which the political centre attempts to secure their support for the existing elite settlement? How do opposition parties strategise around this issue? More generally, is deepening democracy the harbinger of more ‘programmatic’ policies or more short-term efforts to buy off farmers with transfers such as input subsidies?

We noted the enormous gaps in our understanding of the functioning of the Tanzanian agricultural bureaucracy, suggesting other priorities for future research. More research is required to understand the interface between the state, donors and the new external actors. The big issues include: (1) whether a new external-internal alliance might arise to challenge the traditional hegemony of the donor-supported state, and (2) what the implications of such an alliance might be for the fates of Tanzanian subsistence and commercial agriculture. Though quantitative evidence is lacking, there are signs that a class of medium- to large-scale Tanzanian farmers is beginning to emerge, based in part on rents captured from acquiring land at below market prices. How do the external and internal forces relate to each other?

Is there a trend towards more local political autonomy, with local elites extracting more rent opportunities from the centre in exchange for allegiance and ‘bringing in the vote’? How do local agribusinesses protect their interests against external competition? Anecdotal evidence of investors losing land titles and litigation in conflicts with state or business interests (JV partners, local competitors) needs to be fleshed out with more systematic research.
Donors remain key actors. The manner in which the interaction between aid and the political settlement works over time is a story yet to be told. How does aid affect the ‘elite bargain’? What more can be said about the ‘implicit conspiracy’ between government and donors? We are used to discussing aid in terms of success versus ‘failure’, but the actual impact of aid has not been seriously addressed. Measuring aid impact poses serious methodological problems, however.

At a lower level, more independent assessments of projects are required for a better understanding of their nature and impact. Regarding the small-scale irrigation projects, for example, we have no information on the fairness or technical quality of the screening process, or the degree to which patronage is involved. Partial indirect evidence cited above suggests that the pattern of DADP financing is unrelated to irrigation potential, but more research is required. The actual distribution of input vouchers would tell us a lot about the underlying forces determining ‘policy in practice.’

The practical difficulties involved in undertaking such a research programme—accessing sensitive data, challenging state and donor discourses, assessing actual as opposed to claimed policy/project impacts, examining rent-seeking practices and their effects—should not be underestimated.

END NOTES

1 For a summary, see Cooksey 2011a.

2 Official agricultural statistics are generally unreliable; yields may have improved in some areas and deteriorated in others.

3 Tanzania imports 120,000 to 140,000 metric tons of rice a year and half a million tons of wheat.


5 In a list of ‘problems’ faced by farming households in 2007, ‘cesses, taxes and deductions’ were a ‘major problem’ for only 18 percent of respondents, while input prices, availability and quality were a major problem for 85, 71 and 70 percent (REPOA 2007:14).

6 A sub-type structuralist argument stresses urban bias in national agricultural policy favouring poor urban food consumers over poor rural producers. Michael Lipton makes the general case, Robert Bates makes the argument for Africa.

7 Skarstein 2010. Despite its rain dependence, very little of Tanzania can be effectively irrigated (Andrew Coulson, comment on earlier draft, November 2011).

8 See the work of Khan and Chang for examples.

9 Hyden 2006:146.


11 See Poulton 2011 for the use of political economy in the PEAPA programme. Our use of the term ‘political economy’ could be challenged by different schools of political economists, whether neo-classical, structuralist or Marxist. Coulson (personal communication, November 2011) challenges the use of the term without clear specification of the object and methods used. His usage of the term ‘is about the way social classes make decisions about economic and social policy which may or may not lead to growth or prosperity. It is very difficult to have a political economy of agriculture, or any other sector. It is intrinsically about how the choices about sectors interact with each other.’ Further work is required to specify an inclusive model of the relevant ‘political economy’ that embraces all the main actors, as discussed in section 6. One thing missing is a discussion of rents and rent-seeking as potential factors in agricultural transformation.


13 URT 2009:11. Household Budget Survey comparisons suggest that rural basic needs poverty fell from 40.8 percent in 1991 to 37.6 in 2007. Though malnutrition seems to have declined between 1999 and 2004, more than 50% of under-fives were stunted in Mtwara, Lindi, Ruvuma, Iringa and Kigoma Regions in 2004/05. Under-five stunting was 31.1% for the least poor rural quintile nationwide and 44.2% for the poorest. In urban areas the comparable figures are 11.5% and 40.8% (RAWG 2009:58-9).

14 Bryceson and Jamal 1997; Bryceson 2010; Binswanger-Mkhize and Gautam 2010:54.

15 Ellis and Mdoe 2002; Ellis and Freeman 2002. ‘Rich’ and ‘poor’ suggest class differentiation, perhaps ‘primitive accumulation’, or ‘accumulation from below’ and indeed the ‘rich’ hire the labour of the ‘poor’, but as ‘vibarua’ rather than full-time farm labourers, as was previously the case. See reference 17.

16 World Bank 2008:57.

17 Bryceson 2010:79. Bryceson (2010:81) argues that changes in individual and household livelihood strategies meant that: ‘Male patriarchal power within the peasant household was increasingly challenged.’

18 Large amounts of rice and maize are imported, however, and the livestock and dairy industry is chronically undeveloped.

19 State owned farms and ranches cover hundreds of thousands of hectares; many are overrun by ‘squatters’.

20 Putterman 1995:321. Mueller (2011) argues that rural class formation is taking place on the basis of income and land use inequalities and that some poor household members provide kibarua labour to better off farmers. Whether ‘peasant differentiation’ constitutes ‘capitalist relations’, as the author suggests, remains to be seen.
34 This does not mean that improving livelihoods will
not be subjected to value for productive use. The result may be policy incoherence,
27 Government spending is not subjected to value for
money analysis. See Cooksey 2011b:35.
28 Patronage, like rent-seeking, creates rents
(non-market transfers) or opportunities to create
rents.
29 Down from 29% in 2001.
30 See Hoeffler 2011.
31 ESRF 2010:85-88. Non-transfer of donor commitments
is one possible reason for the difference. Another
is more aggressive lobbying by non-agricultural
ministries. In 2010-11, MAFC accounts for 58% of
total sector spending, followed by PMO-RALG
(17%).
32 Some of these were investigated under the ‘Drivers
of Change’ research programme in 2005-06.
33 REPOA 2007. The condition of the roads ranked
second only to the cost of basic goods as ‘a major
problem’ for rural residents.
34 This does not mean that improving livelihoods will
solidify popular support for the ruling party. History
shows there is no simple relationship between
improved livelihoods for the masses and loyalty to
the ruling regime.
35 For example, in March 2012, Minister of Agriculture
Jumanne Maghembe ... accused extension officers
and other agricultural experts of frustrating the
country’s efforts to produce more food. ‘It seems
that you attend workshops and training seminars
for the sole purpose of collecting allowances...we
don’t see you putting into good use what you
learn...’ (Chidawali 2012).
36 The WB’s critique of African statism (1984) is silent
on the role of donors, including the WB, in supporting
failed policies. Appendix 4 summarises donor
support to Tanzanian agriculture since independence,
with special reference to the World Bank.
37 With large concessional tied loans, China is making
a major impact on the aid scene, though not
particularly in agriculture.
38 See Cooksey 2011e for a discussion of the difficulties
of aid coordination in general.
40 ASDS also proposed to clarify public and private
roles in providing agricultural services. Though
highly participatory in preparation, ‘stakeholders’
consulted did not include the private sector. The
donors involved were: JICA, Denmark, DFID, Irish
Aid, Japan, WB and EU (Process for preparation of
42 These are: the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security
and Cooperatives (MAFC), Ministry of Industry, Trade
and Marketing (MITM), Ministry of Livestock
Development and Fisheries (MLDF), Ministry of
Water and Irrigation (MOWI) and the Prime Minister’s
Office – Regional Administration and Local
Government (PMO-RALG). To this list we could add
the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism
(MNRT), responsible for forestry and game
management (Andrew Coulson, comment on draft
report).
43 Holton 2002, 2006. Another capital ‘C’ may have been
left out of the list. The UK, Denmark and the EU
dropped out of the basket.
44 Agriculture Development Partners Group 2004.
45 According to Booth (2011:15): ‘On some issues, such
as democratic decentralisation, there is something
like a global pressure-group which brings together
all those with interests in this sector, including local
government practitioners and their associations,
consultants specialising in this field and agencies,
especially UN agencies, which have staked out
decentralisation work as their territory.’
46 Current commitments by donors to the ASDP Basket
Fund for the period 2006-2013 include: the World
Bank (US$90 m), the African Development Bank
(US$60 m), IFAD (US$36 m - initial), the European
Union (US$8.5 m), Irish Aid (US$1 m - initial), and
the Embassy of Japan (US$3 m). The domestic
contribution is expected to amount to US$51.9
million (US$28.7 million from the Government and
org/operations/pipeline/pf/tan.htm (accessed
December 30 2008).
47 Greeley 2008:16.
48 The GoT’s contribution to ASDP is funded through the
recurrent budget, which contains General
Budget Support from a range of donors equal to
30-40% of recurrent spending. Thus, all the major
Unlike traditional projects, LGAs had more discretion in the final allocation of funds.

Therkildsen 2010:10. Central ministry concerns may have been well founded. According to Greeley (2007:1): ‘The DADPs are the vehicle for most of the public investment in the sector and there is little evidence from the process so far that they will lead to a coherent strategy for poverty-reducing agricultural growth.’

DPG 2004.

Lwambuka and Massanja 2004. The list of major problems: the GoT lacked commitment, ownership and leadership; donor support was sometimes contradictory and uncoordinated; management was overly complex and responsibilities unclear; district councils were not adequately empowered; Task Forces (TF) were not working efficiently or effectively; communication and coordination were weak at all levels; MAFS dominated at the expense of the TFs, the secretariat, other ASLMs, and non-state stakeholders; private sector, civil society and farmers were inadequately integrated into the process; and implementation was slow and to date there were no tangible results achieved at lower levels.

Greeley 2007:20. The agricultural budget showed that: ‘The government has signed up for very little investment outside of irrigation and has left capacity building almost entirely to development partners’ investments.’

The consultants thought the capacity to exploit the 2.3 million ha of land with high irrigation potential was ‘limited’ (Therkildsen 2011:11). The following discussion relies heavily on this source. Appendix 4 gives figures for irrigation potential by region.

GoT increased allocations to agriculture from USD 62.4 million in 2003/04 to USD 158.5 million in 2006/07. According to Wolter (2008:17), about 80 per cent of the agriculture sector development budget is financed by donors.

Greeley 2007:15. The investment is largely in private goods, however, whereas the state’s main responsibility is to produce public goods.

The ruling party obtained 202 seats in parliament, with three opposition parties sharing the remaining 30 seats (Policy Forum 2009:2). See Table 4 and accompanying text for further discussion.

Mungai is an old-time CCM politician who has served in various ministerial positions over the years, including Minister of Education under President Mkapa. Perhaps it is relevant that Mungai hails from Iringa, the main maize growing region in the Southern Highlands. Iringa farming households use more fertiliser than any others in the country (see text). Mungai was replaced by Stephen Wasira when Jakaya Kikwete came to power in 2005. A defector from CCM to an opposition party and then back, Wasira was demoted to a junior ministry in 2010 and replaced by Professor Jumanne Maghembe, who moved from the Ministry of Education. A forester by training, Maghembe is rumoured not to have wanted the new job (Interview K, 15/10/11).

One version of this story is that it was planned that Mungai’s wildly overambitious target should be slashed by the President to show the latter’s wisdom and moderation. It appears that irrigation engineers had not been consulted, and did not find the final commitment credible (Therkildsen 2011:11), though no expert was prepared to say so publicly. The still unrealistic targets are said to be partially ‘met’ by fudging the distinction between rehabilitation of old schemes and the construction of new ones. Figures are in the text.

There is no evidence that any ‘irrigation lobby’ in the private sector was involved in the process.

See page 4. In particular, Hyden flags the state’s inability to formulate policies that reflect the human and financial resources required to implement them, and a ‘disconnect’ between policy formulators (politicians) and implementers (government officials). See Cooksey 2011a (Appendix 2) for an attempt to assess state capacity constraints on policy implementation in the post-independence period in light of pervasive patronage politics.

Therkildsen 2011:17

Therkildsen 2011:13. Between 1995 and 2010 there were seven ministers of agriculture and five PSs.

Wassira is associated with state-centric agricultural marketing policies and legislation that contradicted the official commitment to market-led agricultural development.

The donors’ refusal to endorse a presidential ‘directive’ goes against the notion of local policy ‘ownership’, one of the pillars of the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness.

ASDPr objectives are: (i) ‘to enable farmers to have better access to and use of agricultural knowledge, technologies, and infrastructure’; and (ii) ‘to promote agricultural private investment based on an improved regulatory and policy environment.’

ANSAF, a civil society group, said DADPs were ‘bureaucratic, spread resources too thinly, and excluded the poorest farmers ... as well as the civil society organisations and the private sector.’

The WB justified additional finance via the ‘Pilot Crisis Response Window’ to ‘provide supplemental resources to help the Government mitigate the impact of Global Economic Crisis on budget allocation to irrigation development sub-component of ASDP.’ (WB 2010:1).

The WB tends routinely to overestimate the instrumental capacity of state institutions at different levels.

See discussion of YARA in the text.
Tanzania was demoted from the highest to the second highest category for new Bank loans as a result of declining performance in governance and financial transparency indicators.

The often quite insightful criticisms of projects undertaken by the Bank’s Evaluations Department are routinely ignored by those responsible for project formulation.

The GoT established National and District Irrigation Development Funds (NIDF, DIDF) to implement the irrigation component of ASDP. The DIDF finances small-scale irrigation up to a value of USD 50,000 (about TShs 75 million at 2011 rates).

Schram, Mlingi and Kalinga, 2007:20. The O&OD process to access funds for a scheme involved 13 steps with a further 17 steps at the regional and national levels. Not surprisingly, project implementation in the first years of the project was extremely slow.

Therkildsen 2011:15 for all quotations in this and the following paragraph.

Therkildsen 2011:15 citing URT 2009 (emphasis in the original).

Slaa was subsequently Chadema’s presidential candidate for in the 2010 presidential elections.

Slaa 2009. According to the author, ‘there is urgent need to address extensive weaknesses in public finance management that exist at Local Government level.’

Mayunga 2009.

Chidawali 2012.

World Bank 2010: Annex 7. Meta-analysis may consider the possibility that aid agencies routinely overestimate implementation capacity at central and local levels out of necessity. It follows that donors are equally likely to assess implementation performance more leniently than the ‘facts’ justify.

Sectors that routinely fail the sustainability test include: subsidised agricultural inputs, research and extension; agricultural marketing; rural (and urban) domestic water supply; construction; electricity infrastructure; ...

URT 2010. Forty-six of the 60 reviewers were GoT officials, and most of the non-civil servants on the team (N=14) were Tanzanians working for the WB, IFAD, AfDB, FAO, ACT, JICA and Irish Aid (URT 2010, Appendix 2). Review teams visited projects selected by district authorities.

The issue is not even mentioned in the executive summary. Therkildsen 2010:16.

Given that LGAs generally decide on which projects are to be visited by review teams, the average performance of irrigation schemes is likely to be even worse than that portrayed in the reviews’ findings.

Therkildsen 2011.

Performance in extending irrigation before ASDP started was thought to be better than this, though we cannot know for sure (Respondent J, personal communication).

Therkildsen 2011:17. Similarly impressive improvements in yields are reported for beans and maize.

Historically, those who controlled the water supply for irrigation were the rulers of what Witfögel (Oriental Despotism) called ‘hydraulic’ societies. Developing irrigated agriculture is as much a political as an agro-technical issue.

The bleakest comment on ASDP comes from a seasoned researcher (respondent J) who argues that ‘ASDP is an empty shell ... or a dead duck! It is just the documents. When you spend a few days on it and visit a few sites you will discover that there is hardly anything on the ground to show for it. These things are written largely to attract funding support from donors and when the funds come they are distributed “among themselves” and the farmer gets “f...k all” as usual’ (via email, 25/07/11).

Poulton (personal communication) suggests that Kikwete may have hoped for a “first term” effect – showing by 2010 that he was delivering for agriculture as his predecessor had not.

Or TShs 85,000,000 at October 2011 exchange rates.

Allocating potential rent-earning opportunities to lower levels of the ‘system’ could be considered as forms of patronage spending at the centre (see Cooksey and Kelsall 2011 and Cooksey 2011a).


Bourgoin, Therkildsen and Geelan 2011:8. Perhaps ‘influence’ would be a more appropriate term.

This could be viewed as a basic principal-agent problem where the supervisory/sanctioning role of the principal (central government) breaks down. The centre simply does not have the resources, including information, to hold the periphery to account.

Campaigners argued inter alia that it was unconstitutional for MPS to be both overseers of government spending and recipients of discretionary funds to spend themselves. Lwinga 2009; Kiria, 2009; Mwita 2009.

Tsutura 2012.

Greeley (2008:21), ‘Clearly the DIDF resource envelope is effectively controlled from the centre.’

Therkildsen, comments on the draft report.

Apart from irrigation, ASDP has three other main components: planning, implementation and coordination, agricultural services (research, extension and mechanization), and marketing and private sector development. On extension, in 2008 the Minister of Agriculture committed the
government to a target of one extension officer per village by the year 2011 (Haule 2008). All told, ASDP plans to recruit 11,703 and 13,469 agricultural and livestock extension officers by the year 2013 (Staff Writer 2008). This is a classic supply-driven policy. In practice, extensionists and farmers do not get on very well with each other.

Lewis et al. 2008:53. Tanzania Agricultural Partnership (TAP) has tried to increase private sector involvement in ASDP by incorporating a Commodity Investment Plan (CIP) in DADPs (Thisday Reporter 2008).

Creeley 2008:2. Bilateral projects are generally implemented by consulting companies. USAID is the main example. Principal-agent problems and ‘moral hazard’ apply.

Bilateral projects are generally implemented by consulting companies. USAID is the main example. Principal-agent problems and ‘moral hazard’ apply.

Lewis et al. ibid., the final quote is from Wolter (2008).

For a more recent formulation see Planning Commission (1999:11): ‘Tanzanians have developed a propensity to prepare … plans and programmes, and ambitions which are not accompanied by effective implementation, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. As a result, implementation has been weak.’


The programme’s other sub-components, implemented directly by the agricultural ministries, involved a lot of ‘capacity building’, training and procurement. It is possible that substantial rents have accrued to politicians and officials through the management of these components.

Greeley 2008:2.

Bilateral projects are generally implemented by consulting companies. USAID is the main example. Principal-agent problems and ‘moral hazard’ apply.

See Berkman 2008 for a detailed exposé of how WB projects are corrupted in West Africa and how WB procedures are ineffective in addressing abuses. Kramer (2007) describes corruption in international aid tendering. No systematic evidence exists for WB and other projects implemented in Tanzania, though anecdotal evidence and the pervasiveness of rent-seeking in the Tanzanian state apparatus lead us to suspect that such abuse is systemic (Cooksey 2011a). See Knack (2000) for evidence that aid dependency exacerbates poor governance and corruption.


Ateba (1999:1). The same applies to other agencies.

Mosoba 2008. Emphasis added. Dr Kigoda also ‘denounced the “prohibitive bureaucracy” placed on large-scale investors keen to play a role in the sector.’

Therkildsen 2011.

In January 2012, the WB announced a $14m irrigated rice project loan to the GoT designed ‘to enable farmers to access and use agricultural knowledge, technology, marketing systems and infrastructure.’ (Ndeketela 2012). The IDA is administering Japanese funds provided under the Policy and Human Resource Development (PHRD) mechanism.

OPM et al 2005:47. MP’s were neither consulted nor ‘informed prior to the announcement in the National Assembly.’

OPM et al 2005:47. What’s more, the move ‘was not supported by any comprehensive technical analysis.’ See above for Hyden’s observation that policies tend not to be ‘evidence-based.’

It appears that MAFS attempted more than once to ‘slip in’ support for subsidies into the MKUKUTA “hoping that no one would notice” (OPM et al 2005:47).

The regions were Iringa, Rukwa, Ruvuma, Morogoro, Manyara, Kilimanjaro, Kigoma, Arusha, and Mara (Niyibitanga 2008).

URT 2010. The GoT allocated TShs 68,310,300,000 and IDA allocated TShs 64,683,871,200 to facilitate the implementation of NAVS.


Broadly, Iringa gained at the expense of the three other regions, while production in Arusha and Morogoro also increased.

Fertiliser use fell to 63,000 tonnes in 1989, the lowest level since 1973 (Skarstein 2010:116).

Binswanger-Mkhize and Gautam 2010:63, citing World Bank 2000. Fertiliser subsidies reached 80 percent of the retail price in 1988. This challenges the view that the take-up of fertiliser in the Southern Highlands constituted a ‘green revolution’ (Rasmussen 1986, cited by Skarstein 2010:117) and suggests remarkable inefficiency in fertiliser use.

Binswanger-Mkhize and Gautam 2010:60.

REPOA 2007.

Only two in five respondents claimed to have ever used natural fertiliser, which helps explain the declining soil fertility and yields noted in the literature.

The survey also shows that both poorer and less poor farmers had little contact with extension officers. Input prices and input availability constituted ‘major problems’ for 87% and 77% of poor farmers, and 82% and 64% of the least poor.

Iringa has the second highest regional income per capita in Tanzania after Dar es Salaam, followed by Ruvuma, with Mbeya ranking 6th and Rukwa 10th (National Accounts of Tanzania Mainland 2000 – 2010, p 41).

Extracted from MAFS (2011) input subsidies data base. If Morogoro is included (7.8% of all fertiliser), these five regions, Dar es Salaam’s main sources of maize, account for 56% of all fertiliser distributed nationwide.

Appendix 3 shows a range from 98 percent of the poorest to 69 percent of less poor farmers nationwide who never used chemical fertiliser (a range of 29 percentage points) compared to 77 and 27 percent respectively in Iringa (50 percentage points). Note that the poor Iringa farmers were also much more likely than poor farmers nationwide to have used chemical fertiliser (23 versus 2 percent).

Tanzanian expert opinion was against subsidies on input agro-forestry, are in some cases superior alternatives' (AGR 2004). However, few farmers use tillage/conservation farming, for example, or low input agro-forestry, are in some cases superior alternatives' (AGR 2004). However, few farmers use organic fertiliser (see Box 2 above).

In addition, unnecessary bureaucracy in MAFS increased the risks and reduced the profits of fertiliser importers.

‘Fallowing and using organic matter may become unattractive when free or subsidised fertiliser is available. Other technologies, such as minimum tillage/conservation farming, for example, or low input agro-forestry, are in some cases superior alternatives’ (AGR 2004). However, few farmers use organic fertiliser (see Box 2 above). In 2008, the WB committed to increase lending to African agriculture ‘to curb food shortages’. (Navuri 2008).

Respondent C, 25/03/11. WB projects often ignore the Banks’ own analytical work. For example, a recent IEG evaluation of WB support for agriculture and agribusiness in Africa concluded that ‘... the findings from [the Bank’s own] analytical work have not strategically informed Bank client policy dialogue and lending program design.’ (IEG 2011).

Respondent C, 25/03/11. In June 2008, President ‘Kikwete sought WB support to enable local farmers access affordable imported fertilisers...’ (Tarimo 2008).

When fertiliser is sold commercially, the majority of farmers not buying it claim price to be the impediment. In Iringa in 2002/03, 81% of farmers not using chemical fertiliser cited price as the reason. This accounted for half of all crop-growing households in the region (URT 2007:201, 207).

Ministry of Agriculture, NAIVS voucher data (excel file 01 10).

We may assume that the 40,000 difference between the two figures represents better-off farmers.

The current voucher scheme was introduced in 2008, replacing the original scheme of 2003, which was turned into a rent-seeking exercise.

MAFC 2010 (translation by Virdiana Mushema). The 11 member committee has a representative from farmers groups, agents, companies (?) and the NMB, which manages the scheme’s finances.

The fact that the input distributors were hand-picked by the MAFS suggests collusion ab initio.

This is a polite way of saying ‘very poor’, and would be considered outright failure in the real world.

URT 2010:35.

URT 2010:36.

URT 2010:30 (Emphasis withheld).

CAG 2010:7. ‘Unqualified’ means that formal procurement procedures and Credit Agreement financial regulations and provisions were followed. However, site visits were undertaken to selected districts ‘to assess physical progress and achievement (sic) of the Project.’ The CAG adds the caveat that: ‘As an auditor, I am not required to specifically search for fraud; therefore my audit cannot be relied upon to disclose all such matters’ (CAG 2010:4). See text below for CAG queries on AFSP spending.

One senior official employed a Kiswahili saying to describe rent-seeking practices related to the input subsidies: ‘mbuzi anakula urefu ya mkanda yake’ (‘the goat eats according to the length of its tether’) (Interview C), suggesting that higher-level looting is a major problem.

Respondent C, 25/03/11.

Sanchawa 2008.

Civil society plays a very minor role in agricultural policy making and advocacy, though an umbrella organisation for non-state actors has been established. By contrast, there have been substantial civil society contributions to education and health policy, expenditure monitoring, budget analysis, and informed critical commentary.

Anon 2011.

CAG report for 2008/08 cited by agricultural economist Damian Gabagambi (Joseph 2009).

Siyame 2010.
164 Daily News Reporter 2011. PCCB were investigating accusations of ‘gross mismanagement’ in the input voucher scheme in Rufiji.
165 Kimaryo 2011. The quote continues: “The feeling among many villagers is that … something fishy is going on.”
166 Letter to the editor, Thisday, 4 September 2011.
167 AgCLIR Tanzania 2010.
168 In other cases two farmers club together to redeem a voucher. Vouchers are provided for seeds, fertiliser for planting and for supporting growth. It appears that the minimum 50 kg bag of fertiliser is sometimes sold in smaller units.
169 Fundisha 2009.
171 Pan and Christiaensen (2011:i).
172 Stein 2011. Wealth rankings were based on imputed income. Manyara received 62,400 maize vouchers in 2009, or 4.3% of the national total (MAFS input database 2011).
173 Mgussi 2011. The forgers ‘should be taken to task.’
174 Tanzania Corruption Tracker 2011:1. Mr Cheyo is quoted as saying: “In the eyes of the committee, we see power tiller as nothing more than a project for benefitting district commissioners, divisional secretaries and village executives rather than poor, small scale farmers.”
175 CAG 2009. This report also claims that ‘The Ministry overpaid Shs. 257,416,122 to M/s Smith & Ouzman Ltd of UK for printing 2,350,000 input vouchers at a contract sum of UK £308,555 which is equivalent to Shs.674,192,675.’
176 URT (2010:30).
177 Cooksey and Kelsall (2011) highlight the inability of the executive to control lower-level looting and elite capture by state officials in an administrative system lacking a central coordination mechanism for key rent transfers.
178 At the time, the voucher scheme was still quite small.
179 The question was open-ended and post-coded.
180 At the time of the survey the subsidy was quite modest.
181 The second round of Views of the People (2012) will examine this issue.
182 As recently as 2007, over two in five Tanzanians (41%) preferred a one-party (ie CCM-run) polity, marginally less than those who were glad the country had adopted a multi-party system (45%). Rural opinions were almost identical to the national average (REPOA 2007).
183 Barasa 2008.
184 It is worth remembering that the other components of ASDP bring considerable financial resources to the five agriculture ministries, some of which may be consumed in clientelism and patronage spending.
186 See the discussion around Table 4.
187 Personal communication, respondent D. TFC is apparently not paying the plant, forcing its closure. This is yet to be corroborated.
188 It has always been thus: the WB helped bankroll the ujamaa policies that caused the Tanzanian economy to implode in the 1970s and 1980s.
189 An efficient state bureaucracy is more likely to deliver the benefits of subsidies than an inefficient one. Even then, input subsidies are arguably a poor policy choice except as a short-term measure.
190 Williams 1987: 639.
191 The relative success stories (sugar, tea, cotton) involve outgrower and contract schemes based on private factories/ginneries.
192 The authors argue that MPs may well support policies inimical to their constituents’ interests and that it may be in MPs’ interests to keep their voters poor and uninformed. Lacking the necessary tools to analyse policy options, voters are more concerned that their MPs represent their interests at the political centre. Cited by Poulton (2011:20).
193 Asked whether they thought foreign aid mostly benefited state officials or the poor majority, 81% of the respondents in the 2007 Views of the People survey who offered an opinion chose the first option (REPOA 2007).
194 Cooksey and Kelsall (2011) and Cooksey (2011b) cite ideology as an important source of disaccord between the state and private, especially foreign, business interests. We do not have space to discuss the role of ideology in this paper.
195 Many of the incumbents of state power also have private companies: internally, it is (traditionally ‘Asian’) merchant capital that they oppose, not the capitalist mode of production per se.
196 The Tanzania Warehouse Act was passed in June 2005. Billed as a means of setting farmers free from middlemen, the GoT plans to extend the system to cover the entire country. The WRS is the brainchild of the Common Fund for Commodities (CFC) (Navuri 2008). In theory an excellent idea, the WRS will succeed or fail on the quality of its organisation and management.
197 Traders come to buy Tanzanian cashew during a specific period, when the current harvest must be sold.
198 This is not the only scenario. During the 2011-12 buying season, the cashew board (CBT) set a price for cashew that traders were unwilling to pay, leaving many thousands of tones of unsold cashew in the cooperatives’ warehouses. Farmers were
unlikely to receive their ‘second payments’ for cashew delivered to the warehouse.

In the event that cooperative loans turn bad, they are paid out of taxes. This happens quite frequently.

Promoted by IFAD, the WRS was not designed as an anti-private trader initiative, though it was intended as a means of increasing farm-gate prices. In March 2012, President Kikwete expressed his support for the WRS. According to Rugonzibwa 2012: ‘The Warehouse receipt system is here to stay and the government will protect it against any attempt to sabotage or kill it.’

Space prevents a full treatment, but the relative revival of agricultural cooperatives in recent years, energetically promoted by former minister responsible for Cooperative Development George Kahama, has not served the interests of farmers in general, though the better-off are more enthusiastic about cooperative marketing than poorer farmers. Cooperatives have benefited from the spread of the WRS.

Email observation, respondent D, 26/03/11.


Wolter 2008. The largest single item is USD 280 million for infrastructure (14 donors). The actual number of projects is likely to be higher since NGOs and non-DAC donors such as China or the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) are not included in the total. Donors such as USAID operate mainly outside GoT structures.


Respondent A.

DFID 2011. The ‘top 5’ IDA claims were: immunised 310 million children; provided 113 million people with an improved water source; provided basic health, nutrition and population services to 47 million people; improved the quality of teaching and facilities for 105 million children; given 26 million people access to an all-season road. Note also there is only one achievement with direct relevance for market development.

The ‘allowances culture’ that has developed in aid dependent countries owes its existence in no small part to the training and capacity building activities favoured by donor projects (Cooksey 2010).

Respondent D, email 25/03/11.

Malawi and Mozambique were 132nd and 135th respectively, Kenya 95th, and Botswana 45th. World Bank 2009, www.doingbusiness.org.


‘The government has decided to intervene by buying crops directly from farmers, because liberalization in the sector (free market) has failed.’ (Mwakalebela 2009).

Di John and Putzel 2008. The term ‘elite bargain’ is also used in the literature.

The exception to this rule is Zanzibar, though a recent classic elite bargain may have introduced a new era of relative ‘peace and tranquillity’. See Cooksey and Kelsall (2011) for a summary.

Legal and Human Rights Centre and TACCEO 2010:143.

NEC 2011: xxiii. We do not have urban-rural disaggregations.

See Cooksey 2011a and Cooksey and Kelsall 2011 for the rise of Tanzanian money politics.

It is worth noting that at the lower levels of electoral representation, CCM hegemony is almost total, though there was a slight tailing off in 2010 (Table 3).

‘On balance’ implies that the positive achievements of aid agencies (and INGOs and local CSOs) in addressing local constraints on household income and welfare are outweighed by the moral hazard effects. For example, virtually all the new agriculture-relevant ministry headquarters and departments in Dar es Salaam have been financed by WB loans. A market-led aid regime would ask first what useful functions (if any) central ministries serve for the public good. (See Future Agricultures 2007 on the advantages of limited direct state involvement in solving market failures). Large foreign investments in agriculture might have the welcome effect of reducing the central importance of the MAFS in the overall institutional architecture governing the sector.

Hoeffler 2011:42. Therkildsen (2011) names some of these interests.

Daily News reporter 2008. Regional export bans were lifted in advance of the 2010 elections.


Therkildsen 2011:22-23.

Other relevant private actors include the Agricultural Council of Tanzania (ACT), formerly the Tanzania Chamber of Agriculture and Livestock, which brings together a range of agricultural stakeholders. ACT’s executive director is a former Director of Planning in MAFC. ACT and Agriculture Non-State Actors Forum (ANSAF) work with GoT through the Tanzania Agricultural Partnership (TAP). (ANSAF (ansaf.tanzania@gmail.com) is an umbrella of international and local civil society organisations, focusing in particular on marginal and smallholder farmers). Defined as a Public-Private Partnership, TAP is also a member of SAGCOT, the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (see text).
The issue is not that state intervention is ‘wrong’ a priori, but that it is likely to be vitiated by inefficiency and patronage in practice.

Promoting export horticulture requires a pro-active state, but one playing a coordination and facilitating rather than a directive role. See Cooksey 2011b.

See Policy Forum 2011; Chirimi 2011.

Chirimi 2011.

DFID 2009. Setting budget commitment targets for agriculture ignores the obvious point that giving additional monies to inefficient and unaccountable bureaucracies is unlikely to have much impact on front-line services.

Known as the Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund. See: www.dfid.gov.uk/Working-with-DFID/Funding.

Interview E, 07/02/11. President Kikwete led an official delegation to Norway in 2005.

SAGCOT 2010; Daily News Reporter 2011. SAGCOT is an activity under Kilimo Kwanza. Chaired by Salum Shamtie of the TNBC, its new board of directors (October 2011) consists of five Tanzanians and ‘two members from the World Bank’(?). The WB was not one of SAGCOT’s original signatories, and its muscling in on the scene (with money for projects) may or may not, according to respondent A, spell the kiss of death for the initiative.

DFID 2008. YARA have already received loans from the Norwegian Development Fund (Norfund) and is implementing projects in various African countries.

DFID 2008. YARA also stresses the importance of port efficiency in promoting agricultural imports and exports.

Leases for hundreds of thousands of acres of land—which no single company could hope to put to productive use—have already been signed. Redfern (2010) reviews the pros and cons of biofuel investments.

YARA’s wresting of significant market share for established commercial fertiliser imports from existing importers is an interesting development in this respect.

Given the controversial nature of global agribusiness, it is difficult not to sympathise with a policy favouring firm regulation of the trade and investment regimes to prevent the worst case scenarios happening. Such regulation, of course, is also vulnerable to the forces of patronage we have been discussing in this report.

We are increasingly uncomfortable with ‘policy formulation and implementation’ as privileged objects of study. A more satisfactory formulation would start from the totality of effects on ‘agriculture’, including state, commercial and non-state actors. Policies and their implementation would constitute sub-sets of these effects.

Did respondent use more/less/same amount of chemical fertiliser last year (2006) compared to the year before?


The WB rates countries on their capacity to absorb loans effectively. Until recently, Tanzania was in the top category, justifying new loans worth up to USD 400 million p.a. The rating has since declined.

Informant B, Email 25/03/11.

Minot and Benson (2009) provide a reasoned critique of input subsidies that is compatible with a ‘pro-market’ position.

A recent World Bank review found that little of the political analysis undertaken by its own and other agencies’ researchers has been operationalised in projects (‘Use of political economy analysis in projects’).


Chabal and Daloz 1999.


Redfern 2003.

Mr Mramba was sacked by President Kikwete for his alleged involvement in a large scam, see Cooksey 2011b.

References

Agricultural Council of Tanzania and Tanzanian Agricultural Partnership 2010. ‘Value Chain Analysis of Rice and Maize in Selected Districts in Tanzania’, Synopsis, November

Agriculture Development Partners Group 2004. ‘Terms of Reference for Agriculture Development Partners Group (A-DPG)’, June


Booth, David 2011. ‘Working with the grain and swimming against the tide: Barriers to uptake of research findings on governance and public services in low-income Africa,’ paper for presentation to the panel ‘The politics and governance of public services in developing countries,’ XV IRSPM Conference, Dublin 11-13 April 2011

Bourgouin, France, Ole Therkildsen with Torsten Geelan 2011. ‘The slowly changing structure of Tanzania’s ruling coalition,’ EPP workshop, Dar es Salaam, January

Chabal, Patrick and Jean-Pascal Daloz 1999. Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument, Oxford: James Currey


Chidawali, Habel 2012. ‘You are letting us down, Maghembe tells experts,’ Citizen, Dar es Salaam, 14 March

Chirimi, Makuna 2011. ‘US $40m tractors still gathering dust and rust,’ Guardian, Dar es Salaam, 8 February


Cooksey, Brian 2009. ‘Kilimo Kwanza’, powerpoint presentation to DPs, World Bank, Dar es Salaam, November

Cooksey, Brian 2010. ‘Allowances in sub-Saharan Africa,’ pre-study for NORAD Oslo, April

Cooksey, Brian 2011a. ‘The political economy of agricultural policy in Africa: Tanzania case study,’ Dar es Salaam, PEAPA, mimeo., January


Cooksey, Brian 2011c. ‘The investment and business environment for gold exploration and mining in Tanzania,’ APPP Background Paper 03, June

Cooksey, Brian 2011d. ‘The political economy of export horticulture in Northern Tanzania,’ APPP Background Paper 02, London, June


Cooksey, Brian and Idris Kikula, 2005. ‘When bottom-up meets top-down: the limits of local participation in district planning in Tanzania,’ REPOA Special Research Paper no. 16, Dar es Salaam


Economic and Social Research Foundation 2011. Agriculture Sector review and public expenditure Review 2010/11, Dar es Salaam, November

Ellis, Frank and Ndungu Mdoe 2002. Livelihoods and Rural Poverty Reduction in Tanzania, LADDER Working Paper No. 18, University of East Anglia, February

Erickson, Morten 2011. Article on Minister of development
Solheim, Aftenposten, Oslo, 8 November

Fundisha, Pendo 2009. ‘DC lashes out at corrupt fertiliser agents’, Guardian, Dar es Salaam, 23 September


Ibadi, Mwanja 2012. ‘Green gram traders “exploit farmers”’, Citizen, Dar es Salaam, 22 March


Kamndaya Samuel 2011. ‘Tanzania to get Sh4tr World Bank grants and loans’, Citizen, Dar es Salaam, 9 February


Kimayo, Janeth 2011. ‘Leader on the spot over allocations of farming inputs’, Citizen, Dar es Salaam, 1 September

Kiria, Irenei 2009. ‘Constituency fund an avenue for corruption’, Citizen, Dar es Salaam, 8 July


Letter to the Editor 2011. ‘Misuse of agriculture input subsidy vouchers retrogressive’, Thisday, Dar es Salaam, 5 September


Lwambuka, Ladislaus and Betty Massanja 2004. ASDP Task Force Retreat Workshop, Agricultural Sector Development Programme, Paradise Hotel, Bagamoyo, May


Mamdani, Mahmood 1996. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism, Princeton

Mayunga, Anthony 2009. ‘Faulty pumps derail Bunda irrigation scheme’, Citizen, Dar es Salaam, 8 December

Mgussi, Israel 2011. ‘JK warns officials over abuse of office’, Citizen, Dar es Salaam, 3 August


Minot, Nicholas and Todd Benson 2009. ‘Fertiliser Subsidies in Africa: Are Vouchers the Answer?’ IFPRI Issue Brief 60, July

Mosoba, Tom 2008. ‘Scrap taxes on farmers to boost agriculture, urge MPs’, Citizen, Dar es Salaam, 17 June


Mwita, Damas 2009. ‘4,000 sign anti-Constituency Development Fund Bill petition’, Thisday, Dar es Salaam, 17 July


Navuri, Angel 2008a. ‘New produce market set to free farmers from middlemen’, Guardian, Dar es Salaam, 9 May

Navuri, Angel 2008b. ‘Middlemen hijack subsidised fertiliser project’, Guardian, Dar es Salaam, 5 August

Ndaketela, Dorothy 2012. ‘Tanzania to spend $14m to boost rice production through irrigation’, East African, Nairobi, 30 January

Niyibitanga, Concilia 2008. ‘Tanzania gives subsidised seeds and fertilisers to farmers’, Thisday, Dar es Salaam, 1 November

Oxford Policy Management, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Research on Poverty Alleviation 2005. ‘Understanding patterns of accountability in Tanzania, Component 3: Analysis of values, incentives and power relations in the budget allocation process’, August


Redfern, Paul 2003. ‘UK Debates Future of Aid to Third World Countries’, the East African, Nairobi, 10 February

Redfern, Paul 2010. ‘Biofuels and the scramble for farmland in Africa’, East African, Nairobi, 6 September


Sanchawa, Haruni 2008. ‘Govt keen to ensure subsidised fertilisers reach farmers’, Guardian, Dar es Salaam, 7 April

Schram, Rommert, Betty Mlingi, Gabriel M. Kalinga 2007. ‘Diagnostic Study on Capacity Building for the Implementation of the ASDP (Irrigation Component)’, April

Simbeye, Finnigan 2008. ‘Agriculture NSA Forum fault district farm development plans’, Thisday, Dar es Salaam, 3 November

Slaa, Willibrod 2009. ‘Effective Use of Field Visits’, paper presented to the 4th Annual Conference of Eastern African Association of Public Accounts Committees (EAAPAC), Blue Pearl Hotel, Ubungo Plaza, Dar es Salaam, 5th-10th May

Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania 2011. ‘Investment Blueprint’, January

Staff Writer 2008. ‘Green revolution effective ladder to prosperity’, Daily News, Dar es Salaam, 12 August
Stein, Howard 2011. ‘Transformation of Property Rights and Poverty in Rural Tanzania,’ Seminar held at REPOA, 21 October

Tanzania Corruption Tracker System 2011. ‘Agriculture ministry embroiled in corruption; Dar es Salaam, April

Tarimo, Judica 2008. ‘Govt: Objective is to set aside 10pc for budget to agriculture.’ Guardian, Dar es Salaam, 19 June

The Economist 2002. ‘Aid effectiveness; Help in the right places,’ London, 16 March


Therkildsen, Ole 2011. ‘Pushing for agricultural transformation. Irrigated rice in Tanzania,’ draft, January

Thisday Reporter 2008. ‘Farmer’s know-how poor, study, shows, Thisday, Dar es Salaam, 7 November


Twaweza 2011. ‘Do people prefer active MPs? MP performance in 2010 CCM primaries,’ Dar es Salaam


United Republic of Tanzania 2006b. ‘Agricultural Sector Development Programme, Support through Basket Fund,’ Dar es Salaam, May


United Republic of Tanzania 2010a. ‘Waraka wa Mkakati wa Utekelezaji wa Kutumia Vocha kutoa Ruzuzu ya Pembejeo za Kilimo kwa Mwaka 2010/11,’ Wizara ya Kilimo, Chakula na Ushirika, Dar es Salaam, 6 October

The United Republic of Tanzania 2010b. ‘Aide Memoire, Accelerated Food Security Project’ (Credit 4619-TA), Mid-Term Review, November 22-December 3


Whitfield, Lindsay and Ole Therkildsen. 2011. ‘What drives states to support the development of productive sectors? Strategies ruling elites pursue for political survival and their policy implications.’ Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies

World Bank 1998, Tanzania, Agriculture and the World Bank, Operations Evaluation Department, Washington, June


World Bank 2010a. ‘Project Paper on a proposed credit of SDR 23.1 million (US$ 35 million equivalent) in pilot crisis response window resources to the URT for the second additional financing for the Agricultural Sector Development Project’ (ASDP), Washington, May 7


### Appendix 1: Potential irrigation areas per region and DADP disbursements 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Existing area under irrigation (ha)</th>
<th>Total potential area</th>
<th>Potential area for development (ha)</th>
<th>DADP disbursement 2007</th>
<th>DADP rank</th>
<th>Region rank minus DADP rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Morogoro</td>
<td>25,144</td>
<td>176,732</td>
<td>151,588</td>
<td>3,566,772,531</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Kilimanjaro</td>
<td>45,638</td>
<td>117,933</td>
<td>72,295</td>
<td>1,192,845,139</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Coast</td>
<td>1,133</td>
<td>58,755</td>
<td>57,622</td>
<td>5,581,021,640</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Arusha</td>
<td>49,947</td>
<td>100,007</td>
<td>50,060</td>
<td>1,753,494,038</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Manyara</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,837,692,680</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Mbeya</td>
<td>35,239</td>
<td>79,257</td>
<td>44,018</td>
<td>1,353,278,531</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Rukwa</td>
<td>5,236</td>
<td>47,672</td>
<td>42,436</td>
<td>3,176,443,760</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Dodoma</td>
<td>3,608</td>
<td>43,689</td>
<td>40,081</td>
<td>7,380,463,532</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>+7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Tabora</td>
<td>2,591</td>
<td>34,880</td>
<td>32,289</td>
<td>1,630,687,658</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Mwanza</td>
<td>1,108</td>
<td>24,886</td>
<td>23,778</td>
<td>1,618,512,467</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Kigoma</td>
<td>3,420</td>
<td>22,530</td>
<td>19,110</td>
<td>1,010,691,355</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Iringa</td>
<td>5,539</td>
<td>23,335</td>
<td>17,796</td>
<td>2,446,865,137</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Kagera</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17,166</td>
<td>17,151</td>
<td>1,234,626,591</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Mara</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>17,476</td>
<td>17,135</td>
<td>1,373,442,314</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Shinyanga</td>
<td>1,650</td>
<td>18,670</td>
<td>17,020</td>
<td>1,381,229,711</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Mtwara</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>15,321</td>
<td>14,591</td>
<td>3,978,247,896</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>+12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Tanga</td>
<td>8,626</td>
<td>21,411</td>
<td>12,785</td>
<td>3,173,102,658</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>+10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Singida</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>11,840</td>
<td>11,315</td>
<td>1,967,572,521</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>+8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Lindi</td>
<td>1,231</td>
<td>9,358</td>
<td>8,127</td>
<td>2,957,684,423</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>+11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Ruvuma</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>7,850</td>
<td>7,652</td>
<td>6,846,696,431</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>+18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Dar</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5,525</td>
<td>5,521</td>
<td>723,012,264</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>191,923</strong></td>
<td><strong>854,293</strong></td>
<td><strong>662,370</strong></td>
<td><strong>56,184,383,277</strong></td>
<td>+/- 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Schram, Rommert, Betty Mlingi, Gabriel M. Kalinga 2007. ‘Diagnostic Study on Capacity Building for the Implementation of the ASDP (Irrigation Component)’, April, citing NIMP 2002
### Appendix 2: Use of chemical fertiliser in 2006

| Region       | Frequency of Use | Income Group |  |
|--------------|------------------|--------------|
|              | N=               | Poorest (%)  | Middle (%) | Least Poor (%) | All (%) |
| Arusha       | 194              | 0            | 2          | 12            | 5       |
|              | More             | 3            | 7          | 15            | 8       |
|              | About the same   | 0            | 5          | 7             | 4       |
|              | Never Used       | 97           | 86         | 66            | 83      |
| Tanga        | 362              | 0            | 0          | 3             | 1       |
|              | More             | 0            | 1          | 4             | 1       |
|              | About the same   | 0            | 1          | 4             | 1       |
|              | Never Used       | 100          | 98         | 89            | 96      |
| Dar es Salaam| 45               | 0            | 0          | 12            | 9       |
|              | More             | 0            | 12         | 3             | 4       |
|              | About the same   | 0            | 0          | 0             | 0       |
|              | Never Used       | 100          | 88         | 84            | 87      |
| Lindi        | 190              | 0            | 1          | 3             | 1       |
|              | More             | 0            | 3          | 0             | 1       |
|              | About the same   | 0            | 0          | 0             | 0       |
|              | Never Used       | 100          | 96         | 97            | 98      |
| Mtwara       | 307              | 0            | 1          | 0             | 0       |
|              | More             | 0            | 4          | 8             | 3       |
|              | About the same   | 0            | 2          | 15            | 3       |
|              | Never Used       | 100          | 93         | 77            | 93      |
| Iringa       | 382              | 0            | 6          | 21            | 15      |
|              | More             | 4            | 14         | 23            | 19      |
|              | About the same   | 19           | 34         | 29            | 29      |
|              | Never Used       | 77           | 45         | 27            | 37      |
| Singida      | 282              | 0            | 0          | 2             | 0       |
|              | More             | 1            | 1          | 0             | 1       |
|              | About the same   | 0            | 2          | 2             | 1       |
|              | Never Used       | 99           | 96         | 96            | 98      |
| Rukwa        | 301              | 0            | 0          | 8             | 3       |
|              | More             | 2            | 1          | 5             | 3       |
|              | About the same   | 2            | 5          | 8             | 6       |
|              | Never Used       | 96           | 94         | 79            | 88      |
| Shinyanga    | 458              | 1            | 2          | 0             | 1       |
|              | More             | 1            | 2          | 7             | 3       |
|              | About the same   | 2            | 1          | 2             | 1       |
|              | Never Used       | 96           | 95         | 91            | 95      |
| Mwanza       | 316              | 0            | 1          | 2             | 1       |
|              | More             | 0            | 3          | 1             | 2       |
|              | About the same   | 0            | 4          | 9             | 5       |
|              | Never Used       | 100          | 91         | 88            | 92      |
| All          | N=2,837           | 98           | 90         | 69            | 86      |

Source: REPOA 2007
Appendix 3: Allocation of subsidised fertiliser vouchers, Iringa 2008/09

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>Agricultural Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iringa (Rural)</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>52,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Njombe (Rural)</td>
<td>27,800</td>
<td>51,000</td>
<td>78,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Njombe (Urban)</td>
<td>26,800</td>
<td>51,000</td>
<td>78,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mufindi</td>
<td>25,800</td>
<td>49,660</td>
<td>56,766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilolo</td>
<td>21,700</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>39,549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ludewa</td>
<td>7,700</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>24,527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makete</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>25,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iringa (Urban)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2,140</td>
<td>1,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>136,000</td>
<td>282,800</td>
<td>278,717</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MAFS input data-base 2011

Appendix 4: Aid to Tanzanian agriculture in historical perspective

In 1980, observers noted the rapid growth of external aid to Tanzanian agriculture:

"Since 1974 a positive blizzard of programmes (by crop, input and region) has emerged and presumably has had some positive effect on output. … The … build-up of new programmes … in some cases appears to have suffered from lack of coherence, priority setting and internal contradictions."\(^{242}\)

Since Tanzania’s independence 50 years ago, WB agricultural projects have systematically failed to achieve their objectives. Pre-adjustment WB lending to Tanzania contributed to the failure of ujamaa and the external debt that ensued. A WB study of aid effectiveness in Tanzania:

"concluded that between 1967 and 1987 donors provided US$15bn of support to what the Bank called a “poorly thought out socialist experiment”, even noting that senior World Bank officials indulged the Tanzanian government without seeking to explain what was realistic and feasible in terms of economic development."\(^{243}\)

There is still a widespread view that poor countries’ development problems are in large part the result of the (forced?) implementation of (implicitly or explicitly ‘wrong’) IFI policy prescriptions. For example, Stein (2008) sees structural adjustment as based on a melange of neoclassical and new institutional economics theories, with the latter interpreted to support a market-led, minimum state role development strategy.\(^{244}\) The assumption here is that the implementation of these policies has helped to create and/or perpetuate the problems they are attempting to solve. The evidence of this research suggests that the WB’s guiding theoretical position since the 1980s has had little practical relevance for agricultural projects on the ground. One would not guess, for example, that the WB favours a market-led development strategy from the nature of its support to ASDP and NAIVS, in which the private sector is accorded a dependent and secondary role. Though private contractors presumably do well out of irrigation construction work and stockists/retailers out of input distribution, and NMB out of managing voucher finances, private sector interests did not obviously influence the development of these projects.

This analysis is consistent with the view that policy, institutional and capacity constraints on project implementation are regularly overlooked in the interest of getting new projects off the ground and meeting disbursement targets.\(^{245}\) One colleague made the following observation: ‘...the projects you are reviewing … often carry so [many] unrealistic assumptions and the need to burn donor money overrules prudence.’\(^{246}\)

Challenging the formal neo-liberalism of structural adjustment are concerns with poverty reduction and food security, which suggest support for both public goods (research, extension) and private goods (input vouchers) provision by the state, with little or no concern for private sector involvement. But at the same time, the WB and others have criticised input voucher schemes on both theoretical and practical grounds, so one could legitimately challenge WB support for just such a scheme, given that there are numerous alternatives.\(^{247}\) Non-policy factors come into play at all stages of the project cycle.

Stein also points to the compatibility of a neo-liberal position and ‘good governance’, including corruption control, as key strands guiding WB lending. Yet ‘good governance’ has little substantive application when it is defined as a separate ‘sector’, with its own projects, rather than being mainstreamed in all sectors.\(^{248}\) What would an analysis of agricultural ministries’ and allied agencies’ governance practices reveal? We do not know, since no such analysis has ever been attempted. Do governance...
shortcomings help explain the apparent inability of the state to deliver public goods in general and in agriculture in particular?

At the local level, the quality of governance will influence how policies are implemented (or not) implying that even well formulated and adequately funded policies may be undermined. Writing before MKUKUTA and ASDP, Ellis and Mdoe (2002) noted that:

‘The PRS [Poverty Reduction Strategy] needs to identify, evaluate, and seek to diminish those factors in the institutional and fiscal environment at local levels that are discouraging and inimical to trade, investment, risk-taking and enterprise.’

These authors also highlight: ‘the risk that decentralisation will lead to an escalation of predatory behaviour on the part of local councils rather than more accountable government and better service provision.’

Silence on institutional governance issues on both sides of the aid equation suggests the presence of a powerful implicit alliance to defend a lending-borrowing status quo that could otherwise constitute an issue of major public concern. Similar logic could help explain the continuation of Tanzania’s triple A status as a borrower long after evidence of ruinous political corruption and rent-seeking had emerged to shatter the ‘good governance’ reputation that the country was beginning to enjoy. This is not an exclusively WB problem, of course. In the absence of ‘counter-hegemonic’ forces, donors and recipients like GoT will continue to conspire in the production of projects destined more often than not to fail.

Finally, general problems of aid dependency and effectiveness are also relevant for our agricultural theme. In a nutshell, aid routinely undermines the state institutions it is supposed to ‘strengthen’ while providing substantial resources that are diverted into local patronage networks.

Chabal and Daloz (1999) argue that the misuse of foreign aid in the pursuit of political objectives is one of the major features of ‘aid dependency’. The Economist (2002) quotes the WB’s estimate that: ‘there are 28 countries that are home to 500m people, mostly in sub-Saharan Africa, where aid is unlikely to work.’ Cooksey (2011e) claims that the diversification of aid sources and increased volumes of aid transfers since the turn of the century have heightened competition between agencies for market share and reduced the chances that aid can be effectively coordinated. At the same time, aid dependency has weakened governance in a number of ways that are relevant to our overall theme. For example, Knack claims that:

‘Aid dependence can undermine institutional quality by weakening accountability, encouraging rent seeking and corruption, fomenting conflict over control of aid funds, siphoning off scarce talent from the bureaucracy, and alleviating pressures to reform inefficient policies and institutions.’

... ‘analyses of cross-country data provide evidence that higher aid levels erode the quality of governance, as measured by indexes of bureaucratic quality, corruption, and the rule of law...’

Kramer argues that the extent of corrupt practices in international aid projects is:

‘too often underestimated’... contractors and honest project officials ... complain (privately of course) about the pervasive, systemic corruption and the naiveté of aid organizations that seem unable or unwilling to recognize the problem.

Although the WB audits its projects thoroughly, many are not convinced that this helps prevent fraud and corruption. Financial audits do not look at value for money (see text, Box 2). More important, most project audits take place at ministerial level, ignoring what happens once money is transferred to lower levels, as with small-scale irrigation and input subsidies discussed above. We suspect that clientelism and inefficiency are the norm, not the exception.

In February 2003, British overseas development secretary Clare Short:

‘criticised the failure of billions of dollars of development assistance to alleviate poverty in Tanzania. [She] criticised the money she believed had been wasted through the European Union’s aid budget in recent years, complaining that huge sums had been lost to corruption’

On the same occasion, Tanzania’s Minister of Finance Basil Mramba confided:

‘I’ve seen a lot of aid money. But I’ve not seen development with that aid. In the past five years, I’ve seen investment in Tanzania. And now I see change. Aid has not got us anywhere; aid should never be more than the icing on the cake.’